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iABSTRACT
Technology is important to the process of developnent and is as 
essential an aspect of the process of investment as the 
accumulation of financial resources. LDCs typically obtain this 
technology from advanced countries rather than by creating it 
themselves. This thesis examines both the short and long term 
effects of imports of industrial technology on LDCs* economies, 
the impact of state intervention on the demand and supply of
technology in these countries, and the effects of local
conditions on the process of assimilation (ie. absorption and
diffusion) of imported technologies. These problems are
discussed in the light of Algeria's industrialization experience 
in general, and cement and flour-milling development in 
particular.
The thesis has four major conclusions. These are that:
The straightforward application of the concept of comparative 
advantage to the transfers of technology to LDCs is simplistic 
and inadequate for two reasons. The first is that it leaves out 
the fact that there are important external economies of leaming- 
by-doing in the technological field. This means that if market 
forces are left alone to determine the extent to which foreign 
technologies and skills are used, there will be less accumulation 
of technological experience than is socially desirable. Second, 
on top of this inherent characteristic of the market, there is 
the question of ’technology monopoly’ which tends strongly to
ii
influence the way the market operates and makes it difficult for 
locals to even get involved in the leaming-by-doing process. 
Both of these, in addition to the direct costs of technology 
imports, are arguments for direct state intervention to 
restructure the demand for, and supply of, technology. However, 
emperical evidence available so far shows that the explicit 
technology policies adopted by many LDCs have been often ill- 
conceived, inconsistent with each other and with the implicit 
technology policies contained in the overall strategy (see 
below), and not properly implemented.
The overall industrial strategy of the country strongly 
influences the kind of and terms of technology imports and local 
technological development. The characteristics of the economic 
system and of many government policies contain an array of 
implicit technology policies which are often more important than 
the explicit ones, and which frequently work against the 
objectives of local technological development.
- The accumulation of technological capacity is not accomplished 
through costless, automatic leaming-by-doing, or simply by 
acquiring ready-made skills. Evidence shows that absorption and 
diffusion of imported technologies require conscious effort on 
the part of the recipient firm or country to develop a 
technological strategy, to invest in resources for technological 
change, and progressively to accumulate technological capability. 
Unless carried out with the explicit objective of learning,
iii
technological transfers do not necessarily provide the experience 
which is critical to the development of an indigenous 
technological capacity. Emperical evidence shows, for example, 
that turnkey contracts did not provide mastery by the recipient 
in any of the tasks involved in project execution and that they 
might fail even to transfer an adequate understanding of 
operational technology.
- Firms1 attitude towards selection, absorption and diffusion of 
foreign technologies under very similar macro-economic conditions 
differ substantially. Emperical evidence shows that state owned 
firms which are run according to a common set of regulations act 
quite differently from each other in the way they select, absorb 
and diffused imported technologies.
iv
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Conventional wisdom in the past has had it that "capital is the 
engine of growth". There has, however, been a growing 
recognition of the pervasive role of technology in the process. 
Thus even if the productive system of a country could generate a 
surplus on which to base a viable economic growth it would be 
necessary to count on the capacity to transform it into 
reproducible capital goods with the appropriate technical and 
economic characteristics. In turn, this capacity is determined 
by the scientific and technological level of the country, by the 
existence of the capital goods sector, and by the effective 
combination of the two. Without this capacity, the accumulated 
surplus must be used to import technology in both embodied and 
disembodied form. Most LDCs lack this capacity and consequently 
rely heavily on technologies developed in the industrialized 
countries. This heavy reliance often results in two major 
problems. The first is a short-run one: it is the problem of 
international income distribution effects which are likely to 
reduce the surplus available for reinvestment and so curtail the 
ability of the economy importing the technology to be self- 
generating. The second is a long-run problem: it is about the 
methods used to import technology which may limit the opportunity 
for the locals to develop their skills. Thus if technologies are 
transferred in a way that substitute for local skills and so 
effectively inhibit their development, the chances of both coming 
to terms with the first problem (discussed above) and effectively
xi
absorbing and diffusing imported technologies, will be reduced. 
In this sense, the latter problem has a certain priority over the 
former. This thesis is mainly about the second problem which is 
discussed in great detail in the light of Algeria's experience in 
cement and flour-milling industries. However, both problems are 
considered in Chapter One, where the technology market, the 
transfer of technology and the various policies devised by many 
LDCs to regulate technology imports and to promote local 
technological capacities, as well as the unique role of the 
capital goods sector in the generation and diffusion of 
technology, are examined.
Since technology issues are often strongly influenced by the 
overall industrial strategy because the latter usually contain an 
array of implicit technology policies, Chapter Two is devoted to 
the examination of the basic-industry strategy followed by 
Algeria in the 1970’s. The main technology implications of the 
strategy are examined in great detail both conceptually and in 
the light of Algeria’s recent experience.
Chapter Three focuses on the concept of "technology assimilation" 
and examines the various technological capacities and efforts 
required to select, absorb and diffuse an imported technology 
locally. It also discusses briefly the strategies which may be 
followed to assimilate an imported technology in the light of 
experience of some countries. It provides a theoretical 
background to the two case studies which are discussed in
xii
Chapters Four and Five.
Chapters Four and Five examine in great detail the process of 
acquiring, absorbing and diffusing cement and flour-milling 
technologies in Algeria. The empirical studies discuss the 
determinants of technology assimilation at the firm level and of 
inter-firm differences, factors that facilitate or inhibit the 
process of assimilation of technology and the influence of macro­
economic conditions on that process. Both industries have been 
given a major priority in the Algerian strategy of 
industrialization because of their vital importance both 
economically and politically. In terms of investment, their 
combined share in total industrial (excluding hydrocarbons) 
investment implemented between 1967-1984 amounted to over 8% with 
the cement industry absorbing around 5% of the total.
1Chapter 1:
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN LDCs
Science and technology are as important to the development process 
and as essential an aspect of the process of investment as the 
accumulation of financial resources. Thus, even if a country’s 
productive system could generate a surplus on which to base a 
viable economic growth strategy it would be necessary to count on 
the capacity to transform this surplus into reproducible capital 
goods with the appropriate technical characteristics. This 
capacity, in turn, is determined by the country’s scientific and 
technological level, and by the effective combination of both. 
Without this capacity:
1. The accumulated surplus must be used to import capital goods 
and know-how from advanced countries. Two main problems are 
often associated with LDCs’ reliance on imports of technology 
from advanced countries. The first is a short term problem: 
the leakage of the multiplier effect which in turn result in 
reducing the surplus available for re-investment and so 
curtailing the ability of the economy to be self-generating. 
The second problem is that the mechanisms that are used to 
transfer technology may limit what Skitovsky called 
’’technological external economies": if technologies are
transferred in such a way that limit the opportunity for 
learning on the part of the local people, the economy will
2forego some of the important ’external economies’ which are 
often used to justify the policy of industrialization in LDCs. 
This is a long-run problem: because if technology is
transferred in a way which substitutes for local potential 
suppliers of goods and services, the chances of coming to 
terms with the short term problem which we have discussed, 
will be reduced.
2. The country cannot make independent technological choices, 
operate efficiently, adapt and improve upon imported 
techniques and products, and generate new ones. "A country 
without an indigenous scientific and technological capacity 
has no means of being aware of its own needs, nor of the
opportunities existing in science and technology elsewhere, 
nor of the suitability of what is available for its own needs. 
Thus, far from being substitutes, the obtaining of technology 
from advanced countries and the building of a scientific and 
technological capacity are, in fact, complementary”.1
Attitudes towards the role of science and technology in the 
development process have evolved over the last three and a half 
decades in the developing countries as well as among academics and 
UN agencies. In the 1950*s and early 1960’s the role of science
and technology in the strategy of national development was largely
underestimated. The availability of production technologies from 
the advanced countries seemed an unqualified blessing - though 
some development economists drew attention to the 
incompatibilities of factor endowments and capital intensity.
3Despite these qualifications there was a more or less general 
agreement at the time that developing countries could quickly 
industrialize by applying the technologies which had been 
generated and used in the advanced countries. This view was 
largely based on neo-classical assumptions about access to 
technology. Conventionally technology was assumed to be a ’’free 
good” and accessible to all potential users. Consequently LDCs 
could draw ’’from the shelf of world technology”.2
As time proceeded it emerged that the indiscriminate flow of 
technology and heavy reliance on scientific and technological 
knowledge generated elsewhere, had led to dualistic patterns of 
development, had involved high costs, had increased the degree of 
reliance on foreign technology and had inhibited learning effects. 
Consequently both the approach to and policy towards technology 
transfer have evolved. Some of the assumptions about access to 
technology have been put into question. The idea that technology 
is a potential source of monopoly, and is therefore itself 
monopolized by private capital and that the overwhelming 
international concentration of scientific and technological 
potential in the advanced countries have adverse socio-economic 
effects in the LDCs as well as their position in the international 
economy have been emphasized. New attitudes towards the role of 
science and technology in development had subsequently evolved in 
the mid-1960’s; in particular many policy-makers in LDCs and 
academics as well as UN agencies called for the regulation of the 
inflow of technology and promotion of an indigenous scientific and
4technological capability. This new attitude towards the role of 
science and technology in LDC’s had contributed to a mode of naive 
optimism particularly among science and technology advocates3 who 
viewed science and technology as a panacea that would solve all 
the Third World problems and might even eliminate all the "ills of 
underdevelopment". Not only it seemed at the time that it is easy 
to introduce science and technology in LDCs, but it also seemed 
that a bit more science and technology would both open new 
production possibilities and might even eliminate backwardness. 
The only difficult problem to solve was a merely technocratic one: 
how to establish scientific and technological institutions and 
train personnel needed to operate them? What is the kind of 
activities they should carry out and the amount of R & D 
expenditure required? and the like.4
By and large these prescriptions were founded on the most 
superficial kind of diagnosis. * One cannot argue from the success 
of science based innovation in the advanced countries to the 
imperative of science and technology development in LDCs. The 
economic and social organisation of the latter are different from 
the former and consequently research institutions established in 
LDCs might serve rather different social functions from those of 
the advanced countries. Hardly anyone at the time asked why 
science and technology are, in the first place, acutely backward 
in LDCs. After all the "underdevelopment of science and 
technology" could be regarded as a particular aspect of the 
general phenomenon of underdevelopment.
5In the early 1970 * s a more critical approach to the role of 
science and technology in LDCs had emerged.lt is argued that the 
establishment of research institutions, the training of labour 
force required to operate them and the allocation of financial 
resources to research activities do not necessarily ensure 
economic and social progress, as science and technology advocates 
had suggested. This, they argue5 , is primarily due to the fact 
that socio-economic organisation in LDCs inhibits the application 
of scientific knowledge to the productive sphere. Furthermore, 
they argue that the particular form which scientific and 
technological institutions take in developed countries, the way 
they are linked to production via a network of machinery, 
producers, engineering consultancy firms and the like, and the 
type of research they carry out are contingent upon the process of 
historical development of the advanced countries. The notion that 
the content and form of research activities and their links with 
their socio-economic environment are a result of a particular form 
of economic and social organization has played an important role 
in research on the social function of scientific and technological 
activities in developing countries. Additionally, more attention 
has been paid to some problems associated with the transfer of 
technology to LDCs. In particular the negative effects on the 
balance of payments because of monopoly pricing of technology and 
the effects on "learning-by-doing” which is relevant to the 
development of local scientific and technological activities.
This chapter provides an interpretive survey of many of the issues
6related to both development of local scientific and technological 
activities in LDCs and transfer of technology to LDCs. The first 
section focuses on social functions of scientific and 
technological activities in DCs and LDCs. The main arguement 
which runs through this section is: in contrast to DCs where R & D 
activities are closely linked to their socio-economic activities, 
these activities in LDCs are often, for a number of reasons,
divorced from their environment. The second section deals with 
technology transfer to LDCs and its direct and indirect effects. 
Special emphasis will be put on the mechanism of transfer and
their effects on LDCs* balance of payments and learning-by-doing. 
It is argued that some of the mechanisms used to obtain technology 
from DCs are costly and have adverse effects on the process of 
learning-by-doing which are relevant to the development of local 
skills. The third section deals with the role of the state in 
both regulating technology inflow and promoting local scientific 
and technological activities. While there is a more or less
general agreement that the State has a major role to play in this
field, empirical research findings about the effectiveness of some 
state policies implemented in some countries differ substantially. 
The fourth section focuses on the role of the capital goods sector 
in the process of technological change and diffusion. It is 
argued that the capital goods sector occupies a unique role in the 
process of technological change. Having said that, two crucial 
questions should be taken into account: the first is related to 
the decision whether or not to import or manufacture locally, and 
the second is related to design capabilities of capital goods
7producers els technical change associated with the capital goods 
sector depends heavily on the existence of this capacity. There 
is no general agreement among economists on these two issues.
1. Social Function of Science
Technology and technological change are not autonomous forces 
exerting uni-directional effects on society and neither are 
they neutral. The belief in the contrary6 stems mainly from 
the mistaken view that regards technology as the mere 
application of science and scientific discovery, itself the 
result of the ingenuity of certain thinkers transcending 
existing socio-economic circumstances. The recognition that 
science and technology interact in many ways and that both are 
affected by, as well as affect, the prevailing socio-economic 
circumstances has important implications for the way we 
examine the social function of science in relation to the 
development of production in developing countries.
Although the social function of science was well acknowledged 
and discussed by the classical economists, the neo-classists 
neglected it almost totally. Marx and Adam Smith in 
particular were interested in the origins of new forces of 
production as well els in their effects. Both were well aware 
of the important role of science7 in promoting technological 
development. Thus Smith spoke of "men of speculation" who, in 
cooperation with raachine-builders and workers, were
8responsible for many technical "improvements". However, it 
was Marx who explored at length the relationship between 
science and production and this earned him the title of 
"technological determinist".9 The essence of his arguement 
can be summarized in the following:
1. New forces of production change, not exogenously or as the
result of some mysterious deux ex machina, but rather as a 
dialectical outcome of a historical process in which the 
forces of production and relations of production play an 
essential role. As he put it: "It must be kept in mind that 
the new forces of production and relations of production do 
not develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from 
the womb of the self-positing Idea, but from within, and in 
anti-thesis to the existing development of production and the 
inherited, traditional relations of production".10 The
importance of socio-economic organization in establishing the 
link between science and production was dealt with in great 
detail in Marx’s writings. Thus he argued that this link was 
only established after craft-based production system was 
superceded by the machine-based one. He showed that science 
itself can never be extensively applied to the production
system so long as the handicraft system continues to be its 
basis. In other words, science must incorporate its 
principles into impersonal machinery and this was achieved in 
the machine-based factory system. When this stage has been 
achieved, Marx argues that:
2. Technology becomes for the first time capable of indefinite
9improvement11 as the requirements of production eventually 
begin to have an effect on the direction of scientific 
development itself. For example, technological advances 
generated new specialized skills at the interface between 
science and production. This is reflected in the emergence 
and development of engineering specialists who are able to 
interpret the needs of the entrepreneurs to the scientists and 
subsequently economic requirements begin to affect the 
direction of science;
3. The driving force in his model of technological change is the 
search for profit. He states quite clearly that the 
technological changes associated with the two stages of 
capitalist development he studied - the manufacturing system 
and Modern Industry - were responses to an expanding universe 
of profit-making opportunities12. This line of thought was 
further explored by Schumpeter who demonstrated how 
competition in a free market economy leads to a sustained 
demand for "new innovations’’.13 Furthermore, Schumpeter 
argued that such ’’new innovations” confer quasi-monopolistic 
advantages over those who command them.
The social function of science was further explored by J.D. 
Bernal.14 He analyzed at length the reciprocity of the 
relationship between science and society as well as the 
effects of economic demands, including those of the military, 
on technological innovations. In his view, the manner in 
which society was organised influenced technological change
10
and vice versa. He maintains that ’’the machinery of the 
Industrial Revolution was not the simple gift of inventors - 
there has been ingeneous men in plenty in earlier times - but 
... grew in response to the availability of capital and labour 
and the opportunities the market offered for profit” .15 
Furthermore he stresses that: "successful application in war 
or profitable applications in peace have been the only 
criteria for technical advances.... Considering the available 
technical skill and intellectual capacity at different 
periods, it is apparant that these were rarely if ever the 
major limiting factors in industrial progress... It was lack 
of anticipated profit that kept short-sighted and tradition- 
bound capitalists from embarking on new enterprises long after 
they were technically feasible” .16 In other words the link 
between science and production is best stimulated by socio­
economic organisation and conditions conducive to 
technological development and economic demands.
Bernal distinguishes two phases in the development of 
relations between science and production. In the first phase, 
i.e. the early stage of capitalism, technological development 
was mainly achieved through the accumulation of small 
improvements on the shopfloor, spreading out in space and 
communicated from generation to generation over time, and from 
time to time through the invention of a new process or 
product. During this phase technological advances were often 
the source of scientific discoveries, if scientists were
11
interested in these advances which had been developed by 
machine-builders and craftsmen, so as to learn from them. In 
the second phase, i.e. modern capitalism, technology 
production has become increasingly a moment in the capital 
accumulation process as entrepreneurs began to directly invest 
in scientific research as a potential source of profit. The 
research laboratory, whether public or private, has become the 
major source of technological innovations.
To summarize, the particular form which scientific activities 
have at present in the developed countries, the way they are 
linked to production through a complex network of machine- 
builders, engineering institutions and the like, and the kind 
of research they are engaged in, are the outcome of the 
process of historical development of the advanced countries, 
and the increasing demands on innovation in various sectors of 
their economies.
The notion that links between science and production are a 
result of particular forms of socio-economic organization and, 
especially, of economic demand for new techniques and products 
has been the cornerstone of recent analysis of the social 
function of science in LDCs. According to this new approach 
the main weakness of those who argue from the success of 
science-based innovations in the advanced countries, to the 
imperative of strengthening scientific activities in LDC’s 
lies in their failure to recognize that underdevelopment is an
12
historically particular form of socio-economic organization 
which cannot be identified with the early stages of 
development in today’s advanced countries. 
"Underdevelopment...” Furtado argues, "calls for an effort at 
autonomous theorization".17
A great deal of effort at ’autonomous theorization’ about 
underdevelopment in general and underdevelopment of science in 
particular, has mainly come from South America. Essentially 
this approach uses particular aspects of the structuralist 
analysis to demonstrate how the dynamics of the underdeveloped 
economy operate in such a way that local scientific activities 
are alienated from production (’marginalization of science* as 
it is often referred to). This ’marginalization of science*, 
it is argued, was the result of economic policies implemented 
by the dominant classes in these countries. "For example, the 
implicit science policy contained in the import-substitution 
industrialization of many Latin American countries has often 
reinforced technological dependence".18 The process of 
industrialization through import-substitution has been heavily 
influenced by the fact that income distribution is skewed in 
favour of a minority which therefore dominate consumer goods 
markets. Since this affluent minority demand goods similar to 
those produced in DCs, industrialists (both foreign and local) 
prefer to import technologies already in existence in DCs. 
Consequently, foreign technology tended to be a substitue for 
technologies that might have been developed locally by
13
scientific and development institutions. The arguement is 
also extended to explain why engineering activities are both 
underdeveloped and underutilized in many LDCs.
Similar arguements apply to countries which switched to 
export-oriented industrialization in the late 1960’s, as their 
markets are located in the DCs, which implies that productive 
techniques and know-how have to be imported to cater for the 
consumption habits, tastes and standard requirements of these 
markets. As for the ’’traditional” sector (for example 
handicrafts and subsistence agriculture) of these economies, 
it generates very little demand on local research and 
engineering imports partly because this sector is not 
organized in a way which is favorable to scientific and 
technological advances and partly because it is deprived of 
resources which are preferentially channelled to the ’modern* 
sector. The result is that scientific activities are 
alienated from the production system and consequently their 
orientation is in the main determined by individual decisions 
of research workers. Meanwhile engineering activities in 
these countries are either underdeveloped or underutilized as 
individual enterprises, local and foreign prefer to use 
foreign technology and skills (which are proven commercially) 
than local variants of technology and engineering skills.
Recent studies of scientific activities in LDCs emphasized the 
existence of a serious discrepancy between the needs of
14
national development and the orientation of scientific 
research in these countries. Analyzing the reasons for this 
situation, India's National Committee on Science and 
Technology pinpointed the existence of bias in the allocation 
of resources19, inefficient assimilation of research results 
due to the absence of links between scientific institutions 
and the production system and underutilization of existing 
capabilities.20 Meanwhile the Indian scientist A Rahman 
argued that because of this bias in resource allocation and 
the availability of and accessibility to foreign technology, 
Indian scientists and engineers oriented themselves towards 
research topics which contribute to the growth of scientific 
potential in the DCs with very little regard to the specific 
research needs of the country. By not using the country's 
scientific potential to solve immediate problems of the 
country, he argues, India is not helping to increase the 
country's wealth or expand employment. That is why there is 
substantial unemployment among highly skilled personnel, a 
’’brain drain” to the DCs and continued reliance on imported 
technology.21
Studies on Latin American scientific activities point out 
problems similar to those observed in India. It is argued 
that most scientific activities in this region bear little 
relation to its most severe problems and needs. With few 
exceptions most research projects have no relation to the 
needs of the economy and society. Thus Sagasti argues that:
15
"Because the productive sectors of the economy exert little 
pressure on the local scientific and technological
communities, scientists and researchers orient themselves 
toward the international community, choosing research topics 
in fashion, seeking to contribute to the advancement of
science as an international undertaking, and disregarding the 
specific research needs of their countries".22 The following 
quotation from a joint report of the UN Commission for Latin 
America and the Organization of American States summarizes the 
situation of scientific activities in Latin America:
"Up to now, in Latin America, in the government vertex, 
recognition of the importance of science, technology and
innovation has been merely rhetorical. This sector is 
absolutely isolated from the productive structure with the 
exception in some countries of some contacts with the 
agricultural sector.... However, they (Councils for Scientific 
and Technological Research) are not very efficient in using 
their infrastructure for the solution of the specific problems 
of society, the same may be said of the Universities and
Institutes of higher education ...science and technology are 
still components divorced from the production process".23
In sharp contrast to both the optimistic view that emphasizes 
the contribution of science to development and the widespread 
belief among science and technology advocates that the key to 
rapid economic development is massive investment in R & D
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activities24, recent research on scientific activities in LDCs 
suggests that these activities appear to contribute very 
little to socio-economic development of these countries. This 
is not to deny that science can contribute to development, nor 
to suggest that it is more efficient from the social point of 
view to rely on the technologies which have been developed in 
the industrialized countries, than to use resources to develop 
local innovative capabilities. Science and technology can 
contribute to development. However, the present socio­
economic structures of the LDCs and the orientation of their 
scientific activities as well as the structure and orientation 
of those located in developed countries, are such that this 
potential is not being fully utilized to solve the immediate 
problems of LDCs. Rather, they appear to reinforce and 
perpetuate the conditions of underdevelopment. Meanwhile 
there are a number of reasons for rejecting the view which 
suggests that it is more efficient from the economic point of 
view to draw "from the shelf of world technology”25 (what is 
the point of re-inventing the wheel!) than to use resources to 
develop local scientific and technological activities in LDCs. 
First of all, foreign technology can never be a total 
substitute for a local innovative capacity. The latter plays 
an important role not only in generating new technology and 
improving the imported one, but also and above all, to ensure 
the successful transplantation of foreign technology. The 
successful transplantation of foreign technology requires the 
ability on the part of the recipient to search, evaluate,
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select, effectively use and adapt it to local conditions and 
eventually to improve upon it. An economy which possesses 
this capacity is in a position to draw upon foreign knowledge 
in ways which can have positive results. Without this 
capacity, the recipient is most unlikely to make a successful 
use of innovations developed elsewhere, and can be subject to 
many important adverse effects. In particular, the negative 
effect on the balance of payments because of ’monopoly 
pricing’ of technology and the effect on ”learning-by-doingM 
which is relevant to the development of local innovative (like 
R & D activities) and engineering (like project design) 
activities. The following section focuses on these two effects 
of technology imports by LDCs.
2. Technology Transfer to LDCs and its Direct and Indirect Costs
The international ’transfer of technology’ refers essentially 
to the process whereby knowledge related to production of 
goods and services is acquired by entities within a country 
(for instance research institutions, firms, etc.) from sources 
outside that country. In examining international technology 
transfer, several questions related to the subject emerge. 
These include the sources of technology and their motives for 
its transfer, modes of technology transfer and their effects 
on the recipient and the price of knowledge transferred and 
its consequences on the recipient country.
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The international transfer of technology is dominated by 
private capital and it is thus, by and large, subordinated to 
the requirements of profit-oriented decisions. This notion 
of predominance of private capital does not preclude the 
possibility that the public transfer of technology might 
outrank or at least equal private transfer in certain sectors 
or at least with regard to certain functions. In most cases 
the former plays a complementary role to the latter by helping 
to establish some of the necessary pre-conditions such as 
infrastructure and personnel training. However, private 
firms, especially the big multinationals, are by far the most 
important actors in the field of technology transfer both 
within developed countries and between developed and 
developing countries.
The main motives behind technology transfer by private firms 
to LDCs are:
1. Extending the product life cycle: international technology
transfer is a means of extending the product life cycle of 
technologies which are either at their latest stage of 
maturity or are going to be soon obsolete, "...the strategy of 
multinationalization may be regarded as a substitute for 
innovation through the method of geographic extention of the 
life of the product".26 There is ample evidence that such 
technologies and even obsolete ones were transferred to LDCs. 
It was also reported that low technology industries rank 
highest in terms of royalties.27 However, this does not mean
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that only mature or obsolete technologies are being 
transferred to LDCs,as Vernon's product life cycle model seems 
to suggest. Indeed, some new technologies have been 
transferred to LDCs before they have been applied in the 
country where they were originally developed.28 Meanwhile the 
'export stage' of the product life cycle has often been 
truncated and sometimes eliminated. It has also been reported 
that new products are commonly introduced by US-based MNCs 
within one year of US initial introduction.29
Whatever success the product cycle model may have had in 
accounting for empirical data on the sequence of events in 
some industries30, it turns out to be inadequate as an 
explanation of technology transfer to LDCs. This is largely 
due to certain assumptions on which the model was based as 
well as to certain changes which have taken place since the 
late I960's. In the first place, the model assumes that there 
is some relationship between the age of the product and the 
extent of quasi-monopoly. It may be true that quasi- 
monopolistic control over 'new' products is more frequent than 
over 'mature' ones, but it is nevertheless possible that many 
products will be firmly controlled by the innovating firm long 
after they have become 'mature' according to criteria used in 
the model. One must remember that extra-technology types of 
monopolistic advantages (such as firm-specific skills in 
marketing and management, trademarks and brand names) are 
often used by firms to support their quasi-monopolistic
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position, and consequently extend the period of quasi­
monopoly. Secondly, the model takes given factor endowments 
in LDCs as the ultimate determinant of when technology will be 
transferred to them. Like other theories, it leaves the 
movement of factors across countries out of the picture. Once
this assumption is lifted, and it is hard to see how this can
be avoided, it becomes difficult to perceive the relationship 
between the age of the product and the moment at which 
production will be transferred to LDCs.
Meanwhile there has been a considerable change in the 
structure and behaviour of firms, in particular the MNCs. 
Firstly, the emergence and development of consultancy 
engineering firms whose business is mainly based on the sale 
of their services and whose profitability depends on extensive 
sale of technology and related services. Secondly, most big 
and medium firms have come to take a worldwide view of their 
operations. Many of them have in place both extensive 
overseas production facilities and sometimes even substantial 
R & D activities located abroad. Given the existing worldwide 
network of facilities and personnel, firms are trying to use
as fully as possible their resources.
These developments led Vernon to acknowledge that: "By 1970, 
the product cycle model was beginning in some respects to be 
inadequate as a way of looking at the US-controlled 
multinational enterprise. The assumption of the product cycle
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model...was beginning to be challenged by illustrations that 
did not fit the pattern”.31
Even if new technologies are transferred to LDCs, there are 
other ways of planning their obsolescence by the supplier, 
such as retaining the essential elements of the know-how of 
the technology transferred or by developing new technologies 
to replace the exported ones. As J. Baranson observed: "This 
Strategy (of measured release of core technology) is common 
within the process design and engineering industry where the 
company is interested in selling newly designed technology as 
extensively as it can and reinvests a portion of profits in 
developing new generations of technology. In most cases, a 
deliberate attempt is made to retain an essential element of 
the know-how, without which the purchasing enterprise is 
unable to develop a more comprehensive version or to become 
self-sufficient in the technology”.32
2. Penetrating closed markets: commercialization of technology is 
an efficient means of penetrating markets closed to products. 
As Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., President of Ex-Ira Inc., 
observed: ’’Markets closed to products are invariably open to 
technology. Even extremely closed markets will open to 
Western technology...as long as the United States is the 
predominant technological power, closed product markets will 
always be open to American technology”.33 Exports of 
technology are often accompanied by exports of equipment, 
materials and components. There may be even follow-on exports
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of goods and services. Consequently, technology exports 
provide the exporter with the longest and surest means of 
market penetration available.
3. Internationalization of production; international technology 
transfer is a necessary precondition for the 
internationalization of production. Since the 1960*s, the way 
technology is transferred internationally has greatly changed. 
The role of licences and patents has declined in favour of 
transfer based on the TNCs activities, whereby technology 
crosses national borders but remains essentially inside the 
TNCs economic system. Supply of technology by the parent 
company to its affiliates is essentially restricted to 
production functions assigned to them within the frameword of 
the TNC global strategy.
Internationalization of production is very often accompanied 
by a highly centralized organization of technology production. 
The role of the affliates, especially those located in LDCs, 
is confined to that of an executant at the production level. 
Thus it was reported that out of the 8% of US-based TNC*s 
expenditure on R & D undertaken in 1970 outside the USA, only
0.5% of this expenditure was undertaken in LDCs.34 As 
Michalet argues: "The subsidiaries* main concern is...to keep 
a strict check on possible openings for the external 
dissemination of technology. This must be limited to the 
technological elements embodied in the finished product sold 
on the market".35
23
4. Recovering the costs of R & D and other follow-on costs: 
international commercialization of technology is an efficient 
means of shifting the burden of costs of technology production 
to others especially those with weak bargaining power. 
Technology has become a costly production function not only to 
enterprises engaged in R & D activities, but also to other 
enterprises which wish to introduce the new technology through 
either imitation36 or licencing. Whereas in the early phases 
of capitalism, technology was mainly produced through the 
accumulation of small improvements on the shop floor and from 
time to time through invention of a new product or process, 
then diffused with very little cost37, at present technology 
production has become an important factor in the overall 
strategy of both individual institutions and states. 
Technology is not produced only to be consumed by the same 
institution and within a particular country, but also to be 
transacted internationally. Meanwhile there are nowadays
specialized institutions whose main function is production of 
technology for exchange.38 Additionally, the way technology 
is at present produced is radically different from those in 
the early stages of capitalism. Decisions on R 8t D ar decided 
upon by top-level management of big firms and specialized 
institutions, and their application is not anymore a 
spontaneous operation, but based upon direct and programmed 
effort.39 This does not suggest that invention/innovation is 
the exclusive domain of the big enterprise and specialized 
institutions. Small firms and individuals still participate
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in this field. But a large proportion of their achievements 
still end up into the hands of the big enterprises through 
various channels, including absorption of the inventors or 
innovators themselves.
Expenditure on R & D by both private and public institutions 
has witnessed a rapid increase in recent years. Thus: 
"According to data supplied by the German Chemical Industry, 
its R & D expenditure have been increased by at least 100* 
over the last 10 years”.40 However, a large proportion of R & 
D expenses have been entrusted to the state as the "general 
capitalist”. In the US, for example, federal spending on R & 
D "had risen by over 50* in the last four years”.41 It must 
be emphasized that the costs of R & D are often minimal 
compared with follow-on costs as the diagram on page 25 shows. 
The diagram shows that follow-on costs exceed the direct costs 
of R & D by between 10 and 20 times. To summarize, 
expenditure on R & D as well as on other activities related to 
technological innovation is rapidly increasing in developed 
countries both at the micro- and macro-level. Consequently, 
the need to export technology so as to recover at least a part 
of these costs will continue.
Modes of Technology Transfer to LDCs
The possibility of skill formation and acquisition of specialized
information are likely to be influenced quite strongly by the type
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of transfer mode which is used. The supplying firm often has a 
direct interest in preventing others from learning about its core 
technology which may be a source of ”quasi-monopoly" to the firm 
and an essential factor in maintaining its competitive position. 
This suggests that the choice of mode of technology transfer is 
important to the recipient. These modes can basically be 
categorized as being passive or active, market- or non-market- 
mediated. The diagram below presents this categorization.
Role of foreigners in the transfer process
Active Passive






Purchase of machinery 
and equipment
Non-market Learning through Personal contact,
exporting and scientific exchange,
training of trade Journals and
personnel manuals, and 
imitation
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The mode of technology transfer is described as active if 
foreigners assist the buyer in acquiring and/or applying the 
technology transferred. If, on the other hand, the technology is 
acquired and applied without assistance, then the technology 
transfer mode is said to be passive. It should be noted that in 
the later case, the buyer is presumed to have competence in the 
acquisition and application of technology concerned. The capacity 
for searching, selecting and applying efficiently foreign 
technology, is not present in most developing countries. This at 
least partially explains why the active modes of transfer are the 
most widely used in LDCs. It also explains why most literature on 
technology transfer to LDCs has been devoted to the examination of 
those modes included in the North-West of the rectangle. These 
include turnkey projects, direct investment, joint ventures, 
licencing, management contracts and other technology agreements. 
In all these foreigners play an active role in the transfer 
process, influencing the quantity and quality of technology 
transferred, and the circumstances and conditions under which it 
is transferred, including factors such as restrictions on the use 
of technology transferred and consequently its assimilation and 
diffusion and the price of technology.
Imports of machinery and equipment is market-mediated, but 
foreigners often play a passive role and usually do not exercise 
much control over the way in which technology, embodied in them is 
used by the buyer. Imports of machinery and equipment is an 
important source of technological knowledge in developing
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countries. Imported machinery and equipment could also 
potentially play an important role in generating technological 
knowledge through "reverse engineering" and imitation.
In learning by exporting, foreigners play an active role in 
providing information which can result in improvements in 
products exported. The mode of technology transfer is said to be 
active because the transfer depends on foreigners’ willingness to 
feed back information to the exporter. This mode was examined 
in great detail in the case of South Korea, where it has been 
argued that an ’important* source of technological knowledge 
involved in the export sector has been supplied by sellers and 
users in their export markets.42 In learning by training, 
foreigners play an active role in transferring scientific and 
technical knowledge to the recipient’s personnel. The mode is 
active because the transfer of knowledge, in particular knowledge 
specific to the core technology transferred depends on 
foreigners’ willingness to train the recipient’s personnel 
adequately, so as to acquire the capacity to effectively 
assimilate the technology in question.43
In the last category (scientific exchange, published materials 
and personnel contacts in meeting and conferences), foreigners 
usually play a relatively passive role. Undoubtedly, these modes 
of technology transfer can potentially play an important role in 
augmenting technological capacities in developing countries. 
However, the exploitation of knowledge transferred through these
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channels depends largely on the recipient’s financial resources, 
technological capability and the environment in which the 
recipient operates.
In any particular case, the mode of technology transfer depends 
on the willingness of the supplier to provide the technology in 
different forms and the desire and the ability of the recipient 
to buy it in a particular form. There are considerable
variations in the way different LDCs acquire technology 
reflecting differences in national policies, in their financial 
and technological capacities and in the industrial composition of 
the technology transferred. In some countries, for example 
historically Japan and currently Algeria, the most packaged mode 
of technology transfer in the form of direct investment is 
strongly discouraged.
Costs of technology transfer
Recent research on technology transfer puts in question the 
assumptions that economists conventionally make about access to
technology. In contrast to the conventional notion that
technology is a ’free good’ and accessible to all potential users 
in time and space, it is today commonly accepted that technology 
is a source of quasi-monopolistic advantages44 and the market for 
technology is highly imperfect. Consequently the transfer of
technology does not take place because some purchasers in 
developing countries draw from the accumulated stock of world
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technology but rather is the outcome of a process in which the 
technology-owning institutions in the advanced countries exploit 
their quasi-raonopolistic advantages in the recipient country 
through the most profitable channel available to them.
On the supply side, technology has the character of a ’social
good’, in the sense that its use by others does not reduce the
magnitude of it available to the owner/developer so that 
optimality requires that it be made available to all potential 
users without charge. Moreover the marginal cost of 
communicating it to others is usually very small compared with 
the initial cost of development. However, in the actual world, 
legal and other protection means are provided to the 
owner/developer of technology so that they may acquire some 
monopolistic control over their technology, and consequently sell 
it at a price above marginal cost. This has been the system 
adopted for much technological development in DCs. It is often 
justified as necessary to secure a continued flow of R & D.
On the demand side, the buyer is usually confronted with what
Arrow called ”a fundamental paradox in the determination of 
demand for innovation”.45 This ’fundamental paradox* arises from 
the fact that the buyer is forced to make a bid for the 
information before being able to assess its value fully. In 
order to make a complete evaluation, the buyer would have to have 
the information before purchasing it, thus having access to it 
without cost.
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Under these circumstances, the technology market is highly 
imperfect: price determination tends to be oligopolistic, and
consequently there is a considerable scope for abuse, and 
potential for bargaining on the part of the purchaser, as the 
price may vary between a maximum level determined by costs of 
reproducing the technology and a minimum price determined by the 
purchaser’s estimate of the cost of the second best alternative 
including going without it. Generally, the price of technology 
is determined by the relative bargaining powers of the seller and 
the buyer; which in turn, depend on their respective resources, 
knowledge and other alternatives. However, the supplier has 
usually the stronger position, if only because the buyers cannot 
know all there is to know about what they are buying until they 
have purchased it. Of particular importance in this context is 
the fact that most LDCs lack the ability to search, assess and 
select among the alternatives available. Because of their strong 
position, the sellers of technology are often not only able to 
dictate the price, but also to maintain control over the use and 
development of technology supplied to the purchaser. This 
control can be exercised either directly or indirectly; the 
former through ownership and/or appointment of personnel to key 
positions in the recipient enterprise, and the latter by imposing 
various restrictions during the process of transfer and/or after 
it on the use and development of the technology supplied.
A great deal of attention has been paid in the literature on 
technology transfer to LDCs to the direct costs of market-
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mediated technology where foreigners play an active role. Direct 
costs can either be overt or hidden. The former refers to costs 
which appear in the contracted price (such as the price of a 
management contract, a licence or an engineering consultancy). 
The latter refers to estimated costs due to restrictive clauses 
and transfer pricing. It is commonly accepted that overt costs 
of technology transfer need bear little relation to real costs 
where the supplier provides more than one service, as the seller 
may choose the form in which to receive payment.46 In view of 
this problem, it is not surprising that none of the quite 
numerous studies on technology transfer to LDCs have come up with 
satisfactory estimates of costs.
An attempt to systematically estimate overt costs of technology 
transfer to LDCs was made by UNCTAD in 1975. For 1968, it was 
estimated that overt costs to LDCs of technology transfer were 
around 1.5 billion dollars for patents, licences, know-how, 
trademarks and management and other technical services. This 
amount was estimated to be equivalent to 5% of exports and 
approximately 0.5% of GDP. The UNCTAD also estimated that these 
payments were likely to grow at around 20% per annum on the basis 
of questionnaires sent to recipient countries.47 Algeria’s 
official estimates48 for technology transfer payments for the 
period 1973-78 were much higher than those estimated by the 
UNCTAD. The average annual payments49 for technology, at current 
prices, over the period 1973-78 were estimated at over 4,766m AD 
(or approximately 1,200 million US dollars at the official rate
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of exchange). Official statistics also show that these payments 
grew at over 50% p.a. over the same period, rising from 1,000m AD 
in 1973 to 6,600 in 1977 and 8,600ra in 1978. As a proportion of 
total exports these payments were equivalent to 15.2, 25 and 33% 
for 1973, 1977 and 1978 respectively. For 1978, technology
payments amounted to over 9% of GDP, compared with 1.6% in 
1973.50
In addition to overt costs, technology transfer is usually 
associated with additional hidden costs as a result of 
restrictive clauses and transfer pricing. In the case of wholly- 
owned subsidiaries, restrictions on the use of technology 
transferred are implicit. For technology contracts between 
independent parties, they are an explicit part of the contract. 
These restrictions include tied purchases of inputs, machinery 
and parts, limitation (or total ban) on exports, limitation on 
competing suppliers both local and/or foreign, clauses 
guaranteeing stable profits, royalties and remittances against 
adverse effects of changes in monetary and fiscal policies and 
the like. Detailed studies of technology transfer to the Andean 
Pact, Argentina and India, as well as preliminary findings on 
Algeria reveal that restrictions on the application, use and 
development of technologies transferred are widespread.51
Meanwhile, the evidence collected so far reveals that transfer 
pricing is a common practice and a significant source of 
international income flow in intra-firm transactions.52
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Manipulation of transfer prices does not only occur in intra-firm 
trade, but also occurs in transactions between autonomous firms, 
where local firms have strong connections with foreign suppliers 
of technology, or where purchasers of inputs are effectively tied 
to the supplying firm. Part of the technology costs may appear 
as inflated prices of imported inputs other than technology.
It would be interesting and useful to have an accurate estimate 
of these hidden costs, but even without these it is evident from 
the Algerian case that costs of imported technology are very 
significant both in absolute and relative terms. Consequently 
LDCs could make significant foreign exchange savings if they were 
willing and able to conceive and apply policies which result in 
reducing the cost of technology transfer.
In addition to direct costs, technology transfer can also have 
adverse social effects. The most important of these are related 
to ’appropriate* technology and ’learning-by-doing*, which is 
relevant to local scientific and technological activities in the 
recipient country. For some observers it seems almost axiometic 
that LDCs would benefit from the use of the stock of scientific 
and technological knowledge which is developed, tested and tried 
in the advanced countries.53 These observers appear to confuse, 
or overlook the difference between the physical presence of 
technology and its availability. There is no question that the 
existing pool of scientific and technological knowledge at 
present is sufficient to provide a decent level of existence for
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all inhabitants of the world. But due to the existing nature of 
property relations, the existence of this valuable knowledge 
cannot automatically be equated with its availability for use; 
that it exists does not mean that it is accessible.
Secondly from the point of view of social context, i.e., short 
and long term requirements of development in LDCs, there are 
important reasons why this view should be qualified, if not 
questioned. First, technology is not neutral: the
characteristics of any technology are heavily influenced by the 
economic and social conditions in the economy in which it is 
generated.54 Thus technology developed for advanced countries 
often has characteristics which are inappropriate for LDCs. 
Consequently any attempt at straightforwardly replicating 
advanced countries* technology is precluded. Indeed, many LDCs 
found it difficult to match local skills, materials and scarcity 
relations with the requirements of technology developed for 
advanced societies. Technological development in the DCs tends 
to be increasingly capital- and skill- intensive, designed to 
produce products to meet the requirements of high-income 
consumers who demand high-quality goods, and of increasing scale 
production. If imported unadapted by LDCs, these technologies 
could have undesirable social and economic effects such as 
unemployment, income maldistribution and inefficiency. Second, 
this view overlooks the adverse effects of unrestricted imports 
of technology on the process of * learning-by-doing* in the 
recipient country. Japan’s experience illustrates the way in
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which selective technology imports may enhance the local 
development of technological capacity. Third, technology imports 
often involves the transfer of marketing rights, which are not 
worth acquiring from the social point of view.
These qualifications are made from the social point of view of 
the recipient country, and do not directly apply at the level of 
the individual enterprise, whether private or public. This is 
due to the fact that social needs and interests do not often 
coincide with those of the individual decision-makers. Even 
where local research effort generate viable technologies, there 
is a strong tendency for these to be rejected in favour of 
foreign ones55, often largely due to the market power bestowed by 
foreign marketing rights, which is in turn due to the consumer’s 
belief in the superiority of foreign goods. Individual decision­
makers, eager to make profits and enhance their competitivity on 
the local and/or foreign markets, prefer foreign technologies and 
skills. For example, local firms may be concerned with 
construction and lead times and consequently opt for foreign 
experienced engineering and machinery-supplying firms in 
preference to less experienced ones. Although these decisions 
may be rational from the point of view of the individual 
decision-maker, they may not be optimal from the rational point 
of view. Clearly there are social benefits to be gained in the 
long-run by restricting technology imports while at the same 
time enhancing the development of local technological capacity. 
Unregulated technology imports may operate so that opportunities
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for * learning-by-doing’ both in innovative (like R & D) and 
design-engineering (like project and capital goods) activities 
are precluded. This in turn leads to weak links or the absence of 
links between local research institutions, engineering firms and 
machine-builders; such links which play a determinant role in 
linking scientific activities to the production system in 
advanced countries.
However, a selective approach to the import of technology though 
necessary is not sufficient by itself to ensure the development 
of local technological and scientific activities. While 
selective measures may be required to protect and encourage local 
innovative and learning activities, promotional policies aimed at 
stimulating local scientific and technological activities are 
also required. The most successful examples of technology 
promotion have combined selective imports of foreign technology 
with many positive promotional measures at the macro- and/or 
micro-level. At the macro-level, Japanese experience illustrates 
how technology was imported with the explicit objective of using 
it as a basis for local technological activities; rather than a 
substitute for it. Its policies have been designed to achieve 
the objective: "the first machine by import, the second by
domestic production". This seems to have been achieved through 
the establishment of complimentary relationships between foreign 
technologies imported and *learning-by-doing* by local 
technologists. The State financed R & D spendings in those 
industrial branches which made roost use of imported technology.
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Most of these spendings were concentrated on improving and 
adapting the technologies which were imported.56
The promotion of local technological capabilities are not only 
required to generate new technology, but also and above all, to 
ensure the success of imported technologies. As Rosenberg has 
argued: ’’Perhaps the roost distinctive single factor which
determined the success of the transfer of technology has been the 
early emergence of an indigenous technological capacity. In the 
absence of such a capacity, foreign technologies have not usually 
flourished. Countries which had successful experiences usually 
learned at an early stage that the successful importation of 
foreign technologies required some minimum level of technological 
skills - not only to modify and adapt the foreign technology to 
local needs...but to provide the basis for an intelligent 
selection among the wide range of potential suppliers to begin 
with. Intelligent choice among the alternative technologies 
available abroad presupposes a considerable amount of technical 
knowledge”.57
3. The Role of the State in the Development of Local 
Technological Capacity.
Technological capacity means the ability to make independent 
technological choices, to adapt and improve upon chosen 
techniques and products and to generate new ones locally. 
This capacity is essential not only to generate new
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technologies but also to ensure the success of 
transplantation of old ones. Any technology transfer 
requires a certain degree of technological capacity and 
effort on the part of the recipient, if only because of the 
’implicitness’ and ’tacitness* inherent in any technology 
transfer58, as a result of which the transfer of knowledge 
cannot be achieved in its entirety. Indeed, one of the 
characteristic features of knowledge is its lack of 
permeability; it is often acquired in bits and pieces even 
when the supplier is willing to provide all the information 
required.59 The result is that the recipient always acquires 
a less complete set of information than possessed by the 
supplier. Moreover, a great deal of knowledge is generated 
through hands-on experience in design and production 
activities. Unlike scientific knowledge, technological 
knowledge is largely product-, firm- and context- specific. 
Accordingly technology transfer from one country to another 
is inherently uncertain and problematic, and its success 
depends largely on the recipient’s technological capacity and 
willingness to allocate the necessary resources, both human 
and material, in order to acquire this knowledge and make 
effective use of it.
The relationship between the import of technology and the 
development of local innovative and project construction 
capacities is complex and involves complementarities and 
conflicts. Whereas local technological capacity may always
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be required to make effective acquisition and use of imported 
technologies, account must be taken of the possible existence 
of substitutabilities and complementarities between local and 
foreign technological knowledge; the former may undermine 
local technological effort and the latter may stimulate it. 
Thus while the import of technology may be a necessary part 
of the learning process - either by providing the critical 
input into the learning process or by allowing the recipient 
to bypass the process of ’re-inventing the wheel’ - 
nonetheless an unregulated and nonselective inflow of foreign 
technologies may severely marginalize local innovative and 
engineering activities and/or inhibit the learning process.
There may be different paths to the achievement of a 
sustained process of local technological information. Both 
the historical experience of successful ’late-comers’ 
technologically60 and actual differences in technological 
levels among LDCs make it difficult to pinpoint a common set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions which have to be met 
so as to achieve a sustained process of technological 
innovation. However, the following may be the types of 
policies likely to be conducive to local technological 
development in LDCs:
1. Policies which remove legal restrictions on local
technological development and enhance the bargaining power of 
local enterprises. These particularly apply to patents and
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trademarkets. The patent system as it operates at present 
seems to work against the interests of LDCs. Over 90% of 
patents issued to foreigners in LDCs are not exploited and 
thus they tend to prevent competition and local technological 
innovation rather than stimulate it.61 Trademarks tend often 
to favour the well-established and reputable foreign 
suppliers, thus making it difficult for less well-known 
alternatives to compete. While the private benefits of 
acquiring trademarks to a particular enterprise, in terms of 
market power, may be great, they are not socially beneficial 
in terms of both direct and indirect costs.
2. Policies which protect indigenous technological development 
through selective imports of technology. Most successful 
*late-comers’ technologically have been selective in
acquiring foreign technologies. Although in the 19th 
century, the US Government intervention in this context was 
minimal, American firms were highly discriminatory in 
importing technology.62 However, it was the Japanese and the 
Soviets who were consciously and deliberately selective in 
acquiring foreign technologies.63 The State in both 
countries played a determinant role in both regulating 
technology imports and promoting local technological 
capacities.
Regulation and selection of the inflow of foreign technology 
involves some form of State control over technology imports.
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A number of LDCs have begun to intervene actively in the 
inflow of technology through various means. The most common 
way of control is compulsory registration of technology 
imports, with the aim of both increasing the bargaining 
position of local technology buyers, protecting local 
technological effort and increasing the learning effects of 
imported technology. Other countries, such as Algeria use 
very specific methods to control the transfer of technology. 
In principle, the Algerian State determines directly, through 
its control of the economy, the country’s technological needs 
as well as the terms and conditions of its transfer. Many 
Algerian laws and regulations can be applied to the transfer 
of technology, but they usually do not only serve this 
purpose. In addition to these laws and regulations there are 
model agreements established by the various technical 
ministries for State enterprises under their control. These 
model agreements constitute the basic text for discussion 
during the negotiations between national enterprises and 
foreign technology suppliers. Two forms of these agreements 
exist: turnkey and production guarantee agreements*. These
contractual forms aim to force the foreign supplier to bear 
the risk for industrial operations (including sale of capital 
goods, trademarks in some cases, licencing patents, supply of 
know-how, training of Algerian personnel, technical
* their equivalent in French are: ’cle en main’ and ’produit 
en main’
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assistance and engineering organization). However, in some 
cases, exemptions of provisions of these model agreements are 
possible and have been obtained by suppliers, usually by 
inserting additional clauses.
The aim of selective policies is to import technologies that 
are both appropriate to local conditions and complementary, 
rather than substitute for local ones, so as to learn from
them and eventually improve upon them. The success of this
policy, from the technical point of view, depends largely on 
the recipient’s ability to acquire technology in an 
unpackaged form64 so as to assess each element of the package 
and decide which parts are available locally and which are 
not. The acquisition of this capacity in turn depends on the 
degree of development, and promotional effort given to local 
consultancy firms, information centres, R & D institutions 
and capital goods industries.
Historians of science and technology and economic historians 
have been puzzled for some time about the precise origins of 
a basic indigenous technological capacity in a given 
country.65 However, research on this point is in agreement 
that this capacity is to some extent related to the general 
literacy level, especially in the agricultural sector, and 
the educational system’s emphasis on empirical problem­
solving and on general cognitive processes. Meanwhile most
research on developing countries is in agreement that the
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general cultural level in most of them, in particular those 
in Africa, does not match the requirements of most imported 
technologies.66 In other words, there is not only a shortage 
of highly skilled technical and managerial personnel who can 
make effective acquisition and use of foreign technologies, 
but also and above all a shortage of the mass of middle and 
lower echelons of managerial and technical personnel, down to 
and including semi-skilled workmen in these countries. This 
lack of coincidence between the general cultural level of the 
country’s population and skills requirements and imported 
technologies may result in the technological graft becoming 
an excrescence that is quite impossible to assimilate and 
diffuse, in particular in the short run.67
While no government can legislate against the initial low 
level of local technological capacity, they can however play 
a determinant role in both overcoming supply-side constraints 
and stimulating demand for local technological innovations 
and consultancy engineering. This could be achieved through 
promotional policies.
3. Policies to promote indigenous technological capacities. 
They are an essential counterpart of policies towards 
technology imports. On the supply side, they include 
provision of general and technical education and training, 
promotion of local consultancy and applied research 
activities as well as of capital goods industries and
45
information screening institutions. On the demand side, they 
include government procurement policies, tax incentives and 
direct subsidies to various kinds of technological efforts, 
and promotion of the use of local suppliers of technology.
Past experience with respect to promoting local technological 
activities reveals that the success of these explicit 
policies depends on the following:
a) Whether or not these promotion policies coincide with the 
general economic strategy of the country: The general
economic strategy strongly influences technological 
development. This is most obvious in relation to the
question of ’appropriate* technology, where policies towards 
trading strategy, income distribution,investment and credit 
allocation,factor prices and sources and modes of technology 
transfer are all critical in determining the choice of 
products and techniques. The general economic strategy is 
also of great significance in relation to local technological 
development. Thus most import-substitution policies have 
tended to be accompanied by full-scale protection of consumer 
goods industries; which in turn tended to promote a passive 
attitude towards the utilization and development of local 
learning process during the early stages of
industrialization.68 Thus, instead of protecting local
learning process and technological effort, which extends to 
those goods which embody technology, I-S policies tend to
protect the market for consumer goods, thus discouraging
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local technological effort as managers become complacent 
within their protected structures;
b) The establishment of links between the production system and 
the various educational and research institutions. Such 
links may be created through various means including 
contractual arrangements and in-house training and applied 
research, as well as through informal relations. Past LDCs 
experience reveals that these links are weak and this led to 
the ’marginalization’ of the educational and research 
activities. The ’marginalization’ of the former led to 
overemphasis on general education at the expense of technical 
and vocational training and to attention being given to 
quantitative expansion rather than to the quality of 
knowledge and skills acquired and their utilization in the
work place.69 The ’marginalization* of the latter led to the
tendency to overdo basic research against applied research. 
Underlying the promotion of education and training and 
research activities was the belief that these links would 
automatically take place. Subsequent empirical evidence has 
shown that this belief was misplaced, and these educational, 
training and research activities have very weak, or no links 
with the production system.
c) Specialization. LDCs are not expected to excel in all fields 
of scientific and technological fields. Consequently, a 
conscious and deliberate selection of the areas, which they
tend to develop, is essential so as to concentrate their
promotional efforts and import selectivity in these areas.
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This specialization may be accompanied by determination of 
the level of technological mastery required in each area, and 
consequently the technological effort required to achieve it, 
according to the objectives of the general economic strategy 
of the country. The experience of some countries suggests 
that the acquisition of production engineering capacity can 
be sufficient for the efficient use of some imported 
technologies. "Korea’s experience...demonstrates that a high 
level of technological knowledge in all aspects of the use 
of technological knowledge is not required for sustained 
industrial development. This is evident from the fact that 
its mastery has progressed much further in production 
engineering than in project execution”.70
The technological capacity required in each area chosen may 
range from mere production engineering to more complex 
operation in the form of basic research through information 
screening, adaptation and improvement of imported 
technologies, and the development of new ones as well as 
project execution. Detailed analysis of these various 
capacities and technological effort neded to acquire each of 
them is reserved for Chapter 3 dealing with the assimilation 
of imported technologies.
Empirical evidence on the impact of these explicit policies 
on terms of technology imports by, and promotion of local 
technological capacities, in LDCs is still sketchy and
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inconclusive. Their proponents assert that they have reduced 
the overt costs of technology imports, have helped to reduce, 
and in some cases even eliminate, undesirable restrictions 
without inhibiting the inflow of foreign technologies71, and 
have helped local purchasers in obtaining "full information 
on technological alternatives and conducting a careful 
evaluation and selection of products and processes”.72 In 
the case of Mexico Graham pointed out that: ’’Critics of the 
Registry* claim that the opportunity cost to Mexico of the 
screening effort has been substantial because of the 
reluctance of foreign companies to bring to Mexico or sell to 
Mexican companies technologies that are unique and closely 
held... Critics of the Registry have included some academic 
economists in Mexico as well as a number of prominent Mexican 
businessmen”.72
As for the impact of the policies on the development of local 
technological capacities, empirical evidence available 
provides no clear conclusion. Whereas Lall and Katz and 
Alpin74 assert that these policies have generally had 
positive effects on deepening the learning process, a cross 
country study carried out by the Science and Technology 
Policy Instrument (STPI)75 concluded that explicit policies 
had less effect on technological development and technical 
change than other implicit policies (for instance related to
* ’The National Registry of Technology’
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trade, investment licencing, credit allocation and the like).
On the Indian experience Lall argues that: "The present
evidence...supports [the first hypothesis]... that the 
protection of domestic ’learning* (comprised of protection of 
local manufacturing, particularly of capital goods and the 
protection of local technological effort by restricting 
access to imported technology) leads to a diverse and deep 
technological capability which spills over into technology 
exports...Thus [in] India...government intervention, almost 
unique in the newly industrializing countries group for its 
inward-looking obsession with self-reliance has been largely 
responsible for its accumulation of technical capabilities”. 
However, he also adds that India ”may also have generated a 
certain amount of socially wasteful technological effort 
which would have to be written off in a more open, 
competitive environment” and asserts that: ”The costs of
pushing technological effort too far leads to high costs, 
technological lags and various distortions which are very 
difficult to remove". Lall’s ultimate conclusion was: "Some 
intervention is clearly needed to promote technological 
deepening. Such intervention may enhance both the production 
process (on classical infant industry grounds)...and the 
technology generation process (on protection of ’learning* 
grounds)”.
In contrast to Lall’s findings, the STPI Study concludes that
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explicit science and technology policies (with the exception 
of personnel training) had very little impact on the 
development of local technological capacities in the 
countries surveyed, particularly at the early stages of 
industrialization. Nevertheless the study asserts that these 
policies appear to assume increasing importance as industrial 
development proceeds. The study did not explain why the 
explicit policies of technological development in these 
countries appear to be relatively ineffective. It is 
possible to infer that their ineffectiveness was a 
consequence of other findings of the research, which were 
that these policies were inconsistent with other implicit 
policies contained in the strategy of industrialization76 or 
they were not adequately applied, and often appear to work at 
cross-purposes.7 7
Many of the policies described above involve challenging very 
powerful interests, some of which are external; others have 
been internalized and are well represented within many LDCs. 
The history of attempts by a number of LDCs* governments to 
control the terms and conditions of technology imports as 
well as to develop local scientific and technological 
activities is strewn with failure of ’will*, which is 
somewhat a metaphorical way of describing successful 
resistance, on the part of interests involved, to attempt to 
control them. The following examples may provide some 
indications of what happened in some countries.
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In Mexico, the near monopoly of a technologically successful 
local firm in the seteroid hormone industry, which led in R & 
D worldwide, was broken as a result of pressure from US firms 
and the US government. As a result the industry was soon 
after dominated by foreign subsidiaries. Later government 
attempts to regain control over the industry for local firms 
failed mainly because of opposition from external and 
internal vested interests.78
In both Brazil and Sri Lanka, government plans to replace 
brand name drugs by generic drugs were diluted as a result of 
strong political opposition which had powerful foreign 
support.79 Meanwhile, the Brazilian government’s recent 
attempt to protect the local information industry has led to 
a strong opposition from US firms and administration which 
appears to have at least been partially successful as the 
Brazilian government decided to lift control over some areas 
of the industry.80
The experience of the Andean Pact countries with respect to 
the implementation of Decision 2481 illustrates some aspects 
of political economy of each member country. Since its 
inception in 1969, Decision 24 has been controversial even 
among parties to the Pact. Venezuela, for example, did not 
sign the Treaty of Cartagena until 1973, one of the reasons 
being that Decision 24 would discourage foreign investment 
and technology from coming into that country. However,after
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the oil price hike of 1973-4 the Venezuelan government began 
to re-evaluate its position on FDI and, by 1978, it had 
swung to a hard-line position on Decision 24. By contrast 
Peru, with a stronger national bourgeoisie, succeeded in 
divesting the Decision between 1970 and 1975 but began to 
soften its position after experiencing severe balance of 
payments deficits after that. As for Ecuador and Bolivia, 
where foreign interests were relatively stronger, they 
expressed concern over Decision 24 almost from the beginning,
and both de facto did not stick rigidly to its provisions.
While embracing the principles of Decision 24, the Columbian 
government, under pressure from local and foreign interests, 
has not in practice enforced provisions of the Decision
rigidly.82 Finally Chile has experienced the widest swings 
in its official and practical position with respect to 
Decision 24. Under Allende, the official and practical
position was that Decision 24 presented a de facto minimum 
policy on inflow of foreign investment and technology, so 
that some actions which were taken went even beyond Decision 
24. Following Allende’s overthrow, the policy was radically 
revised to a virtual repudiation of Decision 24.
Certain conclusions are suggested by taking into account the 
political economy aspects. First, certain types of policy 
may be easier to secure from the political point of view, 
than others. For example, general promotional policies are 
likely to be less subject to opposition than those dealing
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with regulation and selection of imported technology. This 
is not just because they are likely to be less effective 
(although undoubtedly this is part of the story) but also 
because their effects both depend on the effectiveness of 
control of inflow of foreign technology, and are normally 
more widely dispersed and therefore specific opposition is 
less likely to be aroused. Secondly, from the political 
point of view the ability to control the terms and conditions 
of the inflow of foreign technology is likely to be greater 
the more arms length and the less previous rlationship with 
foreign technology suppliers. Third, discretionary policies 
are more subject to abuse (e.g., through bribery) than 
general policies.
The political economy aspects of technology transfer and 
technological development in LDCs does not provide a reason 
for not attempting to control the inflow of foreign 
technology and foster local technological development. 
However, they suggest that political forces should be taken 
into account in formulating such policies and the need for 
strong ’will* to carry them out, needs to be emphasized. 
Indeed, most research on technology aspects in LDCs is in 
agreement that the state has a major role to play in the 
process of development of local technological capacities and 
in the diffusion of both international and local 
technological knowledge. However, there is a difference of 
opinion on the extent, duration and forms of this
intervention.83
The Role of the Capital Goods Sector in the Process of 
Technological Change
The capital goods sector occupies a unique role in the 
process of technological change. The reason is that it lies 
at the heart of the process of technology diffusion and 
generation. All technical change, whether in the form of 
product or process, requires the development of improved or 
new machinery. Meanwhile the diffusion of improved or new 
machinery enhances the process of technological change in 
using sectors.
In view of the central role of the capital goods sector in 
the process of technological change, it is worth analyzing 
the sources of technical change within this sector as well as 
the way they are diffused. The following diagram illustrates 
the sources of technical change and the way they are 
diffused:









^ flow of products
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As mentioned above, the most important function of machinery- 
building sectors lie in the adaptation, modification and 
innovation of machinery. To achieve this aim, machinery
producers require information on the basis of which they can 
make these changes. One of the important sources of this 
information comes from the interaction between producers of 
machinery and users and distributors of machinery. A number 
of authors analyzed the importance of this interaction in
shaping the kind of technical change produced in the capital 
goods sector.8 4 Another source of technical change in this 
sector is the machinery producer industry itself. As
Rosenberg pointed out, the capital goods sector has a unique 
feature in that it is both a user and producer of some 
machinery it produces.85 This is particularly true in the 
case of machine tools whose producers are at the same time 
users of some of what they produce. The result of this
production-use is that information flows are at least 
partially internalized within the firm producing the 
machinery and thus possibly facilitating the flow of 
information and their subsequent utilization for technical 
change. Another source of information internal to the sector 
but external to the individual firm is other producers of 
machinery whose innovations may be obtained either formally 
or informally.
A third source of information is the components producer 
industry who supply information in both embodied and
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disembodied form to, and receive information from, machine- 
builders. The fourth source of information is the 
engineering and research institutions which provide 
disembodied knowledge to, and receive both embodied and 
disembodied knowledge from, machine producers. Long ago, 
Marx provided the most substantial analysis of the two-way 
link between science and production. As Rosenberg86 argued, 
Marx observed ad analyzed the way in which the link between 
science87 and production via the development of machinery 
created the necessary condition for infinite technological 
improvement.
In view of the central role of the capital goods sector in 
technology generation and diffusion, it is not surprising 
that there is a general consensus on the importance of an 
indigenous capital goods sector for facilitating 
technological change in the LDCs. The reason, it is often 
argued, is that production conditions are to a large extent 
location-specific and consequently they are in many respects 
different from one country to another and particularly 
different in LDCs from those prevailing in DCs. Katz88 
listed a number of factors, such as scale of production, 
market size, factor prices and the degree of competition and 
skill availability, which may make the kind of capital goods 
that are required in LDCs different from those in use in DCs.
In addition to the function of adapting technology to local
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conditions, the capital goods sector plays a major role in 
linking research institutions to the production system, in 
responding to the production requirements of local users and 
in diffusing technology through improved and/or new 
machinery. It is the 'black box' in which information 
received from various sources are transformed, and 
simultaneously the main centre for the diffusion of 
technology. In its absence, new information which may be 
supplied by the various formal and informal sources, is 
either transferred to machinery builders abroad or simply 
shelved. Indeed, a considerable proportion of new ideas to 
improve products and processes in the Algerian industry, have 
been shelved for many years as a result of the 
underdevelopment of the local capital goods sector and bias 
in the allocation of scarce foreign exchange in favour of new 
projects (at the expense of refurbishing existing ones).80
For the reasons discussed above the capital goods sector has 
a potentially important role to play in the process of 
technological development and economic growth in LDCs. A 
crucial question, therefore, relates to the decision whether 
or not to import or manufacture locally. There are 
diametrically opposed opinions on a number of related policy 
questions in developing this sector in LDCs: while most
writers agree that an indigenous capital goods sector 
provides the necessary conditions to adapt, improve and 
generate new products and processes, the consensus abruptly
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ceases in cases where, at least in the short run, the local 
production of specific capital goods is inefficient relative 
to world best practice. In such cases, some argue that, if 
competing imports were to be inhibited this would place the 
users of these capital goods at a disadvantage. Others argue 
that protection of any kind and over any length of time will 
impair long-run progress which may be achieved through the 
effects of international competition.90 On the opposing 
side, there are those who emphasize the possibility of a 
long-run learning process which may eventually result in the 
attainment of international competition, thus justifying the 
short-run costs.91 Indeed, all LDCs, except perhaps Hong 
Kong, are establishing their capital goods sector through 
direct government intervention and some of them such as South 
Korea, India, Argentina, Brazil and Taiwan are competing on 
the world market. But even with this success, a number of 
complex policy issues arise. For example, is there a case 
for selective government intervention to promote the 
protection of certain capital goods that will not be produced 
otherwise? If the answer is in the affirmative, as some 
argue, what forms of government intervention are best? and 
for how long?. Conventional economic theory suggests that 
externalities, infant industry learning effects and training 
of skilled manpower may be taken into account in addressing 
the issue, but in practice the evaluation of these factors is 
problematic because of the uncertainty of what may happen in 
the future. For example, it is not possible to be certain
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that successful learning will take place. A likely danger is 
that local managers may become complacnt within their 
protected structure and lose, or never develop, the ability 
to be competitive, and may even block any attempt by the 
government to lift its intervention. As for the duration of 
the state intervention, it is theoretically a function of the 
lead time which separates the level of technological 
development of local capital goods producers from the world 
technology frontier: the larger the short run costs and the 
longer the period during which this intervention is required 
as local producers attempt to ’catch up*.
Some empirical evidence on these issues has recently been 
published. Some case studies concluded that there was a 
substantial increase in productivity and a considerable 
technological change in parts of the capital goods sector 
that were initially protected.92 Thus, while it is often 
argued that heavy protection and distorted factor prices 
remove incentives for local technological change, empirical 
evidence reveals that there are a number of cases where local 
technological innovation occured in a generally protected 
environment. Thus India and Argentina have been exporting 
technology, including whole industrial plants, to other LDCs 
and some capital goods to both LDCs and DCs.93 The sort of 
pressures which lead to local technological innovation were 
of many kinds, e.g., absence of particular raw materials, 
local users’ requirements and the like, and not confined to
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cost pressures associated with exchange rate policies and 
prices.94 Still it is not possible to conclude from these 
findings that the long-run benefits outweigh the short-run 
costs. Furthermore, Fransman argues that considerable 
learning took place in the capital goods sector in Hong Kong 
under conditions of near-free market. However, he concludes 
that under these conditions some potential protection-related 
gains may have failed to be realized.95 Again, it is 
difficult to be certain whether the learning process would 
have improved by selective government intervention. These 
empirical findings illustrate some of the practical 
difficulties in attempting to plan the development of the 
capital goods sector in LDCs.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a survey of many issues related to 
industrialization, technology transfer to, and technological 
development in LDCs. Perhaps the most important points to emerge 
from the discussion are that the overall economic strategy of the 
country strongly influences local technological development, that 
unregulated technology transfer can have undesirable effects on 
the recipient country (short term negative effects in the form of 
transfer of surplus available for re-investment and long term 
ones in terms of foregoing *learning-by-doing* effects) and that 
the state and the capital goods sector have an important role to 
play in fostering technological development in LDCs. Although
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some empirical evidence suggests that the state intervention had 
very little impact on terms of technology imports and 
technological development, these findings do not provide a reason 
for not trying to introduce desirable changes. In fact what they 
suggest is that political economy aspects should be taken into 
account in formulating policies and the need for strong 
committment to carry them out, needs to be emphasized. Most of 
the issues raised in this chapter will be discussed in the next 
chapter which focuses on Algeria’s experience.
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ECONOMIC STRATEGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL POLICY: THE CASE OF ALGERIA 
Introduction
In the previous chapter we argued that the general economic 
strategy of a country strongly influences local technological 
development. This is mainly because the general strategy
contains an array of implicit technology policies which are 
sometimes more important than explicit policies, and which 
frequently run against the objectives of local technological 
development. Identifying these contradictions are of great
importance for local technological development. For example, the 
explicit technology policies contained in the basic industry 
strategy1 followed by Algeria in the 1970s, reinforces 
technological dependence at least in the short and medium term. 
While its main long term objective is to reduce both market and 
technology dependence by emphasizing investment in the producer 
goods sectors, the strategy contains an inherent contradiction 
between medium term heavy reliance on foreign technology, and 
long term technological independence2.
There is no doubt that the basic industry strategy, if it is 
successfully implemented, will reduce both market and technology 
dependence by creating an integrated industrial productive system 
that features a capital goods sector, and thus provides a
necessary handle on the problem of development of indigenous 
innovative capacity. However, it requires investment in basic 
and producer goods sectors with advanced technologies that are 
unlikely to be mastered by the developing country, at its initial 
stage of industrialization, in the short run. Consequently it is 
inevitable that the implementation of such a strategy in the 
initial stage will heavily depend on foreign technology and 
management. This is only part of the learning process, a 
necessary but not sufficient step towards technological 
independence. The real question therefore is whether the initial 
heavy reliance on foreign technology and management will 
eventually give way to local ones. Proponents3 of the basic
industry strategy argue that there is bound to be friction 
between the introversion and extroversion tendencies inherent in 
the strategy, but they tend to emphasize the former and play down 
the latter, by emphasizing investment in the capital goods sector 
in order to end the dependence on raw material exports as a means 
of affording a necessary intermediate and capital goods imports. 
They also emphasize the importance of reorienting consumption and 
of reallocation of resources by channelling available resources 
towards the producer capital foods, the expansion of which would 
provide the necessary conditions for the development of a local 
technological capacity.
It appears that proponents of the basic industry strategy 
underestimate the effects of both the gap between local knowledge 
systems and the imported technology and internal and external
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constraints which may inhibit the process of local technological 
development; and they overestimate the role of the capital goods 
sector in the process of technological development. the 
implementation of the strategy requires heavy concentration of 
investment in producer goods and basic industries with advanced 
technologies that are unlikely to be mastered in a short time. 
These industries will have to be started and maintained for some 
time by using foreign patents, capital goods, engineering and 
foreign technical assistance. This is only part of the learning 
process, a necessary but not sufficient step towards local 
mastery of technology. The real question is whether the learning 
process envisaged will take place and eventually result in the 
development of a local innovative capacity capable of sustaining 
itself. In reply to this question, the basic industry strategy’s 
proponents argue that these problems are foreseen and can be 
managed both with conscious efforts of resource deployment on 
manpower training and institution-building and with protection 
while local technical and managerial personnel learn-by-doing.
It is doubtful whether LDCs could create in the short, and even 
in the medium run a system of knowledge comparable to that of DCs 
even if all their resources have been put into the effort. 
Development of the system of knowledge takes a much longer time 
than the establishment of a productive sector through the import 
of technology. This is a fact which is underestimated by both 
proponents of the basic-industry strategy and policy-makers in 
LDCs, where there is a pressure to deliver goods to people as
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fast as possible. As for the protection of the learning process 
against the pressure of international competition, it may be 
necessary but not sufficient, to ensure the emergence and 
development of a local innovative capacity4 . There is a likely 
danger, though not a necessary outcome of the strategy, that 
managers may become complacent within their protected structure 
and lose, or never develop, the ability to innovate. 
Furthermore, proponents of the basic-industry strategy argue that 
both diffusion of technology and innovation would take place 
through the establishment of an integrated productive system that 
features a capital goods sector. This argument underestimates 
the difficulties of establishing an integrated productive 
structure and overestimates the importance of the capital goods 
sector in the process of technological innovation and diffusion.
The ’blackening of the matrix’, or integration, is not only 
complicated in itself for reasons inherent in the planning and 
execution of a very detailed system of inter-sectoral and inter­
industry linkages. It is also restricted because of the terms 
imposed by the extrovert policy of seeking foreign assistance in 
solving these problems of introversion. Thus when foreign 
engineering firms and machinery suppliers are called upon to 
design, equip and construct industrial projects, they often tend 
to apply norms, specifications and technical coefficients 
familiar to them without taking into account the internal 
application and linkages, thus making the envisaged coupling a 
practical impossibility. It may be doubly difficult for local
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institutions to catch up and adapt un-linked production units if 
they, as it seemes to be the case in Algeria, continue to act 
independently of each other5.
There is no doubt that the establishment of a local capital goods 
provides conditions necessary to adapt and improve as well as 
diffuse products and processes, however its existence alone is 
not sufficient to fulfill these functions as this depends on the 
producers’ design and manufacturing capabilities as well an on 
interactions between them, potential users of capital goods and 
engineering and research institutions. Recent case studies 
carried out in some NICs reveal that the design capabilities of 
the most sophisticated capital goods producers in these countries 
are still limited. Examining the results of these case studies, 
Chudnousky concluded that "evidence is far from conclusive about 
the progress made by firms surveyed in mastering design and 
manufacturing technology... [B]asic design and, in some cases, 
even detailed designs are not yet mastered by leading producers 
in the countries studied. Accordingly, they suffer from a major 
handicap which affects their ability to fulfill their role as 
eventual generators of technological innovations".6
In addition to design and manufacturing capabilities of capital 
goods producers, the role of the capital goods sector in 
technological development depends to a great extent on the flow 
of information between producers and users of capital goods and 
on the competence of engineering and research institutions which
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often play a major role in translating the problems of users 
(particularly those lacking technological capability) into 
engineering solutions, as well as on their interactions with 
manufacturers of capital goods. Analysis of research activities 
in LDCs reveal that their links with the productive system are 
either non-existent or very weak. (See Ch. 1).
Having briefly analyzed technological implications of the basic- 
industry stragegy, we will examine in this chapter in great 
detail the points raised above, in the light of both de Bernis* 
Theory of * industrializing industries* and Algeria’s experience. 
Both de Bernis* theory and Algeria’s Strategy of 
industrialization contain implicit policies which aim to allow 
the country to attain a certain technological autonomy in the 
long run. Both argue that technological autonomy is not an 
immediately accomplishable goal but must be approached in the 
context of a transition from dependence to autonomy* This 
transition was to be achieved through the combination of rapid 
industrialization based initially on imported technology and 
extensive education and training programmes. Industrialization 
(based on ’industrializing industries*) through imports of 
technology was expected to provide the necessary input in the 
learning process and outlets for the education system; which was 
expected to provide the necessary skilled labour. The 
combination of the two was expected to provide a pool of skilled 
labour which, in combination with engineering and research 
institutions building would lead to the mastery of imported
77
technology and eventually to the generation of new technology. 
According to Algeria’s policy makers, Algeria would be able to 
master production by 1980, to have the necessary technological 
capacity to do most of applied research by 1985 and to be a 
relatively autonomous nation in scientific and technological 
fields by the year 2000, by being able to do R & D as well as 
basic research work in a comprehensive way.
Although insititutions for training local manpower and 
accumulating scientific and technological capacity have expanded 
considerably, it seems that they lag far behind the needs of the 
established productive system. This growing gap was partially 
due to rapid industrialization and the extrovert policy of 
seeking foreign assistance in solving the problems of 
introversion and partly to the initial low level of development, 
the established system and the education and training policy. 
The consequence of the imposition of these external and internal 
constraints was that the system of knowledge in its broadest 
sense, could not keep pace with the development of the productive 
system which was established through imported technology. This 
in turn resulted in a great waste of scarce resources both during 
projects’ implementation and after.
The discussion is organized as follows. The rest of this section 
provides an introduction to the next four sections and sets the 
study in its historical context. The first section focusses on 
the main objectives of the Algerian strategy of industrialization
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and the means to achieve them. The second provides a summary of 
the underlying theory of the strategy, ie, de Bernis’ theory of 
’industrializing industries’ and its implications for technology. 
It focusses particularly on contradictions inherent to the theory 
with regard to the role of ’industrializing industries’ in 
economic integration and technological development. We shall 
argue that although the author was aware of frictions between 
introversion and extroversion tendencies inherent to the strategy 
he advocates, he seems to have underestimated their adverse 
effects on the implementation of the strategy. The third section 
deals with the implementation of the Algerian strategy of 
industrialization, its achievements and problems. Although 
Algeria could hardly have done without realizing its hydrocarbon 
resources through exports, the question is whether the policy of 
rapid industrialization through massive imports of technology, 
with emphasis on the end product of an integral chain of 
scientific and technological activity, on competitiveness and 
thus on meeting the standards of the world market, is not making 
its long term objective of introversion through extroversion a 
practical impossibility. In addition to external constraints 
emanating from the policy which attempts to make use of the 
international circulation of technology, products and finance, 
other problems relate to the initial low level of development, 
the economic system and rapid industrialization, have resulted in 
great distortions and waste. The strategy’s achievements are to 
be analyzed from the point of view of economic growth, 
integration, employment and provision of a skilled labour force.
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The fourth section focusses on the education and training policy. 
The main conclusion to be derived from this analysis is that the 
inherited educational system which was essentially kept intact 
until the mid 1970s was irrelevant to the country’s priorities 
and needs and resulted in great waste.
Having outlined the contents of this chapter, it is helpful to 
situate the study in its historical context. When Algeria became 
independent in 1962, its economy was heavily dependent on France. 
Nearly all its industrial producer and consumer goods were 
imported from France. In exchange, it exported raw materials and 
agricultural cash crops, particularly wine, as well as unskilled 
labour. Its industrial sector was scarcely developed, its 
contribution (including mining, energy and construction) to GDP 
in 1958 accounted for just over 27%. In addition to this 
structural dependence, Algeria’s independence coincided with a 
massive exodus of European settlers. Among them were most of 
Algeria’a managers, administrators, technicians, teachers and 
skilled workers. This was accompanied by a tide of disinvestment 
and capital outflow which continued freely until the beginning of 
1964.
The historical experience of the war of liberation, the 
structural dependence of the inherited economy and the events 
which took place during the first years of independence have 
decisively contributed to economic independence becoming the main 
objective of development policy. Industrialization was regarded
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from the beginning as necessary for agricultural modernization, 
the creation of jobs and exploitation of the country’s raw 
materials. The 1962 Tripoli Programme adopted by the National 
Liberation Front (NLF) a few weeks before independence, states 
that: "the true and lasting development of the country depends on 
the establishment of the basic industries which are necessary for 
the m o d e m  agricultural sector. In this respect, Algeria has 
huge possibilities for promoting petroleum and steel industries. 
In this field, it is up to the state to create the conditions 
that are necessary for heavy industrialization"7. The Algerian 
planners regard "industrialization" as "the sole remedy to the 
problem of underdevelopment" and the only strategy "capable of 
promoting economic and social development in poor countries"®. 
For de Bernis, it is a "means to abolish economic dependence"10.
Although much remains to be learned about the nature of these 
goals, the tradeoffs between them, and the possibility of 
achieving them given both internal and external constraints, the 
economic literature has substantially analyzed in great detail 
these goals, and their investigation has become a fairly 
straightforward matter. The following chapter is a contribution 
to this investigation.
2.1 Objectives of Industrialization
Though launched in 1967, Algeria’s strategy of
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industrialization had been until 1971 lacking both practical 
and doctrinal justification. It was only in the early 1970s 
that the consolidation of the state apparatus and state 
control of the leading sectors of the economy were 
accomplished, thus making a centrally planned strategy of 
development feasible. The doctrinal justification of the 
strategy was outlined in an official document published in 
197111. This document was a synthesis of contemporary 
theories of development as well as the historical experience 
of certain countries. Ample reference was made to many
contemporary economists such as Perroux, Hirschman and above 
all to de Bernis as well as to the historical experience of 
certain Socialist countries.
The long terra objective of the strategy was to create an 
integrated productive system capable of ensuring both full 
employment and utilization of the country’s national 
resources and economic independence. This objective was 
expected to be achieved in the course of the 1980-1990 decade 
by which time an integrated national productive system based 
on a powerful industrial sector would have been set up. A 
powerful industrial sector was regarded as the means to 
achieve economic independence, introversion and integration.
The construction of a national independent economy explains 
largely the priority given to heavy industry in the process 
of industrialization. As A. Marchal pointed out, the
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industrializing effort ’’concerns essentially the strategic 
branches of production in economic, political and military 
terms"12. From the economic point of view industrialization 
in general and heavy industry in particular, was regarded as 
the only means capable of ensuring independent expanded 
reproduction. Thus, President Boumediene stressed in 1965 
that: "The main objective of industrialization is to
manufacture locally the necessary means of production so as 
to ensure the establishment of a solid base for our economic 
development"13 .
Introversion14 implies the reorientation of a dependent, 
disarticulated and disintegrated economy producing cash crops 
and raw materials for exports to a balanced and articulated 
national economy producing manufactured goods primarily to 
satisfy national demand. The objectives of industrialization 
according to President Boumediene were: "the increase of the
national income, the improvement of the workers* technical 
level, the increase of employment and the widening of the 
national market, ie. less dependence on foreign markets"15.
However, neither economic independence nor introversion imply 
total autarky. Consequently there is need for specialization 
and trade. This exchange must be based on both self-reliance 
and dynamic comparative advantages. This implies rejection 
of both import-led industrialization and static comparative 
advantage16. Algeria aims at replacing its exports of raw
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materials and labour with manufactured goods. However, these 
exports are primarily regarded as a vent for surplus from 
industries producing for the home market. Moreover, given 
its low level of development, Algeria regards economic 
independence as not an immediately accomplishable goal but a 
long run objective. While rejecting the existing status quo, 
the Algerian Strategy recognizes the need for trade in the 
initial stage of industrialization. As an exporter of
hydiscarbons of average importance and with limited reserves, 
Algeria aims at using its foreign exchange earnings from 
hydrocarbons to set up an industrial and technological base 
capable of self-generation and self-expansion. Algeria’s 
policymakers and their followers appeared to see no 
incompatibility between the long term objective (ie. economic 
independence) and the means to be used to achieve it (ie. 
heavy reliance on foreign markets for imports of capital 
goods and technology and for exports of hydrocarbons). Thus 
they expected that the country would reach the innovative 
stage (once a relatively integrated industrial structure and 
a pool of highly skilled and experienced personnel were 
created) in the course of the 1980-90 decade17 .
Industrialization and agricultural development were seen to 
be closely connected. It was argued that industrial 
development would provide agriculture with the necessary 
machinery and other inputs required for its modernization and 
consumer goods for its population. Meanwhile, it is the
84
expansion of agriculture which provides industry and its 
labour force with inputs and food. Thus President 
Proumediene stressed this agriculture development- 
industrialization inter-dependence: "Industrialization will
realize a symbiosis between the industrial and agricultural 
sectors and achieve a real complementarity within our 
national economy... With this industrial-agricultural 
complementarity we are not only going to be able to develop 
our agriculture and ensure our industrialization, but we 
shall also be able to save the foreign exchange needed to 
import machinery and equipment”18.
Industrialization was regarded by Algerian policy-makers as a 
cumulative process which tends to integrate all aspects of 
the economy. For such a process to be cumulative, industries 
required at the beginning of the industrialization programme 
must provide the basis for further industrial development. 
Consequently, the priority in the initial stage of 
industrialization must be given to what de Bernis calls 
’industrializing industries’19 or ’integrating’ industries. 
In the Algerian case these are essentially chemical, petro­
chemical, steel, metal processing, mechanical, electrical and 
construction materials. These branches were expected to 
transform the country’s raw materials (such as oil, iron ore, 
gas and phosphates) as well as to provide the whole economy 
with necessary means of production and intermediate products 
which would stimulate the rest of the economy.
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Since economic integration is measured by the degree of 
satisfaction of total national damand, it requires the 
creation of intersectoral complementarities through backward 
and forward linkages so as to prevent the leakages and 
multiplier effects and thus ensure a rapid overall 
development of the national economy. In other words, 
industrialization aims at what de Bernis calls "a systematic 
darkening of the input-output matrix”20. This implies that 
the decisive factor in the process of industrialization is to 
build up industries which would speed up the process of 
articulation of the economy through their * industrializing 
effect’ , ie. industries which provide capital and 
intermediate goods.
2.2 De Bernis* Theory of * Industrializing Industries1
The concept of ’industrializing industries’ departs from F 
Perroux* concepts of industrialization and the leading 
propulsive industry21. For Perroux, industrialization is 
"the restructuring of the whole economy and society by 
employing machinery in order to increase accumulatively and 
with decreasing human effort, the power of human groups in 
obtaining goods which are essential for their well being. 
Thus industrialization is the establishment of a process 
which consists of producing machnines by using machines such 
that the number of machines increases at an increasing rate 
and results in a decrease in human physical effort, therefore 
a greater liberation of man from the negative impact of the 
natural environment".2 2
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For de Bernis, industrialization is a ’total and complex 
phenomenon’ where the technical, the eoncomic, the political 
and the socio-psychological interact and influence each 
other2 3 . However, development of the forces of production 
(ie. the economic and the technical) predominate because the 
idea of the economy and its development are seized and 
understood through the input-output matrix whose 
transformation indicates the industrializing effect24.
Leading propulsive (in French ’motrice’) industries according 
to Perroux are relatively new ones which operate at a 
technically advanced level and exert a considerable influence 
on their environment through forward and backward linkages. 
The concepts of leading propulsive industries and the 
multiplier effect constitute the corner stone of de Bernis* 
concept of ’’industrializing industries”. Thus he defines 
’industrializing industries* as those which ’’indicate a 
systematic darkening of the input-output matrix, its 
transformation, or transformation of the production function 
through provision to the whole economy of new machinery and 
equipment which raise factor productivity or global 
productivity and, in any case, increases man’s mastery over 
his production and product...”25. This is a purely 
technical-economic definition: it ignores social and cultural 
environment and the level of development of the country (or 
region) where they are going to be set up. In other words, 
they are neutral: wherever they are set up, their
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industrializing effect will take place automatically. We 
shall come to this point later.
Amongst the multiplier effects computable to industry 
(technical, economic, social, political and psychological) de 
Bernis indentifies the industrializing effect of certain 
branches of industry. Thus he argues that although all 
industries have the multiplier effect, only certain 
industries belonging to the capital goods sector have the 
industrializing effect26. For LDCs to achieve real 
industrialization they have to avoid both import-substitution 
(based on consumer goods) and export-led industrialization: 
”For under-developed countires, the decisive factor in the 
industrialization process is the establishment of capital 
goods industries which are capable of feeding the economy 
with basic industrial products. Therefore one has to start 
with the industries which produce the means of production and 
not those that produce consumer goods”27.
These industrializing industries according to de Bernis are:
1. machine-building industries which produce capital goods
required to equip other sectors: machine-tools, turbines and
engines;
2 . the main branches of chemical industry which produce major 
basic and intermediate products required by both industry and 
agriculture;
3. energy (though not industrializing in itself, it can have
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positive effects on other sectors through interindustry 
linkages as well as through innovations which may occur in 
this sector).
Moreover, he divides the category of industrializing 
industries into those which produce what he calls ’non­
specific capital goods’ and those which produce ’specific 
gapital goods*. The former produces "essentially machine- 
tools, turbines, engines and computers"29. He stresses the 
importance of this sector because of its ability to initiate 
and sustain a circular process of its own as well as to 
innovate and to diffuse technology30. This implies an 
explicit reference to industrialization strategy advocated by 
Feldman, Mahalabonis, Dobb, Sen and Raj who emphasize the 
decisive role of capital goods sector and within it the 
machine-tool sector in the process of industrialization. 
They regard the machine-tools sector as the key to ’breaking 
out of the determinism’ laid upon the economy by the existing 
structural relations31. Thus Dobb argues that "There is a 
peculiar ability of branch M2 (ie. the machine-tools) namely 
that it can constitute a circular process of its own, turning 
machines capable of reproducing themselves, and also of 
reproducing, if need be, imporved types of themselves"32. 
However, one may add that this decisive role, attributed to 
the machine-tools sector in economic and technological terms, 
is only potential. The realization of this potential depends 
on a number of other factors especially managerial and
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technical skills, investment and trade policies of the 
country concerned. The Algerian experience reveals that the 
role of this sector (though small in size) is extremely weak 
largely because of lack of demand for its products33 as well 
as of skills and incentives.
The main features of the industrializing industries are 
first, they are often large scale and require important 
outlets. Second, they are capital-intensive and hence require 
a high rate of investment. Third, they are highly 
sophisticated technologically in relation to prevailing 
technological levels in most LDCs.
While liberal economists use these features to discredit and 
discourage such industries in LDCs, de Bernis, in contrast, 
aruges that: "It is, indeed, because of this fact that
underdeveloped countries have to use their available capital 
assets to produce more”34. Having said that, he imposes
certain conditions for the success of this strategy: 
a) rejection of the market as a principal criterion for
industrial development and resource allocation, particularly 
in LDCs where the economy is disintegrated and 
disarticulated. He advocates planning so as to ensure the 
’interiorization’ of the industrializing effect. As for the 
smallness of the market, de Bernis insists on taking into
account the potential market rather than the existing one.
In fact, the development of the capital goods sector can
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perform the dual function of expanding both the productive 
capacity of the economy and the internal market. This latter 
function, too often disregarded by liberal economists, was 
emphasized by Lenin, who argued that the widening of the 
internal market is possible despite restricted consumption 
and/or lack of external outlets, because "to expand 
production, it is first of all necessary to draw into it 
workers who create a demand on articles of consumption..."35. 
Therefore consumption develops after accumulation, ie. ’the 
accelerator in reverse’ as Dobb calls it36. The Algerian 
experience reveals that when a relatively high rate of 
investment is sustained for a while, the internal market 
expands very fast even if a disproportionate share of 
investment is allocated to basic and capital goods sectors37. 
Moreover, the basic-industry strategy allows for and even 
encourages exports of manufactured goods, but primarily as a 
vent for surplus from industries producing for the internal 
market. The real question which is often omitted by its 
advocates is whether the initially imported technology could 
be efficiently maintained and/or improved upon, to compete on 
the world market. As an inward-looking strategy, it provides 
for protection while local managerial and technical personnel 
learn by doing, and by doing so, it could result in creating 
an environment not conducive to technological innovation. In 
other words, there is a likely dnager, though not necessarily 
inherent to the basic-industry strategy, that local managers 
may become complacent within their protected structures and
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lose, or never develop, the ability to innovate, produce 
efficiently and react to changing conditions,
b. Because of their often large scale and capital-intensive 
character, the establishment of industrializing industries in 
LDCs require financial and managerial capabilities which are 
beyond the reach of local private capital. Only the state, 
de Bernis argues, is capable of both mobilizing the necessary 
resources to establish such industries and ensure their full 
utilization and expansion38. While emphasizing the role of 
the state and planning in the process of industrialization, 
de Bernis defines neither the nature of the state nor the 
social forces that are supposed to carry out this strategy 
and ensure its success. Consequently, planning is conceived 
of as a purely technical and economic operation rather than a 
political process that aims at transforming the existing 
socio-economic structures.
Furthermore, his analysis refers to the limits imposed by the 
external constraints without including their adverse effect 
on the implementation of the strategy he advocates. Thus 
LDCs* attempt to build independent national economies 
requires imports of machinery and technology as well as 
capital from the very powers whose control they intend to 
break. After all economic independence is not a matter of 
choice, but a matter of how feasible it is given the 
distribution of wealth and power in the world. It is 
inevitable that given the low level of industrial and
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technological development of most LDCs, the establishment of 
’industrializing industries’ requires massive imports of 
machinery and technology from the advanced countries. The 
real question therefore is whether the early dependence on 
foreign technology and management will give way to local 
control and result in the development of a local innovative 
capacity. de Bernis is aware of this contradiction between 
this inevitable medium term dependence and the long run 
objective of technological independence, but he does not 
address the question of how to solve this contradiction so as 
to ensure the success of the strategy. The main weakness of 
the strategy, he advocates, lies precisely in its inability 
to address the question of transition from dependence in the 
initial stage of industrialization to technological 
independence. While stressing the idea that technological 
independence is not an immediately accomplishable goal but 
must be approached in the context of a transition from 
dependence to autonomy and emphasizing the role of the state 
and planning, he neither explains how this transition could 
be accomplished, nor defines the nature of the state and 
social forces that may ensure this transition. Furthermore 
he does not appear to foresee the dynamics of technological 
change in the advanced countries which may render imported 
technologies obsolete before they are even assimilated by the 
recipient country. De Bernis appears to support the Algerian 
view that industrialization coupled with extensive education 
and training would ensure this transition.39 This view
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appears to underestimate both the duration of the 
assimilation process and the dynamics of technological change 
taking place in the advanced countries40.
Concerning the employment constraint, de Bernis calls for a 
distinction between what he calls ’’central processes” of 
production which have to be mechanized and ’’auxiliary 
processes” which do not have to be mechanized so as to save 
investment resources and to create more jobs41. In other 
words, he implicitly refers to the USSR’s early experience 
which, according to Ellman consisted of ’’labour-intensive 
variants of capital-intensive techniques42. It is doubtful 
whether the use of labour-intensive techniques in peripheral 
activities would result in the elimination of un- and 
underemployment in countries where the population increases 
very quickly43. The argument in favour of the use of 
capital-intensive techniques in core production processes 
runs as follows: they result in higher labour productivity
and consequently a higher surplus available for re­
investment; which in turn would lead after some time to a 
higher level of employment them the more labour-intensive 
techniques. The argument therefore is based on a number of 
rather unrealistic and restrictive assumptions. It assumes 
that plants using capital-intensive techniques are operated 
and maintained by local personnel; that their capacities are 
fully utilized; that each technique pays the same wage rate, 
and that all savings are reinvested. Each of these
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assumptions is challenged empirically44 , whilst the 
emergence of a dualistic economy, with its associated 
problems of chronic employment in Algeria has re-created 
emphasis on the need for labour-intensive technologies.
To the question whether the priority given to industrializing 
industries runs against the principal objective of 
development which is the improvement of living standards of 
the population, de Bernis argues that "the transformation of 
the structure of production will, at the same time, enable 
the amelionation of the living conditions of the workers and 
generate surpluses which are succeptible of being reinvested 
in the process of production”45. As pointed out above, this 
argument is based on unrealistic assumptions that installed 
production capacities are fully and efficiently utilized so 
as to maximize the surplus to be generated, and that all 
surplus generated is efficiently re-invested. The Algerian 
experience reveals that neither of these assumptions are 
true. Furthermore the argument underestimates the adverse 
effects of a shortage of consumer goods and social amenities 
on labour stability, the incentive to produce efficiently, 
and consequently on labour productivity,
c. Agricultural reorganization and modernization so as to
increase agricultural productivity as well as to avoid large- 
scale influx of peasants into the towns during the initial 
stage of industrialization. Success of industrialization 
depends on agricultural development. de Bernis views the
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dilemma-agricultural development or industrialization as 
meaningless because both are closely related.
d. An extensive educational and vocational training programme to 
provide skilled and semi-skilled labour required by both 
agriculture and industry. This point will be discussed in 
the last section of this chapter.
Having outlined the main objectives of the Algerian strategy 
and its underlying theoretical foundation as well as some of 
its inherent contradictions, we will examine in the next 
section some of the more specific problems that adversely 
affected the implementation of the strategy as well as its 
achievements. The first sub-section deals with investment 
allocation and realization with special emphasis on the 
priority sectors. The second sub-section analyses the 
strategy’s achievements in terms of employment, production 
and economic integration.
2.3 Implementation of the Industrial Strategy: achievements and 
shortcomings
Until 1969, Algeria had not elaborated a national development 
plan. Up to 1967, its development was mainly based on a 
follow-up to the Constantine Plan launched by the French 
Government in 1959 and primarily financed through foreign, 
essentially French aid. The main sectors of the economy were 
in the hands of foreign capital. In 1967, a 3-year
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investment programme was launched during which an inventory 
of national resources and reorganization of the colonial 
economic and administrative system was carried out. The aim 
was to pave the way for a centralized development strategy. 
The administrative system was reorganized so as to gear it 
towards development. New communal and departmental councils 
were set up to increase the participation of local 
communities into economic and social development.
Reorganization of the administrative system was accompanied 
by a tide of nationalization of foreign capital. By the end 
of 1971, the state imposed its control over the leading 
sectors of the economy: mining resources including
hydrocarbons, banking and insurance, the import-export trade 
and key industrial sectors. By the end of 1974, ’’there was 
no foreign firm operating in full contact, but only mixed 
firms”46. This state control of the main sectors of the 
economy has enabled it to appropriate available surpluses to 
implement its strategy of industrialization.
The state industrial sector was entrusted to national 
corporations which were set up to manage existing production 
units and to develop their branches of activity according to 
overall development plans. In most cases each national 
corporation had total monopoly over a branch of industry 
including import-export activities related to its branch. 
They enjoyed financial autonomy. Cooperation among various
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national corporations was expected to take place by mutual 
arrangements. The organs of central administration, notably 
the National Planning Secretariat, the Finance and Industry 
Ministries were expected to monitor and allocate priorities 
among various corporations according to overall national 
development plans.
In practice, neither centralized monitoring, nor cooperation 
and coordination among national corporations really 
functioned as envisaged. "The position of the state 
individual companies vis-a-vis central organs of the state 
bureaucracy is, if not of complete independence, so at least 
of considerable leverage"47. Subsequently, a network of 
informal connection among enterprises and bureaucracies 
similar to that found in East European countries has rapidly 
developed. This created a system that is neither a true 
bureaucracy nor a true market, but rather a "regime of 
bargaining" among the various entities in the system, in 
which informal relationships between bureau-techno-crats are 
the real keys to economic decision-making. In these 
circumstances neither priorities nor incentives are respected 
regardless of what the rules may specify.
At the micro level coordination among various national 
corporations with respect to the sequence of investment, 
techniques of production and acquisition of technology and 
other inputs, was almost non-existent. Left to themselves
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each national corporation strove to develop its branch 
independently48 . This resulted, among other things, in:
1. Each national corporation striving to achieve integration 
within itself, instead of strengthening inter-industry 
linkages through sub-contracting. A high ’make/buy* ratio 
means in-house provision of goods and services that are 
technologically dissimilar to the corporation’s major 
technological activity. This in turn means lower technical 
specialization, and many more difficulties concerning 
production planning, capacity utilization 49 and industrial 
organizations;
2 . long delays and high cost overruns in implementing investment 
projects and difficulties in bringing new production 
capacities to their full capacity utilization;
3. duplication of technology purchasing from abroad50;
4. distortion in the planned structure of investment and the 
structure of the economy and lack of horizontal, flow of 
information between various entities51.
By the end of the 1970s, most national corporations had 
developed into extremely large, diversified and highly 
centralized institutions, attributes which hampered their 
efficiency and ability to coordinate their actions. This 
weakness became a source of concern to Algeria’s policy­
makers and planners in the late 1970s. Consequently 
reorganization of the industrial sector was launched in the 
early 1980s.
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A. Investment Allocation and Implementation
The primacy of capital accumulation over consumption was 
opted for in 1967. Austerity was repeatedly stressed and 
heavy restrictions were placed on imports of luxury goods. 
It was also stressed that the sources of investment should in 
the main be generated internally, only assigning external 
sources an auxiliary role. The following table shows the 
increasing share of investment in GDP between 1967 and 1978.
Table 2.1 Gross Fixed Investment/GDP (%)
Pre-plan 1970-1973 1974-1977 1978 1974-1979*
1967-1969 Plan Plan
26.4 33.5 46.8 54.7 50.5
Source: MPAT, 1980; Synthese du Bilan Economique et social de la 
Decennie 1967-1978. Algiers, P.2 and my own calculation for the 
last column.
NOTE *: 1978 and 1979 were not included in any plan.
Table 1 reveals that it was in the 1970s that Algeria made 
the transition from the kind of investment ratios 
characteristic of most Third World countries to the much 
higher ratio characteristic of the state socialist countries 
in their initial stage of development. this gigantic
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increase in the ratio of investment did not take place at the 
expense of consumption in absolute terms. While the share of 
consumption in GDP had drastically declined between 1967 and 
1978, the absolute amount of consumption in constant terms 
had annually risen by 8.5*. However, the annual rate of 
growth of investment during the same period was almost twice 
that of consumption: it amounted to 15.5*.
In fact both investment and consumption grew faster than GDP 
whose annual rate of growth during the same period was 7.2*. 
Consequently the main source of increase in the share of 
investment in GDP in the 1970s was external, primarily in the 
form of non-concessional loans53. Indeed the proportion of 
external resources in total investment had risen from 9* 
during the pre-plan period 1967-9 to 22 and 33* during the 
first and second 4-year plans respectively. In general over 
65* of investment funds were appropriated by the Algerian 
state from value either created (in the form of external 
resources) or realized (in the form of exports) abroad. This 
high ratio demonstrates the high degree of dependence of the 
process of accumulation on the world market.
The saving capacity is not the only constraint to rapid 
economic growth. Some underdeveloped countries have no 
saving capacity constraint, yet they are unable to transform 
their savings into productive investment mainly because of 
their limited domestic absorptive capacity. Institutional
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rigidities, shortage of managerial, administrative and 
technical capacity, shortage of capital goods, lack of 
adequate infrastructure and the need to carry out investment 
projects sequentially rather than simultaneously may limit 
the number of investment projects at any time, in many Third 
World countries. Some of these constraints cannot be 
overcome solely by rapidly expanding the saving capacity. 
Efficient use of savings requires adequate institutional 
arrangements and means of realization.
In an open economy, domestic absorptive capacity constraint 
can be expanded through imports of goods and services up to 
the limit set by the country’s foreign exchange earnings. 
However, foreign exchange may not be a limiting factor as is 
the case in some oil rich countries. Yet institutional 
factors may limit the rate of expansion to which society is 
able to adapt itself over a given period of time to 
accommodate such investment. In the Algerian case the 
expansion of the absorptive capacity through massive imports 
of goods and services; which amounted to over 50% of 
investment expenditures undertaken between 1967 and 197954, 
was not enough to ensure efficient use of savings.
Long ago, the Yugoslav economist, Hovart, drew attention to 
the possibility of wasteful over-investment. The reason, he 
argued, is that an economy has a maximum absorptive 
capacity55. It seems that wasteful over-investment occurred
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in Algeria during the 1970s. This is manifested in high cost 
overruns, long delays in investment project implementation 
and capacity underutilization.
Official statistics show that actual costs (calculated at the 
end of each plan period) of investment projects planned 
between 1967 and 1977 amounted to 2.75 times the planned 
costs56. These cost overruns are generally attributed to 
rising prices of imported goods and services, to increases in 
the construction costs and delays in the initiation and 
execution of projects due to deficiencies in the 
administrative apparatus, lack of adequate infrastructure and 
shortage of qualified and experienced personnel. A study 
carried out on a sample of manufacturing projects revealed 
that cost overrun affected every stage of project 
implementation5 7.
Meanwhile, investment projects were rarely implemented in 
time. A survey of projects included in 1970-73 plan revealed 
that 62% of them were subject to delays of two and a half 
years or over5 8. These long delays and cost overruns were 
accompanied by capacity underutilization which was enormous 
in some industrial branches59.
These cost overruns and long delays have resulted among other 
things in great distortions in the structure of planned 
investment allocation. The privileged position of industry
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(including hydrocarbons) in planned allocation of investment 
was further strengthened during the phase of implementation 
at the expense of other sectors notably agriculture and 
infrastructure. More and more human and material resources, 
external and internal, were channelled to industry thus 
depriving other sectors of the necessary resources to 
adequately develop.
Table 2.2: Planned and Realized Distribution of investment in
absolute and proportional terms
Plan Sectors | Planned Realized
Million AD % Million AD %
1970-73
Agriculture, fishing 
and irrigation 4950 18 4350 12
Plan Industry (inc 
hydrocarbons)




16720 15 8900 7
Plan Industry (inc 
hydrocarbons) 48000 43.5 74100 61.2
Source: MPAT, 1980: Synthese..., op cit , p 5 and 7
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Despite this gigantic increase in the share of industry in 
total investment, the rate of realization in physical terms 
was extremely mediocre. While financial targets were largely
exceeded, the rate of realization (the ratio of investment
realized to actual costs of planned projects) between 1967 
and 1978, amounted to just over 50%. The rate of realization 
was above this average in priority sectors, ie. hydrocarbons 
(57%), ’basic and integrating industries’ (57%) and energy
(56%)60.
Although most of industrial projects included in the 1974-77 
plan were carried out by foreign firms on a turnkey basis, 
the rate of realization had drastically declined 
demonstrating the limiting factor of absorptive capacity. 
Thus, whereas the rate of realization was 57% during the
1970-73 plan, it declined to 44% during the 1974-77 plan as 
the volume of investment had sharply risen61 .
Within the industrial sector itself, the planned structure of 
investment had drastically changed during the implementation 
phase, with the share of the hydrocarbon sector having 
considerably increased at the expense of inward looking 
industrial sectors62. (See table 2.3 on page 105).
I. Hydrocarbons: They were expected to play a multiple role in 
the Algerian stragety of industrialization according to their 
uses as a source of capital accumulation and foreign
Table 2.3: Planned and Realized Distribution of Industrial Investment (%)
1967-1969 1970-1973 1974-1977 1967-1977
Planned Realized Planned Realized Planned Realized Planned Realized
Hydrocarbons 43 51 37 47 40 48.6 40 48.3
'Basic and Inte­
grating’ industries* 41 32.5 42 37 46.2 38.4 44.4 37.5
Mining and energy 7 9 11 10 5.4 6.2 7.1 7.4
Others 9 7.5 10 6 8.4 6.8 8.5 6.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data published by: MPAT, op. cit., p. 22.
* ’Basic and integrating1 industries refer to steel, chemical, metal, mechanical and electrical and construction 
materials industries.
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exchange, as raw materials and as intermediate products in 
the form of energy,
a) As a source of capital accumulation: Hydrocarbons were
primarily regarded as a source of foreign exchange needed to 
import machinery and technology to build up an industrial 
base and technological capacity capable of self-generation. 
Therefore they are on the one hand a means of achieving 
integration and introversion of the economy and on the other 
a means of increasing the country’s dependence on world 
market. Adepts of the Algerian strategy are aware of this 
problematic, but they tend to play down dependency, while 
stressing the idea that "Algeria is planting its oil" by 
using its returns to set up a self-generating industrial 
sector. This line of argument is valid only if, first, 
development of hydrocarbons, an export-orientated sector par 
exellence, is firmly made subject to the requirements of 
development plans. Otherwise, as a dominant sector of the 
economy, they may subject the rest of the economy to its own 
logic of reproduction which in turn is determined by the 
world market. Second, if its returns are efficiently 
utilized.
In practice neither of these two conditions were satisfied in 
Algeria before 1980. The actual organization of the economy 
conferred on various national corporations autonomy in 
developing their branches of activity, marketing and 
concluding contracts with foreign firms. This autonomy was
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further strengthened by the weakness of central organs of the 
administration which were supposed to supervise and monitor 
various corporations. Consequently, the national corporation 
SONATRACH which had a monopoly over hydrocarbons had 
developed into a huge institution with fiancial and economic 
weight which earned it the title of *a state within a 
state*63. The dominant position of hydrocarbons coupled with 
lack of adequate central control had considerably attributed 
to distortions in the planned allocation of investment in 
favour of hydrocarbons. Moreover, returns from hydrocarbons 
were not efficiently utilized. This is clearly demonstrated 
by long delays, cost overruns and capacity underutilization,
b) As a source of foreign exchange: hydrocarbons provided
approximately 90* of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. 
At the same time they absorbed 30* of total gross investment 
and 50* of the country’s foreign borrowings64. Over 75* of 
these investments were spent on expanding the export capacity 
of hydrocarbons. Moreover, a considerable proportion of 
investment allocated to other sectors were primarily intended 
to meet the increasing demand of hydrocarbons. Apart from 
cost overruns, two other factors had largely attributed to 
both heavy concentration of investment in hydrocarbons and 
its increasing reliance on foreign borrowings. Firstly the 
need to honour contracts signed with foreign firms. It was 
the exploitation of natural gas that absorbed the lion’s 
share of investment especially in the period 1975-9. 
Secondly, there was a decline in the share of internal
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savings due to the inability of both agriculture and 
manufacturing to release any significant surplus. Faced with 
competing demands for the available foreign exchange, 
SONATRACH turned to the international financial market. The 
aim was to use foreign borrowing to expand its export 
capacity while releasing a proportion of its foreign exchange 
earnings to meet increasing demands of other sectors. This 
resulted in further externalization of hydrocarbons.
This heavy borrowing abroad allowed the state to continue its 
industrialization strategy over the period 1975-9. By the 
end of 1979, the state was faced with heavy debt service 
exceeding 25% of total exports earnings, and it consequently 
decided to cancel a number of projects in the hydrocarbons 
sector. The aim was to save foreign exchange needed to pay 
debt service as well as to switch resources to other sectors 
that had been largely neglected such as housing, 
infrastructure and light industry,
c) As raw materials: Hydrocarbons are the principle base product 
of over 300,000 chemical and synthetic products. According 
to Chevalier the plastics industry is gradually tending to 
replace both steel and metallurgy in the hierarchy of 
*industrializating industries* and therefore construction of 
an economy oriented towards this - without necessarily 
passing through steel industry - is envisageable.
Oil and gas can certainly be the basis for a sound national
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petrochemical industry whose establishment can play a 
decisive role in both modernizing agriculture and inducing 
industries with strong forward and backward linkages with 
petrochemicals. The Algerian state is indeed determined to 
set up a national petrochemical industry geared primarily 
towards satisfaction of increasing local demands66, but also 
for exports to gradually replace crude oil and LNG. However, 
in the absence of regional cooperation, Algeria is forced to 
search for outlets in the world market which at present is 
both saturated and firmly under control of transnational 
corporations. A concerted effort by OPEC members in the near 
future may be necessary to gain access to Western markets, 
particularly as most of them are investing heavily in 
petrochemicals 6 7.
d) As a source of energy: Hydrocarbons were expected to
stimulate industry by supplying them with cheap energy. 
According to de Bernis, industries with strong 
industrializing effects are precisely those which use a large 
proportion of energy as inputs. Consequently, the existence 
of relatively abundant sources of energy provides Algeria 
with a considerable advantage in this sphere at two levels:
1) There is no need to import oil and gas hence saving foreign 
exchange;
2) Energy costs are relatively low due to the fact that world 
market prices of gas and oil are much higher than their 
production costs. Consequently Algeria could exploit this 
’natural advantage’ by setting up highly competitive
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industries. This implies discrimination between export and 
domestic prices at all stages of processing. Thus, according 
to de Bernis ’’...disposing of hydrocarbons sold on the 
domestic market at prices below world market prices, basic 
industries can be highly competitive on the world market, and 
therefore provide an adequate possibility, from the 
beginning, for outlets on the world market. This allows for 
the establishment of large scale production units and 
therefore result in low costs of production thanks to 
economies of scale. Furthermore, Algeria can export a 
proportion of production at world market prices, while 
exchanging the rest domestically at marginal costs. Nearer 
and nearer, the process will continue along the chain of 
production until its final link. Therefore prices of goods 
produced locally will remain low thanks to the 
internalization of external economies and the retention at 
each stage of processing of export possibilities”68.
The model is based on a number of unrealistic assumptions. 
It assumes that both investment and production activities are 
carried out as efficiently as in other competing countries; 
that once basic industries are established, they provide a 
comparative advantage to the country in question and that 
dumping will be permitted by competing countries. The 
existence of cheap energy alone does not automatically result 
in development of such industries, nor is it sufficient to 
ensure their competitiveness on the world market. For
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example, while possessing massive gas reserves, Algeria has 
been for many years using imported coal in steel processing 
even though the direct reduction process was developed in the 
1950s69. As for the competitiveness of such industries, it 
is doubtful whether low energy costs would be sufficient to 
offset high costs emanating from the conditions of 
underdevelopment and learning by doing. Thus, the model 
appears to both underestimate the conditions of 
underdevelopment and their adverse effects on investment and 
production, and overlooked the very great cost reductions 
(which are the result of energy saving as well as of other 
technological change) that have been made in the developed 
countries in the last ten years. Emperically, the assumption 
that both investment and production activities are carried 
out as efficiently as in competing countries, is not 
supported by the Algerian experience, where neither 
investment nor installed productive capacity was efficiently 
utilized, resulting among other things in high costs of 
production70.
II. Manufacturing: The share of manufacturing in planned
industrial investment between 1967 and 1977 amounted to just 
over 53%. High priority was given to ’basic and integrating’ 
industries, ie. iron, steel, metal processing, basic 
chemicals, construction materials and mechanical-electrical 
engineering. The aim of giving priority to these industries
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was to create a solid basis for both a broad industrial 
development and agricultural modernization. Their share in 
planned manufacturing investment amounted to just over 83% 
whereas industries catering immediately for consumption had 
to be satisfied with the rest. Despite this apparent bias in 
favour of the former set of industries, it is misleading to 
conclude that absolute priority was given to capital goods 
industries once we take into account:
a) the difference in capital-output ratios: the average capital
coefficient for ’basic and integrating* industries was 
expected to be 3 to 3.5 times that of those immediately 
catering for consumption;
b) the fact that basic industries* products such as steel and 
cement can just as easily be used for consumer goods as for 
investment goods production;
c) the allocation of investment devoted to capital goods 
industries between investment goods for consumer goods and 
investment goods for expanded reproduction such as machine- 
tools and heavy machinery to equip various sectors.
In practice neither the structure of planned industrial and 
manufacturing investment nor the priority within branches was 
respected. Firstly, the share of manufacturing in industrial 
investment declined from 53 to 44%. Secondly, the share of 
’basic and integrating’ industries in manufacturing declined 
from 83% to just under 80%. Thirdly, a considerable 
proportion of investment in priority branches such as
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electrical engineering were devoted to luxury consumer goods 
at the expense of investment projects producing capital 
goods 71.
Although official data do not reveal the proportion of 
investment allocated to the capital goods sector as a whole 
and within it the machine-building branch, for the whole 
period 1967-1979, official data for 1974-9 show that this 
proportion was relatively low. Thus the share of the capital 
goods sector as a whole amounted to 23,000 MAD or 10.6% of 
industrial (including hydrocarbons) investment programmes for 
1974-79. Compared with the proportion of investment 
allocated to intermediate industrial sectors as well as to 
the country’s needs for capital goods, the share of the 
capital goods sector was very low. Thus 21.6% of new 
investment programmes for 1974-79 concerned intermediate 
industries*. Although these industries play a major role in 
increasing the degree of integration of the economy, they 
neither ensure expanded reproduction of the economy nor 
directly satisfy consumers’ demand. As such they increase 
the country's propensity to import both capital goods and 
consumer goods. Whereas the latter was compressed through 
various means the former had rapidly increased as a result of 
the country’s increasing demand to meet its investment 
programmes.
* See Table 2.5 on page 116
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The share of capital goods in Algeria’s imports had rapidly 
risen both in absolute and relative terms between 1967 and 
1977. In absolute terms they increased almost eightfold.
Table 2.4 Imports of Capital goods at 1978 prices (in m. AD)
1967 1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978
Value of imports 
of capital goods 2200 9300 22400 51000 16500
as % of total 
imports of goods 30 35 41 46 48
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data published by
MPAT, 1980: Synthese..., op. cited, p 30.
In contrast to China which was able to produce locally 85% of 
the machine-equipment needed for its Second Plan, Algeria’s 
domestic production in 1978 amounted to just over 10% of its 
industrial investment needs for the same year65. This was 
primarily due to the fact that China had given priority to 
the machine-building sector at the very beginning of its 
development74. In Algeria the machine-building sector began
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to emerge only in the late 1970s and its full development was 
expected to take place in the 1980s. Preliminary studies 
carried out in the late 1970s showed that the size of the 
internal market was not any more an obstacle to import- 
substitution in many areas of the machine-building sector75.
Within the capital goods sector itself, there was heavy 
concentration of investment in branches producing capital 
goods for construction, public works, transport and 
communication. The proportion of investment allocated to 
these branches amounted to approximately 70% of the amount 
allocated to the capital goods sector as a whole for 1974-9.
Figures in table 2.5 reveal that the proportion of investment 
allocated to the capital goods sector as a whole in the 1980- 
1984 plan had considerably declined relative to that for 
1974-1979 and the share of intermediate industries had 
considerably increased. Meanwhile, over 50% of investment 
allocated to the capital goods sector were devoted to 
branches producing capital goods for construction, public 
works and communication. This reflects the priority given by 
the plan to housing and socio-economic infrastructure which 
were largely neglected before 1980.
Comp>ared with both the size of the existing capital goods 
sector and the volume of investment set for the plan, the 
proportion of investment allocated to the capital goods
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Z of lnd 
Invest.
Capital Goods for 
reproduction 1587 0.7 959.0 1.2 1400 1.1 1256 0.8
Capital Goods for 
industry 3320.4 1.6 1784.1 2.2 840 0.6 2114.1 1.4
Capital Goods for 
construction and 
public vorks 5234.5 2.4 3054.1 3.7 870 0.7 3204.5 2.1
Capital Goods for 
agriculture 1585.2 0.7 512 0.6 104 0.1 616.0 0.4
Capital Goods 
for Infrastructure 2055.9 0.9 1041 1.2 2060 1.6 2181 1.4
Capital Goods 
for transport 
and coomunlcation 9143.6 4.3 4191 5.1 406 0.3 3813 2.5
Total 22924.3 10.6 11541.6 13.9 5680 4.4 13212.6 8.6
Hydrocarbons 33.9 37.1 40.8
Intermediate Industries
(excluding
hydrocarbons) 21.6 15586.4 18.8 57568 43.4 43290.4 28.1
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data published by; HPAT. 1980; Rapport Sectori el
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sector as a whole was extremely low. This proportion does 
neither ensure future reproduction of the economy nor meets 
the country’s needs to capital goods. Consequently, massive 
imports of capital goods are required to implement the 1980- 
1984 and 1985-1989 plans.
Table 2.6: Sectoral Allocation of Investment and the
Corresponding Share of Investment in the Capital Goods Sector in 
1980-4 Plan (in million AD)







Farming 20 000 600 3%
Industry (inc 
hydrocarbons) 154 500 5 600 3.6%
Transport 13 000 3 000 23%
Housing and 
Consulting firms 80 000 3 200 4%
Telecommunications 6 000 600 1%
Total 273 500 13 000 4.7%
Total investment in 
the 1980-4 Plan 400 600
.... ..
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data published 
by MPAT, 1980a: Rapport sectoriel: industrie. Algiers
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Since 1980 there has been a radical change in policy. The 
priority has been given to social sectors rather than to 
"primitive accumulation"76. This change in policy is 
relected in the pattern of investment allocation during the 
1980-84 plan and above all in the pattern of allocation of 
new industrial investment (table 2.5: column 3). The share 
of industry (including hydrocarbons) in total investment set 
for the 1980-84 plan was considerably less than in the 
previous period. It amounted to 38.5%77. Meanwhile, 
industrial investments were geared towards satisfying social 
needs, that is for building materials, plastics, consumer 
durables, electric fittings, processed foods and other 
essential economic requirements, like those of agriculture.
This change in policy is particularly reflected in the 
pattern of new investment allocation in the 1980-84 plan 
where the share of industry was drastically reduced compared 
with the previous period, and the pattern of investment 
allocation within industry had radically changed. The share 
of industry (including hydrocarbons) in new investment 
programmes amounted to 132200 million or 36%. Meanwhile, the 
share of the capital goods sector as a whole in new 
investment programmes was drastically reduced to 4.4%, 
whereas that of intermediate industries was more than 
doubled. More important is the fact that this pattern of 
allocation of new investment programmes largely determines 
the pattern of allocation of investment in the 1985-1989
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plan primarily because a large proportion of new investment 
projects will be completed only after 19847 8 .
Two arguments have repeatedly been advanced by Algeria’s 
policy-makers to justify their decision to defer the 
development of the capital goods sector until a later date79. 
These arguments are:
1) shortage of financial resources particularly foreign exchange 
earnings required to expand rapidly the capital goods sector 
as a whole and within it the machine-building branch. This 
argument is fallacious because the implementation of most 
industrial branches as well as other socio-economic projects 
depends on imports of capital goods and technology. 
Consequently the main problem lies in the policy’s priorities 
rather than in foreign exchange earning constraint itself. 
In other words, it is a question of giving priority to either 
developing the capital goods sector as a whole , and 
particularly the machine-building branch so as to ensure 
future reproduction and rapid rate of growth or to developing 
other industrial sectors and consequently increase the 
country’s dependence on the world market for capital goods 
and technology in the future. Meanwhile, a large proportion 
of the country’s foreign exchange earnings are being 
channelled into projects which could be easily implemented 
without foreign firms’ involvement, and projects of little 
social utility80.
2 ) access to foreign technology in the capital goods sector is
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even more difficult than that in other industrial sectors. 
This conclusion is arrived at without making enough effort to 
search for appropriate sources of technology. Moreover, this 
argument applies only to certain areas of the capital goods 
industry. Technology for cetain areas is available on the 
world market. Meanwhile, Algeria could make full use of its 
cooperation agreements with friendly countries to build up 
its capital goods industry.
The 1980-84 plan gives a major priority to the development of 
the country’s engineering capacity. However, it is not clear 
how to achieve this aim while at the same time reducing 
drastically the share of the capital goods sector in total 
industrial investment. It is inconceivable to develop 
national engineering capacity without development of the 
capital goods sector and in particular the machine-tools 
branch. Without a domestic capital goods industry, Algeria’s 
economy is bound to remain dependent on the world market for 
its capital goods and technology. "Historical and analytic 
approaches both conclude that a capital goods sector is 
essential for innovatory activity. Lacking such sectors, 
underdeveloped countries have to import not only their 
machinery, but also their technical progress"81.
B. Achievements and Shortcomings
Having analyzed the objectives of the Algerian strategy of
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industrialization and examined the efforts deployed in terms of 
investment, we will in the following assess the Strategy’s 
achievements in terms of its main objectives: production and
integration, and employment. The analysis will be limited to the 
pre-1980 period because of lack of detailed data on achievements 
of the first Five-Year Plan 1980-84.
1. Production and Integration. The average annual rate of growth 
of GDP in real terms over the period 1967-78 was 7.2.%. This 
relatively low rate of growth was partly due to lagging 
agriculture and hydrocarbons whose annual rates of growth 
were respectively 2 and 5.2%, and partly to the slowing down 
of the rate of growth of the whole economy in the early 
1970s. The average annual rate of growth of GDP decreased 
from 11% during 1967-69 to 6 and 5.5% during the First and 
Seconde Four-Year Plan respectively, before it picked up 
again in 1977-79 when it attained approximately 9%82.
The average annual rates of growth of GDP during the First 
and Second Four-Year Plan were far below the planned ones 
which were 9.5 and 11.2% respectively. This divergence 
resulted among other things in a great discrepancy between 
the implicit ICOR ratios projected, which were respectively 
3.2 and 4.5, and the actual ones of approximately 7 and 9 for 
the First and Second Plan. This divergence in ICXOR ratios and
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rates of growth of GDP are to be found in cost overruns83, 
the change in the structure of planned investment and the 
situation prevailing at the outset of the plans with regard 
to utilization of productive capacity.
The change in the planned structure of investment during the 
plans implementation resulted in heavy concentration of 
investment in hydrocarbons and basic industries which are 
usually capital-intensive and involve long gestation periods. 
This in turn resulted in a rise in ICOR ratios and lower 
rate of growth of GDP.
Meanwhile, capacity underutilization had largely 
attributed to the rise in ICOR ratios and lower rates of 
growth of production. 1978 statistics reveal that most
industrial (including hydrocarbons) branches were operating 
far below their full capacity84. The proportion of 
underutilized capacity in hydrocarbons in 1978 was 
considerable85. This proportion has further increased since 
1980 when the state shifted its policy from maximizing 
production for export to energy conservation to meet the 
country’s future demand.
The causes and consequences of capacity underutilization in 
hydrocarbons differ from those of other industrial sectors. 
In the former, it was due to lack of demand on the world 
market as well as to a shift in the state policy.
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Consequently, this excess capacity represents a permanent 
wastage of resources. In manufacturing, capacity 
underutilization was not due to lack of demand86, but rather 
to organizational and technical difficulties which can be 
overcome once adequate measures are taken87.
The combination of cost overruns and capacity 
underutilization have partly accounted for the high marginal 
coefficient of capital and costs of production in the 
industrial sector as well as for the distortions in the 
structure of the economy and low degree of satisfaction of 
local demand. According to MPAT, every additional Algerian 
dinar generated through industrial production betwen 1967 and 
1978 required 11.2 AD of investment. The figures for 
hydrocarbons and the rest of the economy were respectively 
8.75 and 3.8 AD88. Meanwhile a comparative study of costs of 
production in a sample of French and Algerian factories 
revealed that costs in Algeria were often considerably higher 
despite the existence of a large differential in wage rates 
and energy costs in favour of Algerian producers.89 These 
findings demonstrate that low wage rates and energy costs are 
not sufficient to render Algerian industrial products 
competitive on the world market as suggested by de Bernis.
Although over 70% of investment realized between 1967 and 
1978 were channeled to productive investment, the share of 
material production in GDP has declined from 70% in 1967 to
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65% in 1978. Meanwhile the combined share of hydrocarbons 
and manufacturing which absorbed the lion’s share of 
investment over the period 1967-78, in GDP and material 
production had considerably declined during the same period 
as the following table shows:
Table 2.7: Change in the Structure of GDP and Material Production 
between 1967 and 1978
1967 1978
Sectors % of MP * of GDP % of MP . % of GDP
Hydrocarbons 50.2 35 44 28
Manufacturing 15.2 11 21.5 14
Construction and
Public Works 16.2 11 22.8 15
Agriculture 18.4 13 11.7 8
Material Production 100 70 100 65
Non-material Production 30 35
GDP 100
. . . . .
100
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data published by: 
MPAT, 1980: synthese..., Ibid., pp. 59-60.
Data in table 2.7 shows that the combined share of 
agriculture and manufacturing in GDP had drastically declined
125
between 1967 and 1978 due to a rapid decline in the share of 
the former which was only partially offset by the increase in 
the share of the latter. Although the average annual rate of 
growth of value added in manufacturing between 1967 and 1978 
was about 10% in real terms, it was far below the planned 
one. The divergence between the planned and actual rates of 
growth was particularly large in priority branches, i.e., 
basic and integrating industries.90
The proportion of local demand for industrial products 
effectively met by local production had drastically declined 
between 1967 and 1977. It declined from 48% in 1967 to 38.8% 
in 1973 an 24% in 1977.91 Thus far from increasing the 
degree of integration of the economy, Algeria’s 
industrialization strategy had resulted in greater dependence 
on the world market not only for technology (both embodied 
and disembodied) but also for semi-finished products and 
foodstuffs. The growing importance of the last two groups 
reflects the economy’s growing dependence on imports for its 
very functioning.92 Some of the reasons for this increasing 
dependence on world markets are inherent to the strategy and 
others are to be found in organizational and technical 
difficulties encountered. The construction of a highly 
diversified and integrated economy is a complicated matter 
and can only be realized in the long-run. The ability to 
complete the chain of domestic resources to domestic use 
depends largely on the resource endowment and time. It seems
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inevitable that even if the country is richly endowed with 
material resources, the inherent contradiction remains 
between medium-term dependence on the world market and the 
long-term objective of economic independence. In addition to 
this inherent contradiction, organizational and technical 
difficulties encountered in the implementation of the 
strategy considerably contributed to the increasing 
dependence of the economy on the world market. These 
organizational and technical problems resulted in long delays 
in project implementation; in bringing installed capacities 
to their rating rates, inefficient methods of communicating 
information on the availability of materials and services and 
near total absence of interagency coordination and exchange 
of information. The latter two resulted in importing inputs 
which are either produced or could be locally produced.93
Cost overruns, long delays in projects implementation and in 
bringing new production capacities to their full use, and 
capacity underutilization have been a major source of concern 
to Algeria’s policy-makers since late 1970’s. A lengthy 
investigation into the causes of industrial inefficiency was 
conducted in 1978-9 and several reforms aimed at speeding up 
the process of initiation and execution of projects and 
stepping up productivity were suggested. The most important 
of these reforms was the reorganization of the industrial 
(including hydrocarbons) sector. National corporations which 
had developed into huge and highly centralized institutionns,
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two attributes that hampered their efficiency and ability to 
coordinate with each other, were split into specialized and 
decentralized enterprises. Most services such as housing, 
transport, consultancy engineering and trade which were 
previously run by national corporations have been transferred 
to either local authorities or other specialized enterprises. 
The aim was to let production enterprises and factories 
concentrate on production so as to improve their efficiency 
and financial viability and to promote sub-contracting.
The most significant features of this reorganization are the 
relocation of a large number of new enterprises outside 
Algiers, devolution of certain powers to factory managers and 
the separation of development from production.94 Whereas 
before reorganization all national corporations had their 
headquarters in Algiers, new enterprises* headquarters have 
been set up where their main production activities are 
located. This has been done with the intention of both 
stimulating regional development and making top management 
closer to production. Meanwhile factory managers were, in 
principle given autonomy in day-to-day running of their 
production facilities within the framework of annual 
production programmes agreed upon in consultation with their 
enterprises* management and central administration.
Though it is early to assess this reform, its main weakness 
lies in its imposition from above without prior consultation
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of those directly concerned. This is bound to result in 
delays in its implementation, wastage and conflicts. These 
problems appear to have been taken into account in the 1980- 
84 Plan during which the reform was expected to take place. 
For example, the annual rate of growth of the economy was 
expected to be 8.23» which is lower than that achieved during 
1977-79. This expected rate can be considered very low if 
one takes into account the volume of investment planned and 
the enormous size of slack capacity existing at the time of 
the launching of the plan. In fact the main objective of the 
plan was to bring existing production capacities to their 
full utilization. However, although the plan appears to have 
taken into account, the short-term adverse effects of the 
reform on the rate of growth of the economy, it 
underestimated the full impact of the difficulties related to 
the implementation of the reform (see below).
First reactions to the reform indicated that the prospect of 
geographical relocation worried managers and executives who 
saw their power position and comfort threatened. The lack of 
social facilities and entertainment in small cities where 
some of the enterprises are headquartered is another reason 
for executive managers and highly skilled workers, used to 
high living standards, to resist the reform. This resistance 
resulted in the implementation of the reform taking longer 
than expected and new enterprises lost a considerable 
proportion of their highly skilled and experienced
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personnel95. This in turn resulted in lower rates of growth 
realized during the 1980-84 Plan. Thus preliminary official 
data published in 1985 revealed that the actual annual rate 
of growth of the economy, excluding hydrocarbons, was about 
5.8% with the industrial sector growing at around 9.5%96. 
Both rates were much lower than those planned and 
considerably lower than those achieved during 1967-79 period.
Although the degree of autonomy of state enterprises and 
factories have increased somewhat, many administrative 
restrictions on their operations have been maintained, thus 
ensuring their de facto dependence on the central and local 
bureaucracy. Many product and factor prices are regulated 
administratively. Wage regulation remained strict, imports, 
especially * non-routine’ purchases, ar strictly controlled 
and investment decisions are decided upon at the centre, 
thus, the system as it actually works cannot foster the 
interests of management in efficiency and profitability, 
which the reform aims at achieving. Frictions and conflicts 
between management and bureaucracy have emerged as the latter 
tries to impose direct control over the former. Meanwhile 
the problem related to coordination between various 
enterprises was not tackled by the reform, except by 
encouraging them through various and indirect means97 to 
coordinate their activities through contractual arrangements. 
A likely danger is that enterprises may behave in the same 
way as the old national corporations, each trying to solve
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its problems on its own.
2. Employment: Unemployment has been a major problem in Algeria 
since the 1930s98. The inability of the colonial economy to 
provide enough employment for the rapidly increasing labour 
force was recognized by the Gaullist Administration as soon 
as it came to power. Writing in 1959, R Gendarme emphasized 
that Algeria’s socio-economic problems were due to lack of 
investment99. Soon after independence, unemployment became 
one of the major political issues. Though there was a 
general agreement on the necessity of industrialization to 
increase the potentialities of the economy to meet employment 
demand, there was no agreement on the immediate priorities of 
industrialization. On the one hand there were those who 
advocated social requirements and the satisfaction of the 
consumption needs of the impoverished masses as the immediate 
priority of industrialization. This view was criticized by 
those who advocated heavy industry and regarded the first 
view as a "fuite en avant" on the grounds that such a policy 
would not eradicate the causes of underdevelopment and 
consequently of under-and un-employment.
This debate came to an end in 1966 when the strategy of 
industrialization was launched. Its employment objective was 
to provide jobs for the whole male labour force by 1980:
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"The principal objective of the chosen long-term development 
strategy has a central preoccupation which is the radical 
elimination of un-and-under employment by means of the 
authentic industrialization of the country... The assessed 
objective is that from 1980 onwards the causes of 
unemployment must be irreversibly abolished and that the 
total annual growth of the labour force must be equal to the 
new jobs that will be annually created by the development of 
industries and the activities related to the 
industrialization of the cities"100.
According to the 1966 census101 the number of employed and 
unemployed males in the labour force amounted to 1.72 and
0.58 million respectively. Meanwhile the male labour force 
was expected to increase annually on the average by 70,000 
over the period 1967-73 and by 100,000 over the period 1974- 
80. The capacity of the economy to generate employment under 
the prevailing conditions of the early 1960s was estimated at 
around 30,000 annually. In order to find a solution to this 
increasing disequilibrium between labour supply and demand, 
it was argued that: "There was no alternative but to take a
radical action"102 in the light of a long-term strategy of 
industrialization.
The number of new jobs created over the period 1967-79 
amounted to over 1.4 million. They were exclusively in non- 
agricultural sectors notably hydrocarbons, construction and
Table 2.8: Distribution of New Jobs created during the Period 1967-79 and of new
jobs expected during the 1980-4 Plan (in thousands)
1967-69 1970-73 1974-79 1967-79 1980-4
1. Industry (inc. hydro­
carbons) 38 84 270 392 185
of which hydrocarbons (2) (14) (18) (34) n.a.
2. Construction and 
public works 11 108 210 329 300
3. Trade and Other 
Services 13 21 295 329 305
4. Transport 11 21 50 82 105
5. Administration and 
Others 12 166 136 314 280
Total 85 400 961 1446 1175
Annual Average 26 100 160 120 235
Industrial Annual Average 12.7 21 45 33 37
Source: Compiled 
by the author 
on the basis of 
data published 
by: MPAT, 1980: 
synthese..., 
op. cit., p. 136 





public works, industry and transport, as figures in table 2.8 
show. Meanwhile employment in agriculture had decreased in 
the 1970s103
Quantitatively, the expansion of employment over the period 
1967-79 did not rsult in the elimination of male unemployment 
by 1980 as projected. The rate of unemployment had been 
reduced on the average during the same period from 25 to 18% 
of the active population as it is conventionally defined (ie. 
including male age-groups 18-59 and only a small proportion 
of women of working age). The rate of unemployment remained 
extremely high among the youth: 37% of the age-group 18-20
were unemployed in 1978. Meanwhile over 50% of school 
leavers (age-group 15-17) were neither employed nor 
integrated into the educational and training system105.
The failure to achieve male full employment by 1980 was due 
to:
1. demographic explosion: the annual average rate of growth of 
the population over the period 1967-79 was estimated at 3.3%, 
’’one of the highest in the world”106;
2 . heavy concentration of investment in highly capital-intensive 
sectors such as energy, hydrocarbons and basic industries and 
long delays in investment implementation. The average cost 
of each job created was extremely high particularly over the 
period 1974-78;
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Table 2.9: Investment per .job created at 1978 prices (in
thousands AD)
1967-9 1970--3 1974-8 1967-78
Basic and integrating industries 60 219 475 340
Other manufacturing industries 43 101 347 225
Mining and energy (excluding 
hydrocarbons) 136 819 722 614
Average for industry (excluding
hydrocarbons) 63 220 467 333
Average for the Economy 
as a whole 302 277
Source: MPAT, 1980: Synthese..., op. cit PP- 13-14
3. low degree of integration of the Algerian economy: This is 
reflected in heavy reliance on imports of capital goods, 
services and semi-finished products produced by labour 
abroad;
4. non-correspondence between domestic labour supply and demand:
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whereas there was a chronic shortage of highly qualified 
personnel and skilled labour required to plan, design, 
construct and manage production units, there was over supply 
of unskilled labour. Already, before independence, Algeria 
had an inadequate supply of qualified manpower at all levels. 
At independence, a big gap was created by the massive 
departure of the European settlers who were Algeria’s 
industrialists, technicians, administrators and foremen. A 
Tiano estimated Algeria’s deficit in qualified manpower 
required by its non-agricultural sectors in 1963 at over
100,000 of which 5000 concerned the category of heads of 
enterprises106.
Official studies carried out in 1966-7 revealed that the 
economy was suffering from a shortage of 2500 highly 
qualified persons, yet it was employing 7000 expatriates in 
the same category. At the middle level of qualification, the 
deficit was estimated at 11,000 elements with 20,000 active 
expatriates in the same category107. With the adoption of 
rapid industrialization policy, demand for skills at all 
levels has largely outpaced supply both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.
This shortage of skills at all levels had a three fold 
consequence. The first was that poorly qualified Algerians 
continue to occupy highly responsible positions with its 
adverse effects on the efficient use of available resources.
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Table 2.10: Algeria’s deficit in qualified manpower in
1977 (non-agricultural)





Estimated demand for 
skills over the 
period 1970-77 67 140 94 000 243 000
Planned training 
Targets (1970-77) (60 180) (48 700) (232 000)
Achieved 48 000 27 950 169 000
Expatriates* 14 200 1 500 3 400
Deficit in 1977 
(inc Algerianization) 32 400 67 500 77 900
Deficit in 1977 (exc 
Algerianization) 18 200 66 000 74 500
Source: MPAT, 1980: Synthese..., op, cit., p. 192.
Note(*): This number excludes expatriates working with foreign
firms contracted by Algerian firms and various administrations.
The second was an increasing demand on foreign technical 
assistance whose presence exerts an influence over decision­
making in many fields, including that of the choice of 
techniques and sources of technology. J Minces estimated the
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number of expatriates working in Algeria in 1978 at 85000108. 
The third consequence was labour instability due to wage 
differentials and other social problems such as housing and 
transport. The average labour turnover in the industrial 
sector over the period 1974-80 was estimated at 30&109.
This increasing shortage of skills despite the exceptional 
effort undertaken by the state in educating and training 
manpower both at home and abroad was mainly due to:
1. the fact that training of highly qalified and experienced 
personnel cannot be achieved overnight particularly in a 
country such as Algeria where illiteracy was extremely 
widespread amongst all age-groups and industrial experience 
was lacking;
2 . a heavy concentration of investment in highly skill-intensive 
industries;
3. inefficient use of the available resources in the educational 
system.
The structure of non-agricultural employment had considerably 
changed during the period 1967-77 with the material 
production sector almost doubling its share at the expense of 
the tertiary sector. Figures in table 2.11 reveal a tendency 
towards a rise in the share of productive employment and a 
decline in the share of the tertiary sector. However, this 
increase in productive employment was much faster than the 
increase in value added; which resulted in a decline in value
added per employee.
Table 2.11: The structure of non-agricultural employment (%).
Sectors 1967 1970 1974 1977 1978 1979
Hydrocarbons 0.7 0.8 1.8 2.8 2. o)
23.3
Manufacturing 13.4 16.1 17.6 18.8 20.0)
Construction and
public works 8.2 11.7 15.3 19.7 20 18.7
Trade 20.4 17.8 14.1 11.6 11 ^
Transport 6.0 6.6 6.9 7.6 6 /
58
Other services 16.3 15.0 12.2 11.1
11 1
Administration+others 35.0 32.0 32.1 29.3 30 )
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data published by: 
MPATt 1980: synthese... op. cit., p. 136.
Figures in table 2.12 reveal that there was a drastic decline 
in value added per employee in the hydrocarbons sector. 
Whereas the annual rate of growth of employment amounted to 
approximately 19%, that of value added was only 5.2% over the 
period 1967-77. The average value added had considerably 
picked up in 1978 as employment was kept at 1977 level.
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Table 2.12: Value added per employee in thousand AD at
1978 prices
Sectors 1967 1977 1978
Hydrocarbons 2,367 562.7 615
Manufacturing 36.8 31
Construction and public works 64.7 32
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data published by:
MPAT, 1980: synthese.... op cit. pp 63-4
This decline in the average value added in all directly 
productive sectors was partly due to overmanning and partly 
to capacity underutilization. The reasons for overmanning 
differ from one sector to another. Whereas social reasons 
were mainly behind overmanning in hydrocarbons and 
construction and public works sectors, labour instability and 
’Algerianization* (ie. employment of Algerians alongside 
foreign personnel to learn how to operate, maintain and 
manage the plants) were the main reasons for overmanning in 
manufacturing. In addition to labour instability and 
Algerianization there was overmanning110 in auxiliary 
activities in the manufacturing sector. To tackle the 
problem of overmanning, the 1980-84 plan called upon 
enterprises to reduce the level of manning in accordance with 
technical and economic requirements of their activities, by 
transferring the existing extra personnel to newly
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established activities111.
Capacity underutilization was a common feature to all 
sectors, except a handful of manufacturing branches112. 
Whereas most production units were operating far below their 
full capacity, the level of manning was often kept at the 
rating capacity. The reasons for this capacity 
underutilization were multiple113. The most important ones 
were:
1. lack of sufficient managerial and technical skills required 
to operate and maintain the machinery and manage production 
units efficiently. This resulted in long gestation periods 
and frequent stoppages due to technical breakdowns and/or 
lack of spare parts and inputs;
2 . administrative rigidities and infrastructural bottlenecks 
which often resulted in long delays in supplying inputs 
required to keep machinery and plants operating smoothly;
3. initial mistakes in the design and/or installation of 
machinery from which a considerable number of plants were 
suffering;
4. systematic option in some manufacturing branches (such as 
mechanical and electrical engineering) for large scale and 
highly integrated production units where most components and 
parts of (the) final product(s) are produced within the same 
production unit itself rather than sub-contracted. This 
option has often resulted in mistakes in the installation and 
design of certain production units as well as in capacity
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underutilization of certain parts of the plant, and 
difficulties in managing such large scale production units;
5. high labour turnover and absenteism (see case studies).
2.4 Education and Training Policies
Algeria’s time horizon was to master production technology by 
1980, to have the necessary technological capacity to do most 
of applied research by 1985 and to become a relatively 
autonomous nation in scientific and technological fields by 
the year 2000, by being able to do R & D as well as basic 
research work in a comprehensive way. It was envisaged that 
the long term objective would be achieved through a 
combination of rapid industrialization using imported 
technology and extensive education and training effort. From 
the technological point of view, the former (ie. 
industrialization through import of technology) was expected 
to provide both the essential input for the learning process 
and outlets for the educational and training system, which in 
turn was expected to provide the necessary skills to 
assimilate the imported technology, improve upon it and 
eventually generate new ones.
As we argued in the first chapter, the relationship between 
the import of technology and the development of local 
technological capacity is complex and encompasses both 
complementaities and conflicts. The import of technology can
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be an essential part of the learning process, however, its 
unrestricted inflow may severely inhibit the development of 
local technological capacity and may even destroy the already 
existing one. It appears that the industrialization policy 
followed by Algeria in the 1970s has generally resulted in 
turning the imported technology from an investment item (ie. 
imported for learning purposes with the aim of reproducing 
it) into a consumption item.
Meanwhile, it is often argued that education is an investment 
and a means of development and consequently its expansion is 
beneficial and necessary to development. In fact, education 
can be regarded as an investment as well as consumption, and 
as a means of development as well as a product of it, and
consequently its expansion has to be considered in relation
to the process of development of the economy. Education is 
an investment if it is geared towards the priorities of the 
economy and its output matches the requirements of the 
economy, otherwise it is consumption and its expansion may 
undermine the country’s potential economic development as 
well as its social stability by producing a mass of educated 
unemployed. Meanwhile, education is a means of development 
as well as the product of it. This reciprocity is clearly 
manifested in LDCs where the school is expected to compensate 
for the backwardness of the general technological 
environment, formal training for the deficiencies of the
education system, learning on the job for gaps in previous
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education and training, and learning-on-the-job of course 
reflects many of the same weaknesses noticed in informal and 
formal training and education. Furthermore, weak links 
between the education system and research institutions, and 
the productive system have tended to marginalize the former 
and maintain dependence on foreign technology.
Despite the financial effort114 devoted to education since 
independence, its output has not kept pace with the range and 
level of sophistication of imported technology, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. The gap between supply of 
and demand on skilled manpower had considerably increased 
during the 1970s. This was due to the initial low level of 
development, the inherited educational system, rapid 
industrialization and to the fact that it takes longer to 
produce qualified personnel than to construct a production 
unit. The inherited industrial sector was very small and 
limited in range. Before independence, its skilled labour 
force was mainly provided by European settlers whose 
departure in 1962 left a large gap which was partly filled by 
Algerians and partly by foreign technical assistance. The 
inherited educational system, which had been established 
mainly to cater for the settlers, became irrelevant to new 
priorities and needs, yet it was essentially kept intact 
until the mid-1970s. The gap was further increased in the 
1970s as planners approved mammoth investment programmes 
whose simultaneous implementation was much beyond the ability
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of the country to carry out, thus increasing demand on 
foreign technology and technical assistance.
Although the growth in total number of pupils and students 
during the 1960s and 1970s was impressive, this expansion was 
both disproportionate and achieved at the expense of quality.
Table 2.13: Pupils and Students in Algeria’s Educational
Institutions* (in thousands)
Year 1962/63 1967/68 1977/78
Primary education 750 1460 2900
Schooling rate (%) 30 47.8 72.5
Secondary education 32 143 745
Higher education 3** 17 55
Vocational training — 9 55
Sources: J Leca in H Defosses and J Levesques feds): 1975:
Socialism in the Third World. Praeger Publishers,
New York, p 147; and MPAT. 1980: Synthese... op cit.
p 150
Notes: (*) These figures do not include students sent for
training abroad.
(**) Most of the students registered in 1962/3 were 
foreigners.
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Figures in table 2.13 show that the number of pupils and 
students in 1962/63 was very small and that the expansion 
that took place in the 1960s and 1970s was disproportionate 
with regard to vocational training and scientific and 
technical education. This diproportionate expansion was 
partly due to the inherited educational system and partly to 
difficulties inherent to education planning as well as to 
long delays in implementing investment projects in this 
sector.
Though repeatedly criticized for its out-of-date curricula, 
incohesion and high selectivity (and therefore wasteful), the 
inherited educational system was essentially kept intact 
until the mid-1970s. Attempts at planning education, so as 
to match investment in and production of graduates of 
appropriate types and levels to the progressive levels of 
development, failed partly because of difficulties inherent 
to planning education and partly due to delays in reforming 
the system and in construction and teachers’ training. The 
objective of maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between supply 
of and demand on skilled manpower is difficult to 
approximate, let alone achieve, through centralized planning 
and direction. The task is further complicated by the fact 
that the individual choice in this field cannot be suppressed 
trough administrative measures. Furthermore, there are 
socio-economic and psychological barriers which tended to 
make reorientation of students towards scientific and
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technical courses and careers even more difficult. There is 
a tendency in Algeria to view manual work as inferior 
compared to other types of work, particularly professional 
work and civil service. These attitudes are perpetuated by 
the low status of manual and technical work in the 
organizational and wage/salary hierarchy. Consequently, any 
attempt at reorienting the education system towards science 
and technology requires provision of an adequate system of 
incentives so as to correct the existing imbalance and to 
change the existing system of attitudes towards manual and 
technical work. In addition to the above mentioned problems, 
attempts at reorienting students towards science and 
technology in the 1970s were hampered by long delays in 
reforming the old system and in construction and equipment of 
technical colleges, universities and vocational training 
centres planned during the First and Second Four-Year 
Plans115.
Broadly speaking, the main features of the old system of
education were:
a) The provision of schooling did not meet the demand due to the 
demographic explosion and delays in implementing projects in 
this sector, and fell even short of meeting the target of
universal primary education. The same is true at secondary
and higher education as well as vocational training.
b) The provision of education for adults was even more
inadequate. The 1966 Census indicated that 63.3% of the male
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population and 86% of the female population were illiterate. 
Although a national programme, which originated in a UNESCO 
project that started with a sample of 200,000 workers in the 
main industrial zones, aimed at extending functional literacy 
to 2 million adults in the 1970*3 was formulated, its 
realization fell far short of its target. The main effort 
has been directed at the economically active population and 
its extent had been very limited as the following table 
shows.
Table 2.14: Adult Population Affected by Illiteracy Programme
Year 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1977/78
Adult students 7,500 44,000 140,345 183,115 84,800
Sources: J Cameron and P Hurst (eds), 1983; p 595, and MPAT,
1980; Synthese... op cit, p 165
c) Vocational training was largely neglected and its output did 
not meet manpower requirements; which resulted in an acute 
shortage of middle level technical and managerial personnel.
d) A dramatic expansion in the number of pupils and students, 
which resulted in great pressure on available human and 
physical resources and consequently in lower quality.
e) Curricula were based on out-of-date methods, textbooks and
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teaching aids were often in short supply, of poor quality and 
irrelevant in content. Curricula were too academic and too 
little concerned with the practical application of knowledge. 
Meanwhile, teaching methods did not favour independent 
initiative and critical thinking. The system was dominated 
by qualificationism, ie. the stress was placed on obtaining 
certificates that had very little relevance to working life, 
and which were academically inflated. Most schools and 
colleges were underequipped and overcrowded. At the same 
time, available resources were not efficiently used: 
buildings and equipment were allowed to lie idle for too long 
both during the academic year due to poor maintenance and 
during vacations which, on average, last four months per 
year.
f) Teachers were underpaid and undertrained, hence their morale 
and skills were low, and the quality of interaction both 
within and outside the school was very poor.
g) The system was highly selective and incohesive. Wastage 
through dropout was enormous and constituted a major problem 
as most of this waste occurred at the early stage of 
schooling (ie. between the primary and middle school) which 
neither prepares the child for working life nor allows him to 
be integrated into vocational training whose access was only 
open to school leavers over 14 years old.
h) Preferential treatment of relatives, friends and highly 
placed persons was, and still is, rife, and consititutes a 
major obstacle to improved efficiency.
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These deficiencies in the education and training system, 
coupled with rapid industrialization, resulted in:
1) the inability of the former to even meet the immediate needs 
of the productive system, let alone provide the necessary 
skills required to develop a ’national* consultancy 
engineering and research activities. Although institutions 
for training and accumulating scientific and technological 
capacity have grown up, they are lagging far behind the
increasing demand of the production system. Early attempts 
made in the mid-1970s to expand consultancy engineering and 
research activities in parallel to the volume of investment 
failed mainly due to shortage of skilled and experienced
personnel. The total number of those employed by various 
consultancy engineering firms116 and departments in 1978 was 
estimated at around 5000117, or approximately one-fourth of 
the country’s needs to implement investment allocated to
industry alone during the same year. The same was true with 
regard to research activities where a dozen of centres were 
established but their efficient functioning was inhibited by 
shortage of skilled manpower as well as high labour 
turnover118;
2 ) increasing reliance on foreign firms and technical assistance 
as the volume of productive investment rapidly expanded. 
Foreign firms were not called upon only to implement
investment projects but also to provide both technical 
assistance to operate completed production units and manpower 
training. However, neither foreign technical assistance nor
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manpower training turned up to be satisfactory. Foreign 
firms have been criticized by Algerian managers and policy­
makers for their unwillingness to depart with their know­
how1 11;
3) the establishment of an educational and training system 
independent of the traditional system: the inability of the
traditional education system to meet the increasing demand of 
the productive system for skilled manpower led other 
ministries to establish their own post-secondary technical 
colleges and training centres in an attempt to make up for 
the deficiencies of the traditional education system. This, 
in turn, resulted in almost completely severing the existing 
weak links between the education system and the production 
system.
Aware of the deficiencies of the traditional education and 
training system as well as its economic and social 
consequences, Algeria’s policy-makers finally decided to 
introduce a totally reformed system which is seen as a means 
of meeting the trained manpower its developing economy needs 
and of bringing about the kind of society they envisaged. 
Its reiterated objectives are democratization, preparation of 
new generation for working life and scientific and technical 
bias. The new system was conceived in such a way that the 
traditionally strong division between education and training 
is eliminated and wastage through dropout is minimized. The 
Ecole Fondamentale Polytechnique (EFP) is envisaged as the
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cornerstone of the new system. It is envisaged as a 
comprehensive school which supersedes the old primary and 
middle schools and offers a nine-year course. During the 
final year the child should proceed to secondary education 
(leading to higher education) or specialized training so as 
to prepare the child for working life. The curriculum was 
designed in liaison with potential employers and slanted 
towards science and technology.
Meanwhile, technical education, vocational training and 
apprenticeship have been given a major impetus since 1980. 
The curricula for the first two were designed in close 
liaison with industry, agriculture and worker’s 
organizations, therefore closely linking technical education 
and trianing with the production system. Moreover, both 
private and public enterprises were instructed to provide in- 
house apprenticeships to school leavers who have been unable 
to be integrated into the vocational training system or the 
production system.
Though it is early to assess the new education system as its 
generalized application took place only in 1984/5, its most 
positive aspects are the design of the curricula in close 
relation with potential employers, its experimental 
approach119, and its potential to limit wastage by extending 
the schooling cycle so as to prepare the child for working 
life. However, its success depends above all on the
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provision of human and material resources required to 
implement it. Even before its generalization in 1984/5, its 
implementation appears to have encountered major problems, 
the most important of which are:
1 ) overcrowding of classrooms as a result of the extention of 
the compulsory cycle, coupled with demographic explosion, as 
well as delays in implementing projects in this sector;
2 ) shortage of qualified teachers, of equipment and various 
materials required to teach new curricula;
3) preferential treatment of relatives, friends and priviledged 
persons, which constitutes a major obstacle to improved 
efficiency.
Despite the new system’s emphasis on technical and scientific 
education, it is doubtful whether the objective of producing
52,000 engineers, 295,000 technicians and over 1 million 
skilled workers targeted for the period 1980-90' would be 
achieved. Indeed the 1980-84 plan estimated that only one- 
third of the 46,000 students expected to graduate during 
1980-4 would do so in science and technology. Aware that 
results cannot be achieved overnight and the economy’s needs 
for skilled manpower is enormous, Algeria’s policy-makers, in 
an attempt to fully utilize available human resources, 
decided in 1980-4 to reform engineering and research 
activities. New national development enterprises and 
research institutions were set up. The aim of the reform was 
to pool together existing scarce skills and to define clearly
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their priorities and prerogatives. Interdisciplinary teams 
were set up and research activities were oriented primarily 
towards priority sectors and applied research. Research 
teams were formed from university as well as industry and 
other activities, with the aim of linking research activities 
to production.
However, a number of problems related to this restructuring 
remain unresolved. Thus, separation of development from 
production may result in severing the links which are already 
weak between development and production enterprises. The 
reforms did not clearly define how these links could take 
place. In practice, however, some development entreprises 
have established formal links with production units by 
establishing research and development cells, particularly 
where the latter possess laboratories, so as to ensure 
continuous exchange of information. Others have very limited 
interaction with production enterprises and units, and 
consequently the involvement of the user in development 
activities could be very restricted. This may, in turn, lead 
to frictions and wastage. Another problem related to 
research institutions and their personnel, is that the reform 
did not include ways of evaluating their activities and 
sufficient incentives to stabilize manpower as well as to 
maintain the links between research activities and 
production. Thus, although economic agents have actively 
participated in the process of selecting research themes and
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priorities, they have no authority over the activities of 
research institutions as they are financed mainly from the 
central government. It seems that in order to improve the 
efficiency of research activities, it is advisable to 
introduce contractual arrangements so as to avoid the 
tendency towards ’marginalization’ of scientific activities 
observed in LDCs and minimize waste.
Conclusion
Algeria’s time horizon was to establish a relatively integrated 
productive system that features a capital goods sector by mid- 
1980s, to master imported production technology by 1980, to have 
the necessary institutions to do most of engineering work by 1985 
and to become a relatively autonomous nation in the scientific 
and technological field by the year 2000. So far, Algeria’s 
achievements are far behind these targets. Although a' relatively 
diversified industrial base has been established, it remains 
heavily dependent on the international market for its smooth 
functioning as well as reproduction. Meanwhile, institutions for 
training and accumulating scientific and technological knowledge 
have been growing up but they still lag behind the range and the 
level of sophistication of the established productive system, and 
much behind international technology frontiers in all industrial 
f ields.
Overall, the contribution of imported technology has remained
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very considerably below its potential because of the mutually re­
inforcing negative impacts of:
1. The initial low level of industrial and technological 
development which constitutes a major obstacle to rapid 
industrialization aimed at yielding an integrated productive 
system and developing a technological capacity in the medium 
term. Whereas the industrial base can be established even in 
the short run through massive imports of technology, this 
process does not ensure either 'the blackening of the 
matrix', nor development of a technological capacity capable 
of assimilating the imported technology. The darkening of 
the matrix is complicated for reasons of its own, for reasons 
inherent to the planning and implementation of a very 
detailed system of interindustry and inter-sectoral linkages. 
It is also restricted because of heavy reliance on foreign 
firms for solving these problems, as these firms tend to use 
technical specifications and standards familiar to them 
without taking into account their application in the 
importing country, thus rendering the envisaged integration 
impossible. Meanwhile, the development of a technological 
base capable of assimilating imported technology and coupling 
of unlinked production units, takes time. These problems are 
often underestimated by the proponents of the basic-industry 
strategy as well as policy-makers in developing countries.
2. Policy miscalculation, particularly with regard to the 
priority given to investment over consumption and to certain
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industrial sectors over others. First and foremost, the 
planners undertook and approved in the 1970s a number of 
mammoth investment programmes whose simultaneous 
implementation was much beyond the ability of the economy 
efficiently to carry out. This in turn resulted in 
increasing reliance on foreign firms, in waste and over­
emphasis on project implementation at the expense of 
production and learning-by-doing. Secondly, over­
concentration of investment in a limited number of sectors 
resulted in bottlenecks which adversely affected efficient 
use of resources.
3. The numerous short comings, even after recent reforms, in 
the economic and education system, which have many 
negative effects on the selection, assimilation and diffusion 
of technology as well as the use of scarce resources. 
Firstly, Algeria has no independent institutions to evaluate 
either local technological potential or transfer of 
technology, nor specific laws pertaining to technology 
improts. In principle, both enterprises and central organs 
participate in determining the economy’s technological needs 
and the terms and conditions of technology imports. Many 
Algerian laws and regulations can be applied to the 
transfer of technology imports; but they do not serve only 
this purpose. The most widely used method to control 
technology imports involve model agreements created by the 
various technical ministries for national enterprises 
under their control. They constitute the basic text for
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discussion during the negotiations with foreign suppliers. 
The most widely used are turnkey agreements and production 
guarantee agreements (’produits en main*). The main aim of 
these contractual forms is to force the supplier of 
technology to bear the risks for industrial operations 
(including sale of capital goods, patent licencing, trade 
marks, supply of know-how, technical assistance, training or 
engineering). The main problem confronted in these all- 
inclusive forms of technology transfer is that tasks that 
could be performed locally are carried out by foreign firms. 
This can increase costs and preclude the possibility of local 
accumulation of human capital through experience-based 
learning as well as inhibits economic integration. 
Consequently, the economy is deprived of experience that is 
relevant to its subsequent development.
Secondly, the quasi-monopoly of an industrial branch by a 
single national corporation and weakness of central control 
resulted in duplication of technology purchasing from abroad 
and in a tendency of each corporation to achieve integration 
within itself, thus inhibiting specialization and development 
of the already existing available technological potential. 
The consequence of this strife by individual big national 
corporations to achieve integration within themselves was 
that many small maintenance and repair shops have been 
virtually cut off from jobs and subsequently disappeared.
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Thirdly, although contract negotiation, technology
acquisition and financial autonomy was conferred upon 
national corporations, and recently upon national
enterprises, the centre has retained a dominant role in 
planning investment and imports and a major role in planning 
production, wages and prices, thus maintaining de.facto 
control over the enterprises' operations. This continued 
central control over enterprises cannot forster the interests 
of enterprises in the long-run profitability and economic 
efficiency. Although the autonomy of state enterprises and 
production units have increased since recent reforms, so many 
restrictions on their operations remained intact and subject 
to red tape and heavy administrative procedures. The most
important of these restrictions are import licencing and 
investment approval, which directly affect day-to-day 
operation of the enterprise as well as efficient use of 
imported technology. The influence of these policy and
system impacts on technology assimilation will be analyzed in 
great detail in the following case studies on cement and 
flour milling industries.
Fourthly, the traditional education system was inadequate and 
irrelevant to the country's needs, yet it was essentially kep 
intact until late 1970s, thus resulting in great waste and 
shortage of skilled manpower, which in turn has had negative 
effects on efficiency and technology development.
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(69) for more details on how the direct reduction process was 
kept unknown for more than a decade to new entrants to 
steel industry, by big producers of steel in DCs, see P. 













see next section and ch 4
see MPAT (1980 May); op cited, pp 20-21
RAJ, K N, in Feinstein (ed), (1967); op cit., pp 220-221
Thiery, S, 1980 (September); pp 449-80
Raj in Feinstein (ed), 1967; op cited, pp 220-224
a handful of projects related to the machine-building
sector were prepared for the 1980-84 Plan. These
included the extension of the existing machine-tool
plant and construction of a complex to produce heavy
equipment for various industrial sectors. For more
details see Thiery, S, 1980 (September); op cited,
pp 486-89
"The Algerian Citizen does not anymore support 
sacrifice in favour of primitive accumulation". MPAT 
(May 1980a); p 7
the pattern of allocation of investment in the 1980-84 
plan was largely determined by the pattern of 
investment allocation in the previous period due to 
incompleted projects started prior to the plan 
the total cost of new investment projects and 
completion of earier ones was estimated at 560, 500 M 
compared with investment in the 1980-84 plan of 
400,600 M AD. The amount needed after 1984 to complete 
new industrial projects at 1980 prices amounted to 
57200 M AD
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exchange earnings are being spent on grandiose projects 
which have very little social utility; such as those 
related to the decoration of the capital as well as 
projects for durable consumer goods 
Stewart, F (1977); op cited, p 153 
MPAT (1980, May); op cit., 48-50
on cost overruns and change in the structure of planned 
investment see sub-section A
for more details, see MPAT (May 1980); op cit., pp 87-88 
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for more detailed statistics, see Ibid, p 86 
some reforms aimed at improving efficiency and stepping 
up production were carried out in the early 1980s. The 
most important of these are: reorganization of the
industrial sector (to be discussed below), 
harmonization of the wage scale to reduce labour 
turnover, estblishment of productivity bonuses as an 
incentive to production, stepping up of manpower 
training, improvement of infrastructure and housing 
conditions and simplification of administrative 
procedures with ergard to import of essential 
engineering components and parts as well as raw 
materials and semi-finished products 
MPAT, 1980 (May); op cit., pp 12-13
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extracts from the speech by the Minister of Planning
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the period 1970-1979. For more details see MPAT, 1980 
(May); op cit., pp 136-137
(104) Ibid, pp 134-137
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(106) quoted in TEM4AR, H (1974); op cit., p 525
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(108) Minces, J (1978); p 50
(109) Thiery, S, (1980); p 184
(110) for a detailed analysis of the degree and reasons of 
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thesis
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those during the 1974-79 period. See table 2.8: 
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op cited, pp 154-165
most of these firms were established in cooperation 
with foreign firms in the form of joint ventures with 
Algerian partners holding a majority share in equity. 
In addition to consultancy firms, some national 
corporations established their own engineering 
departments through technical assistance where 
expatirates were recruited often individually. Their 
activities were mainly limited to feasibility studies, 
detailed engineering and construction and installation 
of new facilities
Thiery, S P, 1980 (September); op cited. It must be 
emphasized that this shortage of skilled personnel was 
particularly acute with respect to basic design- 
engineering. Most local firms did not even attempt to 
train their personnel in process design and engineering 
a detailed assessment of Algeria’s experience in 
scientific research activities can be found in a speech 
delivered by the Minister of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research and published in El Hindis, No. 5, 
1979, pp 19-30 and ONRS (nd): Bilan Scientifique de la
Recherche a l ’Organisme National de Recherche 
Scientifique de 1975 a 1980 (Algiers)
the EFB was introduced on a pilot scale in 1974/75 and 
has been since then gradually generalized.
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Chapter Three
THE ASSIMILATION OF IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY
Assimilation of technology cannot be achieved by passively 
importing technology. The term "transfer of technology” is 
misleading to the extent that it implies that technology can be 
transferred wholesale and in perfect working order. In fact 
technology does not come in convenient, self-contained units that 
can be packaged and shipped for immediate use from one country to 
another. Technology is derived from a continuum of activities 
encompassing research, development and engineering, which in turn 
is closely linked to ongoing production and marketing activities. 
Furthermore, technological activities are often induced by unique 
social environments, and closely linked to use environments which 
provide the signals for what is needed in the way of new or 
adapted products and processes.
Although both capital goods and technological information can be 
transferred, the ability to search for appropriate ones and make 
effective use of them cannot be. This ability can only be
acquired through continuing technological effort on the part of
the recipient; and it is this ability that leads to technological 
assimilation by the recipient. Even in developed countries where 
the technology transferred usually supplements the existing 
capacity, assimilation of transferred technology requires a 
continuous effort on the part of the recipient. This
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technological effort often takes the form of additional training 
of the existing personnel, hiring new ones and/or reorganization 
to accommodate the transferred technology so as to make effective 
use of it.
The Chapter is organized as follows: section I discusses the
meaning of technology assimilation and technological capacities 
required to achieve it on the part of the recipient. Section II 
is devoted to a discussion of technological knowledge and effort 
on the part of the recipient required to achieve assimilation of 
technology recieved. Section III is devoted to how field-work 
was carried out and data concerning the two cases,which will be 
analyzed in Chapter 4 and 5, were obtained.
I. Technological Capacities Required to Assimilate Technology 
Technological assimilation is defined as the effective
j
’’appropriation” and use of technological knowledge through 
continuing technological effort on the part of the recipient to 
operate and maintain, to adapt, to reproduce, and improve upon 
the imported technology as well as to generate new technology in 
the form of new products and/or processes. Effective 
appropriation and use means the acquisition of the following 
technological and organizational capacities:
1. Manufacturing capacity: the ability to make effective use of
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installed production capacities through mastery of the 
technology for organizing, managing and executing the factory 
operations. One basic component of this technology is the 
engineering knowledge of manufacturing techniques and 
methods, including quality control, and of how and when to 
carry out efficiently repairs and preventive as well as 
protective maintenance of existing machinery and equipment. 
Broadly speaking, there are two modes of organizing 
manufacturing production. On the one hand, there are 
manufacturing plants that use continuous flow processes to 
produce large volumes of standardized items; on the other, 
there are factories that apply discontinuous batch processes 
to produce quasi-standard items, or even custom-made items, 
in a plant organized as a succession of work-shops. 
Factories of the first kind, such as cement works, are 
product specific - i.e., their physical layout follows a
sequence imposed by the technical transformation needed to 
produce a given product. The sequence of technical
transformation is always the same and is what decides the
physical layout of the plant. The main common 
characteristics of a factory of this kind are:
a) The pre-production part of the plant lay-out is detailed and 
complete and consequently there is very little flexibility in 
either product design or the production process once
construction is completed;
b) production process sequences systematically follow each 
other along a direct route, thus minimizing delays and wasted
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time;
c) the handling of raw materials and of work in progress is also 
minimized;
d) the product tends to be highly standardized and the 
production equipment tends to be specific to the industry;
e) There is very little on-the-job decision-making, therefore
direct labour skills and supervisory requirements are 
relatively less important than in batch production units.
In spite of its advantages, a continuous flow process
requires a great deal of engineering experience both during 
the design and construction stages of the plant and during 
its operation, as any fault in the first stage or an intended 
stop during the second tend to be expensive. At the design 
stage the reliability and maintainability are the important 
factors to be considered in relation to the plant’s 
performance, capital costs and running costs. At the 
installation stage, maintainability continues to be an 
important factor because it is only then that the
multidimensional nature of many of the maintenance problems 
becomes clear. Finally at the production stage, a suitable 
learning system should be continued to improve techniques and 
methods of production and maintenance engineering and 
organization. The function of this learning system is to 
gather and provide information on production and maintenance 
problem areas, thus facilitating determination of the plant’s 
optimum operation and maintenance work.
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Factories that use discontinuous batch technology are 
organized in workshops rather than along a ’line* and usually 
manufacture goods in small runs or in response to individual 
customers. Different products can be produced 
simultaneously. The main characteristics of a manufacturing 
plant of this kind are:
a) there is a great flexibility in the way a given job is 
carried out,
b) the movement of raw materials and work in progress between 
workshops is the most important element of production 
organization, and any deficiency in it can be a source of 
waiting periods and bottlenecks. In this kind of plant, 
there is usually ample room for reducing the production cycle 
by careful rearrangement of the physical distribution of jobs 
in the work area,
c) given the fact that the output is not highly standardized, 
on-the-job decision-making is very important. Furthermore 
workers* skills in setting up the machines, preparing jigs 
and tools for the job, and actually carrying out the tasks 
are very important.
Another component of equal if not greater importance is the 
managerial and organizational know-how, without which the 
economic viability of the manufacturing operation cannot be 
ensured. Production management and organization can be 
considered as the direction, and organization and actual 
execution of production tasks so as to make effective use of
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human and material resources available. Maintenance 
management can be considered as the direction and 
organization of resources in order to control the 
availability and performance of industrial plant to some 
specified level. The maintenance manager has, generally, two 
main problems - the determination of the size and nature of 
the maintenance work-load and the organization and control of 
men, spares and equipment to meet this work load.
2. The capacity to modify: the ability to introduce technical 
changes so as to adapt the product or the process to local 
conditions, or to improve the product or process. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, technology is always to some 
extent implicit and location-specific. Accordingly, any 
transfer of technology will require a degree of adaptation. 
As Rosenberg pointed out: "New techniques frequently require 
considerable adaptation before they function successfully in 
a new environment. This process of modification often 
involves a high degree of skill and ability, which is 
typically underestimated or ignored."2 A number of local 
conditions have been found to be particularly important in 
LDCs. These include the degree of competition in protected 
markets, the degree of availability of skills, the supply and 
quality of local resources, the climate and the size and 
characteristics of the market.3
The capacity to improve means the ability to conceive and
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apply technical change with regard to product or process. 
Here activities go beyond adapting the technology to local 
conditions and involve introduction of improvements on the 
product or process in terms of its operating simplicity, 
technical performance, maintainability. These improvements 
may be incremental and minor, or they may be major, involving 
a discrete jump at a point in time. As Rosovsky pointed out: 
"Improvement engineering reduces the cost of imported 
technology by making it more productive at the margin...It is 
largely an activity of ’carefully taking apart and putting 
together a little better’; it is concrete and directly 
related to production, especially when compared to basic 
research. In contrast to the pursuit of core innovations, 
this type of activity is less risky and much cheaper...".4 
Recent research on technological activities in some LDCs 
reveal that such improvements take place and have resulted 
among other things, in exports of technology in various 
forms.5
3. The capacity to reproduce: the ability to conceive and apply 
the technology through new investment in the industry 
concerned. It pertains to the establishment of new
production capacities. It involves the mastery of the 
various tasks required to implement an industrial investment 
project. These tasks are: the study of pre-investment
technical and economic feasibility, basic and detailed design 
and engineering, procurement and supply of machinery and
176
equipment, training of the plant’s personnel and start-up of 
operation.6
4. The capacity to generate new technology: the ability to
conceptualize and define and actually to design and engineer 
new products and/or processes that are acceptable to the
market (or to society) on both technical and economic 
grounds. Recent research on technological activities in LDCs 
reveal that Third World countries have rarely produced 
processes and products that are fundamentally new to the
world.
5. The capacity to search: the ability to scan technical and
commercial information so as to increase the recipient’s 
technological capacity. Search activity may include
relatively ’passive* activities such as the screening of 
technical and trade journals as well as active testing of 
alternative products and processes. The importance of search 
activities in technological development was emphasized by a 
number of authors. Thus Dahlman and Fonseca emphasized the 
importance of externally acquired knowledge in technological 
development of the Usiminas steel plant in Brazil: the firm 
made major efforts to seek and acquire technical information 
about technology both through contractual arrangements with 
foreign firms and outside them.7
Several points need to be made about the above categorization of
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technological capacities required to achieve full assimilation of 
technology. To begin with, full assimilation of technology on 
the part of the recipient is not always necessary, nor is it 
always socially beneficial.8 The local development of local 
technology is not an objective in itself but rather a means to 
increase the recipient’s ability to produce efficiently goods and 
services. Underdeveloped countries cannot expect to excel in all 
technological fields nor should they hope to achieve self- 
sufficiency in all industrial technological areas. Therefore 
there is the need for specialization so that the technological 
capacity required in each area may be defined accordingly. 
Broadly speaking, two different ideal type technology strategies 
can be distinguished:
a) the * catch-up* strategy which aims at reaching world 
technology frontier. This strategy requires full 
assimilation of the technology concerned and its success 
depends on the ability of the country/firm to generate new 
technology so as to keep up with competitors in the 
international market.
b) the frontier following strategy which is based on imported 
technology and does not aim even in the long-run to generate 
frontier technology. Partial assimilation of imported
technology may be sufficient to make effective use of it. 
As Dahlman and Westphal pointed out: ’’The South Korean
experience demonstrates that...high indigenous levels of all 
types of technological mastery are not necessary for the 
initial stages of industrial development; in the Korean case,
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a mastery which has been mainly confined to production 
engineering has been sufficient.*’9
Another point which should be made about the above categorization 
is that it does not necessarily mean that the ’stock*of knowledge 
required to acquire each capacity increases as we move from (1) 
to (5), nor should it be identified with sequential technological 
development advocated by some authors. For example it may be a 
far more complex matter, in terms of technological capacity and 
effort, to manufacture an aeroplane engine, than to design a new, 
but relatively simple machine tool. Nevertheless, there is often 
a quantitative difference between the first type of capacity and 
the last four when considered in relation to a given technology. 
However this quantitative difference does not mean that 
technological development should proceed sequentially from (1) to 
(5). Several authors have attempted to identify stages in the 
development of technological capacities in LDCs.10 Like other 
stage theories, these attempts often lack a convincing 
explanation of the causal mechanism whereby one stage progresses 
into another, and can be subject to a mechanistic interpretation 
of the transition from one stage to another. Moreover, a number 
of case studies reveal that the order implied by the stage 
description is not always adhered to.
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II. Technological Knowledge and Technological Effort
The degree of technological knowledge and technological effort 
required to assimilate each type of technological capacity listed 
above differs considerably. To some extent this difference is 
captured by the distinction, made in this context by Lall11, 
between knowing how something works, and knowing why it works in 
the way it does. Generally, within the same industrial branch, 
both technological effort and technological knowledge increase as 
we move from (1) to (5). Thus the capacity to operate and carry 
out corrective maintenance does not require knowledge of the core 
process and basic design and engineering. However, preventive 
maintenance usually requires what Lall calls ’know-why': it
demands perfect knowledge of the core process as well as design 
and engineering capabilities particularly in cases where 
technical breakdowns are due to pre-production design and 
engineering defaults.
One basic component of manufacturing technology is the 
engineering knowledge of manufacturing techniques and methods, 
including quality control and testing as well as maintenance of 
machinery and equipment. Another component of greater importance 
is the managerial and organizational know-how which is essential 
to ensure the economic viability of the manufacturing operation. 
Manufacturing capacity can be acquired through extensive training 
of the existing personnel and/or hiring personnel with experience 
in various aspects of technology operation and maintenance.
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The last four types of capacity require knowledge of both ’know­
how* and *know-why* and the technological effort required to 
achieve them involves the establishment of engineering 
departments, applied research and development institutions and 
capital goods industries. Acquisition of these capacities 
requires a higher degree of knowledge than that required by the 
manufacturing capacity. Although some minor modifications can be 
carried out at the shop floor level12, major modifications often 
require R & D effort as well as design-engineering capabilities. 
Referring to a 1962 study by the Japanese Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, Peck and Tamura noted that: 
”0ne-third of R & D expenditure...were for modifying...imported 
technology”.13
The capacity to reproduce a given technology requires various 
technical and organizational knowledge needed to perform the 
various tasks involved in product and/or process as well as 
project design, engineering and execution. It also requires 
experience in performing such tasks. The types of knowledge and 
experience required to efficiently reproduce the technology will 
be discussed in the following chapter on cement technology.
The capacity to develop new products and/or processes requires 
great knowledge of basic and detailed design engineering. By 
design capability we mean the ability to conceptualize, define 
and actually design a product or a process that is acceptable to 
society and the market on both technical and economic grounds.
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Design work is often divided into three main phases: feasibility 
study, basic design and detailed design. Product or process
design is typically a skill possessed by engineers and 
technologists with advanced training and adequate designing 
experience. In order to acquire this capacity, these persons 
need not only to understand elements and fundamentals of product 
and/or process design, but also to establish their own 
methodology for creating viable designs. Design work is 
multidisciplinary and its success depends on the establishment of 
a harmonious and stable multidisciplinary team.
In addition to design capability, development of new products or 
processes often requires applied, and even basic research. While 
there is relatively little research activity in LDCs, it does 
exist often independently of technical and production activities 
and consequently it participates very little in solving problems 
encountered by the production system in these countries.14
R & D activities are essential not only for the development of 
new technologies, the reproduction and improvement of imported 
ones, but also for search activities. As Mansfield pointed out: 
"R & D provides a window opening on various parts of the 
environment, enabling the nation or the firm to evaluate external 
developments and react more quickly to them. In some economic 
models, R & D is viewed as an invention- or innovation-producing 
activity. Though correct as far as it goes, this view misses 
much of the point of R & D, which also is aimed at quick response
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to rivals and at clever modification, adaptation, and improvement 
of their results".15
A certain amount of knowledge is necessary for the firm or the 
country to gain additional knowledge through its search 
activities. Externally acquired knowledge often arrives in the 
form of * disembodied* knowledge and information, rather than 
being embodied in labour or machinery and equipment. In fact, 
however, such additional knowledge very seldom just arrives. 
Almost always it has to be sought for, screened and acquired by 
the recipient. This means that the flow depends on active effort 
on the part of the recipient, and that in turn requires the prior 
accumulation and deployment of resources to make such a search 
effort, as well as to make effective use of acquired knowledge.
Technological effort is defined as the effective use of 
technological ’know-how* and *know-why* in combination with other 
resources to assimilate technology. Its main sources are human 
capital formation (through training and hiring of ready-made 
skills) and learning-by-doing, or experience. A number of 
studies suggest that various kinds of formalized training play a 
major role in technology assimilation.16 In particular they 
stress the importance of active participation of the recipient’s 
personnel in investment implementation, where the recipient’s 
personnel is allocated to work closely alongside the supplier’s, 
with an explicit objective of training to acquire knowledge 
about the process technology and other tasks involved in project
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execution, as well as operational technology. Others stressed 
the importance of hiring ready-made skills in augmenting the 
recipient's technological capacity.17
The second source of technological capacity to assimilate 
imported technology is learning-by-doing or experience. It is 
often argued that efficiency in performing tasks increases with 
the passage of time as greater experience is accumulated, and 
this is often attributed to doing-based learning. Such
efficiency increases with time may reflect reduced labour 
requirements e l s  tasks become routine through repetition, the 
effects of leaming-by-doing on management leading to better 
planning, efficient labour scheduling and improved quality 
control, learning by R-D & E departments, and the effects on 
increEised efficiency of suppliers, who themselves experience the 
doing-based learning mentioned above and are able to improve 
quality and delivery dates of their supplies. The implication is 
that given a period of time doing something, some quantum of 
learning takes place and automatically results in a regular 
improvement.
The idea of leaming-by-doing has been widely used in the 
literature in order to conceptually capture the information flows 
that are generated by the activities of producing, designing, 
buying and selling. Earlier Arrow18 and Kaldor19 had 
incorporated the concept in growth models where growth is 
influenced by some indicator of doing, for example, cumulative
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output or cumulative investment. The concept has recently been 
widely used in the literature on technology in the Third World.20
As treated in most economic analysis, doing-based learning has 
three features. First, it is costless: it is acquired as a free 
by-product from performing tasks over a period of time. In other 
words, it does not require expenditure beyond that needed to 
perform the usual tasks. Second, it arises passively: little or 
no explicit action is needed to capture the acquired knowledge 
and/or skills and to make effective use of them. Third, the 
learning process takes place automatically with the passage of 
time. In other words, given a period of time of doing something, 
some quantum of learning will take place.
In the following two chapters, we examine the effects of human 
capital formation and experience on the assimilation of 
technology and production performance in cement and flour-milling 
industries in Algeria. The main reasons for the choice of these
i i
industries are, first they have been among the priority sectors 
in the Algerian strategy of industrialization. Second, a large 
number of plants in each industry have been constructed since 
1969, and a large number of employees have been trained or hired, 
and this provides the possibility for the firms involved to 
accumulate a considerable experience in design, engineering and 
operation of the two imported technologies, and consequently to 
augment their technological capacity and improve their 
performance. Third, domestic demand for their products largely
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outstrips supply and consequently they face no marketing 
problems.
Our hypotheses are: first, local content in project execution 
will tend to increase over time for successive projects as a 
result of the learning process on the part of Algerians. This is 
based on the assumption that Algeria would progressively 
substitute its own internal technical capacity for elements of 
the engineering and know-how initially purchased externally, to 
compensate for the local absence of such elements. Second, lead- 
times of successive projects will tend to be shorter, as a 
result of the learning process of those involved in project 
execution, and capacity utilization in completed plants will tend 
to improve with the passage of time as experience in operating 
the technology is accumulated. Third, the significance of human 
capital formation and learning from experience depend, at any 
level beyond that of the individual task, on the existence of a 
feedback system to capture and make effective use of acquired 
skills and experience. Without such a feedback system to 
generate, evaluate and interpret the skill and experience 
acquired by individuals, the on-going leaming-by-doing and human 
capital formation will generate little technical activity, and 
the process of technological development will lack a driving 
force.21
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These hypotheses* will be examined in the following two chapters 
in the light of Algeria’s experience in cement and flour-milling 
technology assimilation. Data needed to test these hypotheses 
were collected mainly through questionnaire-based interviews with 
executives of cement works and flour mills. The questionnaire 
consists of five parts: general information of the technology and 
the mechanism of its transfer, local content in and lead times of 
project execution, capacity utilization and manning levels, 
maintenance and operation of the technology and modifications of 
the technology imported.**
III. Field Work and Data Collection
Field work was undertaken by the author in Algeria during 1985 
and 1986. It took over eight months and three visits to Algeria 
to collect the necessary data. Major problems were encountered 
in obtaining access to information and data, particularly during 
the first visit, which took place at the time when the two 
industries were going through a transitional period as a result 
of a reorganization launched during 1982. Before reorganization, 
each industry was a monopoly run by a national corporation. As a 
result of reorganization each corporation was split into a number 
of enterprises. The process entailed a great movement of
* A detailed discussion of these hypotheses is given in Ch. 4, 
section 3.
** For more details see the appendix
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personnel at all levels and dispersion of the data bank 
concerning the industry. This in turn complicated our mission as 
ex-executives who had knowledge about projects and the industry, 
had either left the industry or even though they had been 
appointed to new enterprises, were still difficult to locate. A 
second problem encountered was the unwillingness of some 
enterprises and plants executives to cooperate, even after we had 
obtained the authorization, which they had initially requested, 
from relevant ministries. To overcome this problem, an effort 
was made to gain a prior introduction to potential interviewees 
in order to avoid negative reponses and delays. The main sources 
were the researcher’s personal contacts and the assistance of the 
already interviewed executives who were generally helpful. 
However even the application of this procedure was not always 
successful. Thus, although not a single interviewee of all the 
ones contacted refused to participate, it became apparant that 
six of the thirty mills, two executives at one of the flour- 
milling enterprises and three officials from the Ministries of 
Planning and Light industry, who acquiesced had done so only 
nominally. They routinely kept breaking appointments until the 
researcher stopped pressing them. Third, geographical dispersion 
of plants and enterprises made field work extremely difficult and 
time-consuming. An attempt to save time and effort was initially 
made by mailing questionnaires to far away interviewees to be 
answered and returned, while visiting only those which are 
located near the researcher’s home town. However, this method 
proved to be useless, as none of the questionnaires sent during
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the first visit had been returned after six months. 
Consequently, an effort was made in cooperation with individual 
enterprises to set up a time table of the researcher's visit to 
each plant. The result was only partially better as most plants 
did not respect the time table and kept breaking appointments. 
New appointments were consequently agreed upon with the managers 
of the plants and copies of the questionnaire were left with them 
for subsequent completion on the researcher's return. Even then, 
most respondents were found to be not ready to answer all the 
questions because they either lacked information or were 
unwilling to part with it.*
Forty-two questionnaire-based interviews were arranged with 
executives of all newly constructed cement works and flour mills, 
of which thirty-six were conducted. Four of these were
unsuccessful and the data obtained inadequate for any sort of 
analysis. Twelve of the remaining thirty-two concerned the 
cement industry and covered all the newly set up works, and the 
rest concerned flour mills. All interviews were carried out by 
the author so that interpretive variance was minimized. In 
addition each interview took a considerable amount of time as 
respondents were not allowed the luxury of quick and attractive, 
but inappropriate, responses where it was felt that the correct 
situation was not brought out. For example, respondents who
* To complete questionnaire answers and to check their validity 
two other methods were used. See below.
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answered in the affirmative as regards full capacity utilization 
and technological modifications were pressed for further details 
and specific examples.
In all cases, respondents were department or sub-department 
directors and general managers. In the cement industry, each 
part of the questionnaire was answered by the relevant department 
director, with the general manager completing the parts which 
were left unanswered, whenever that was possible. In two cases, 
the data was supplied by a group of executives in conference 
format. In the flour-milling industry, data, in most cases, were 
obtained from the information officer whose responsibilities were 
gathering information and data at the mill level as well as those 
emanating from other mills and sources, screening and diffusing 
them within the mill and outside it whenever that was required. 
The existence of this information centre saved the researcher 
time and energy as all information on production, maintenance, 
manning levels and technical effort carried out at the mill was 
available in one place. However, most mills lacked information 
on project execution and lead- times, because this information 
related to the 1970’s and had been kept at the firm's 
headquarters. After reorganization, some mill managers 
successfully obtained these documents. Other mill managers 
suggested that they either did not try to search for them or 
tried but did not know of their whereabouts.
The questionnaire used is reproduced in the appendix. In all
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cases, a copy of the questionnaire was given to the respondent. 
The researcher and interviewee then went through the document 
concurrently, with the former providing clarifications if and 
when necessary, and then noting responses on his copy. This
saved time by avoiding the question having to be read out, and
also promoted a less rigid setting.
Another method was used with the aim of both completing
questionnaire answers whenever possible and to test the data and 
information collected from works and mills. This consisted of 
interviewing some enterprises* executives and relevant 
ministries* officials, and screening some confidential as well as 
non-confidential reports at the ministries level. Thus, twenty 
interviews were carried out with some executives of the 
enterprises and officials at the Ministries of Planning and Light 
Industry. Although the questionnaire contained an appendix table 
and questions which were added deliberately to check 
interviewees’ responses, it was observed that some interviewees 
were aware of them, and consequently tended to point out that 
such questions had already been answered. Four mills were 
excluded from the sample because data obtained from them, which 
was in the first place incomplete, were found to be inappropriate 
after being compared with those obtained from the enterprises and 
the ministries mentioned above.
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force". While the former - limited to the transfer of
knowledge and skills from one individual to another - was
quite satisfactory, the latter was difficult to achieve. 
For more details, see Judet, P. et al., (1977): pp. 533ff.
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Chapter Four
IMPORTS OF CEMENT MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY AND ITS ASSIMILATION
This chapter consists of three sections. The first provides an 
introduction to the next two sections, which focus on the 
development of the cement industry in Algeria during the 1970*3 
and early 1980*s and the assimilation of cement manufacturing 
technology. The first section focuses on how cement is produced 
as well as on technological trends in the industrialized 
countries and their effects on Algeria's choice of techniques and 
equipment. Section two looks at how the cement industry emerged 
in Algeria before independence, and its development since 1969. 
Special emphasis is placed on investment in the cement industry 
and the mechanisms used to import technology.
The third section focuses particularly on the assimilation of 
cement manufacturing technology on the part of Algerian firms and 
examines the significance of leaming-by-doing and personnel 
training and hiring of ready-made skills on the firm's 
technological capability and production performance. This 
involves a detailed analysis of the process of assimilation of 
various activities related to the generation and application of 
cement technology. These activities can be grouped into three 
main categories:
a ) investment implementation which pertains to the
establishment of new cement works or the extension of
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existing ones.
b) production and maintenance engineering which pertains to the 
operation of existing production capacities.
c) R - D and E which consists of activities aimed at improving 
the existing technology and creating new technological 
knowledge related to the technology in question.
1. Cement Manufacturing Techniques and Algeria’s Options
This section examines the various techniques used in 
manufacturing cement and recent technological trends that 
prevail in the industrialized countries, as well as Algeria’s 
choice of techniques in the industry. The section is divided 
into two sub-sections. The first describes the process of 
manufacturing cement and analyzes technological progress 
which has taken place in the industry over the last three 
decades. The main characteristic of this technological 
progress is the introduction of new techniques for capacity 
enhancement and energy conservation as well as increasing 
automation. The second analyzes the main factors which 
determined Algeria's choice of techniques and kilns. As we 
shall see, this choice was determined as much by the 
technological and economic trends prevailing in the DCs as by 
Algeria’s local conditions.
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1.1 Cement technology and technological trends in the DCs.
World cement production has registered more than a six- fold 
increase during the last three and a half decades, from 133 
million tonnes in 1950 to over 880 million tonnes in 1984. 
At the same time there has been tremendous technological 
progress in the cement manufacturing process which is 
continuously updated through the introduction of new 
techniques for energy conservation and for capacity 
enhancement. Recent technological development has involved 
the development of precalciners and new types of preheaters1 
as well as instrumental control of raw material analysis, 
blending and burning to make a product with a quality as 
consistent as possible.
The chemical composition of Portland cement2 indicates that 
the raw material components should be predominantly 
calcareous with small amounts of silicious, aluminous and 
iron-rich constituents. Occurence of rocks which on burning 
without any admixture, give a cement clinker are rare in the 
nature. Consequently, the choice of the raw material falls 
on a variety of naturally occuring rocks or industrial waste. 
By far the most important raw material for cement 
manufacturing is limestone which is obtainable from natural 
deposits. These deposits are relatively abundant and widely 
distributed in forms which are easy to exploit. Beside 
limestone, industrial wastes are also used as raw materials
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in some industrialized countries, where beside their 
availability, they fit well with other technical, economic 
and environmental parameters.
Hie location of cement works is usually determined by the 
availability of adequate supplies of raw materials within a 
reasonable distance of each other. However, relatively small 
quantities of raw materials, other than lime or industrial 
waste, may be brought in from a considerable distance to make 
up deficiencies of selica, alumina and iron oxide. Generally 
to produce one tonne of cement more than 1.5 tonnes of raw 
materials must be extracted and transported to the works. 
Hie greater the number of components that have to be mixed 
together, the more expensive is the winning and preparation 
of the material for obtaining a mixture suitable for burning 
in the kiln.
The winning and handling of raw materials is a major part of 
the industrial process of cement manufacturing, and accounts 
on the average for 10% of net operating costs of manufacture. 
Whereas the ’soft* materials - clay and chalk - can usually 
be extracted directly by excavation, ’hard’ materials must be 
blasted from the quarry first and crushed before being 
transported to the works either by conveyor belts or by high 
capacity tipper lorries.
Regardless of the production process used to manufacture
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cement, the raw materials once they have arrived at the 
works, pass through the following stages:
a) crushing and milling: the raw materials are crushed and 
milled to fine particle size so that they can be correctly 
mixed,
b) blending: the crushed and milled materials are blended and 
mixed to produce a raw meal of uniform chemical composition,
c ) drying: the blended mix is heated to the point where all 
moisture is driven off as steam or water vapour,
d) pre-heating and calcining: the mix is further heated to 
decarbonation or calcining temperature,
e) clinkering: the mix is further heated to produce clinker,
f) cooling: the clinker is cooled to a temperature at which it 
can be handled. Once it is cooled, the clinker is either 
sent directly to the grinding mill or stored temporarily,
g) clinker grinding: the clinker is grounded to certain fineness 
with the addition of small quantities of gypsum to control 
the setting time of the cement.
h) the finished product is stored in silos before being 
expedited either in bulk or in bags.
At present two different methods of cement manufacturing are 
used: wet and dry process. Beside these two there are two 
variants of the wet and dry processes: the semi-wet and semi­
dry, in both of which the raw feed, prepared either by the 
wet or dry methods according to the nature of the raw 
materials, is formed into pellets or nodules with a medium
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moisture content.
The choice of process to be used depends on a complex 
combination of factors. These include the nature of raw 
materials to be processed, the thermal efficiency of the 
different processes, fuel and other energy costs. Energy 
consumption is much lower in the dry process and therefore 
preferable if the raw material components are not too wet or 
sticky. The dry process is often recommended for energy 
consumption especially in cases where the raw material 
contains less than 15-18% of water.
Since the mid-1970*8, the more energy-intensive wet process, 
once used very widely for all types of raw materials, 1ms 
been largely superceded in new or modernized works by the 
dry or semi-dry processes whenever the raw materials are 
adequate. Definitive predominance of the dry process was 
established with the application of precalcining whose 
advantages are multiple: increase of refractory lining
stability, reduction of disturbances in the kiln operation, 
the possibility of utilization of waste fuels, a considerable 
increase of kiln output and reduction of atmosphere 
contamination.
The wet process is technically preferable for dealing with 
’ soft ’ materials - chalk or clay - as the dry preparation of 
such materials present technical difficulties. It is always
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recommended in cases where the raw material contains 
deterious admixtures which have to be removed by washing. 
The wet process still plays an important role in some 
countries, especially in the USA where it accounts for more 
than 50% of production.3
Technically the wet and dry processes differ in the way 
materials are processed up to the calcining stage (stage d ) . 
In the wet process, the raw materials are milled together 
with the addition of 30 to 40% water and fed as a slurry into 
the kiln. ‘Soft* materials are converted into a slurry with 
water in a washmill. Where ’hard* materials such as shale 
and limestone are still used for the wet process, they are 
first crushed to a convenient particle size for milling and 
then, after careful proportioning, are ground in a wet tube 
mill to a certain fineness. The resulting slurry flows into 
the storage and blending tanks where it is vigorously 
agitated both mechanically and by compressed air so as to 
maintain it thoroughly mixed and in suspension for drawing 
off to the kiln. Once in the kiln, the slurry passes first 
through the drying zone where it forms into nodules as a 
result of the tumbling action of the kiln. As it is
thoroughly dried, the material passing through the kiln is 
raised to the decarbonation temperature of about 800°c at 
about the mid-point of the kiln. As the temperature
continues to rise the dissociation of calcium carbonate into 
carbon dioxide and calcium carbonate is completed and the
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transformation of the oxides of aluminium, silicon, iron and 
calcium into the active ingredients of Portland Cement 
begins. This transformation is completed at a temperature of 
approximately 1400#c in the firing zone, the hottest part of 
the kiln. The resulting product is cement clinker.
In the dry process raw materials are reduced to a fine powder 
for feeding to the kiln by a combination of crushing and 
milling. The raw materials are crushed and put into the 
stockpiles, often under cover. A considerable degree of 
homogenization is obtained by laying each of them in layers. 
There are various systems of storage and recovery in use at 
present, but they are all designed to minimize variation in 
the composition of the raw material fed to the grinding mill. 
After homogenization, the raw material is fed into the 
milling/drying system continuously by weight. Drying is 
often accomplished by passing kiln exhaust or hot air through 
the grinding mill itself. The exhaust heat from the kiln is 
sufficient to dry material having a moisture content of 
about 8%, but supplementary firing may be necessary for 
greater moisture contents. Milling is carried out in either 
a ball mill or a roller mill. The latter uses less energy 
for a given product fineness but with very hard, abrasive 
materials it loses its efficiency and presents a maintenance 
problem. Where moisty and sticky materials are used, which 
present problems in crushing, the Aerofall mill is often 
used. In such a mill the large sized stones are ground
201
against each other with the help of large steel grinding 
balls.
From the mill the raw mill is fed to blending and storage 
silos. Various methods of blending the fine powder are used 
but all have the same result of producing a kiln feed which 
is uniform and consistent in composition.
In m o d e m  dry-process kilns the blended powder is passed 
through preheaters before it enters the kiln itself. In the 
fifties and early 1960’s two types of preheaters were 
developed: suspension preheaters and preheaters with Lepol
grates. Progressively the suspension preheaters reached 
predominance because they are easy to use, mechanically 
simple and require no raw material pre-treatment, which is 
necessary in case of grate preheaters, where the granulation 
of the raw material is necessary. This predominance has 
become conclusive with the introduction of precalciners in 
the 1970’s.
In a full four-stage preheater installation the raw feed is 
heated to about 800 °c during its passage through the 
preheater tower, so that it enters the kiln partially 
calcined. Partial precalcining gives an increase in the kiln 
capacity of about 30%, with the possibility of utilization of 
waste fuels. But it has severe effects on the refractory 
lining of the kiln. With the introduction of precalciners,
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the raw meal is entirely decarbonated and calcined before it 
enters the kiln, thus reducing the thermal load on the kiln. 
As a result of complete precalcining, the output of the kiln 
increased 2 to 2.5 times without any increase in the kiln 
size. Additionally it resulted in reduction of NQx 
emission, an increase in refractory lining stability and a 
reduction of disturbances in the operation of the kiln, as 
well as providing the possibility of using the total amount 
of by-passing gases, and of producing low alkali cement.
The most important advantage of complete precalcining is 
lower energy consumption, particularly as energy costs 
account on average for some 40% of total cement manufacturing 
costs. The choice of kiln is very important because burning 
accounts for 40 to 60% of total cement processing costs.4 
The table on page shows differences in size and energy
consumption of various rotary kilns in use at present.
Although dry-process kilns are similar in general 
construction and operation to those used for the wet process, 
for the same production capacity they are more energy 
efficient and smaller in size as there is no drying zone and, 
in the case of works using a full-scale suspension preheater 
and precalciner system, the material is already completely 
precalcined before it enters the kiln. However, complete 
calcination is justified only in cases where the kiln 
capacity exceeds 2,000 tpd.5
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Table 3.1: Main Characteristics of Various Rotary Kilns








process 80-230 3-7.6 1200-1450 0.4-0.8
Long dry
process 70-230 3-7 850- 950 0 .6-1
short dry
process* 40-110 3-6 720- 900 1.4-2.2
Source: J. Mukur.ii, "Refractories in Cement Making" in S.N. Ghosh
(Ed.). 1983: p. 368.
Note (*): short dry process (with suspension preheaters, cyclone 
and precalciners).
Besides the rotary kiln which dominates cement manufacturing 
technology, the vertical kiln is still used in some 
countries. Its part in world cement production (excluding
China) in 1974 was estimated at 5%. Since clinker produced 
in m o d e m  automatic vertical kilns is practically equal in 
quality to that produced by rotary kilns, the choice depends 
mainly on the factors of space requirement, fuel type and 
efficiency. Substantial saving in space can be achieved
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through the use of vertical kilns, as the rotary kiln is 
basically horizontal and its length may exceed 230 m. 
Vertical kilns require a ’ lean’ fuel and can therefore only 
be used in places where coke is available. As for rotary 
kilns, they can be fired with ’fat* coal, oil, gas and waste 
fuels. Meanwhile processing costs are approximately 20% 
lower for vertical kilns than rotary ones in small sized
plants not exceeding 100 000 tpy.7
Despite the significant improvements in the design and 
operation of the vertical kiln, many technical experts in the 
cement industry maintain that it is inadequate in terms of 
efficiency, operation and product quality. In fact the 
rotary kiln superceded the vertical kiln worldwide largely 
because the present trend is to have larger and larger kilns 
and to introduce more and more automation. In industrialized 
countries the economies of scale, automation and efficient 
use of energy appear to have compensated for the additional 
transport costs.
The operation and control of the kiln are the most important 
part of the entire cement manufacturing process, not only in 
ensuring the consistent quality of the cement but also in 
preventing damage to the kiln itself. The rotary kiln 
operates continuously achieving, under good operating 
conditions, running times exceeding 93% of available hours
throughout the year. Planned shutdown once or twice a year
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is necessary to perform essential maintenance and to attend 
to refractory brickwork lining. An important element in the 
successful operation of a cement kiln is the selection and 
installation of refractories lining it.8 They have to 
withstand abrasion, mechanical stress and changes as the kiln 
rotates, and in the cl inker ing zone chemical attack by the 
clinker as well as very high radiant temperatures during part 
of each rotation, when they are protected by the clinker bed. 
Additionally to avoid problems in the operation of the rotary 
kiln, it is essential to maintain very close control over 
all aspects of the kiln process. This requires a high degree 
of electrical and mechanical reliability as well as precision 
in chemical control of the raw meal and in the supply of 
fuel. Slow initial warm up and good control of the raw 
composition and feed rate and steady flame, when the kiln is 
running, all increase bricklife and consequently the running 
time and life of the kiln.
Until quite recently the control of the kiln operation was 
mainly dependent on the skill and experience of the kiln 
operator and his helpers. In recent works conditions in the 
kiln are monitored by weighters and flow meters, and the 
readings are displayed alongside the kiln control. 
Instrumentation control of the kiln is in fact only part of 
instrumentation control of the whole flow process that 
extends from the extraction of raw materials to the discharge 
of cement into the cement storage. Furthermore, in some
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recent, works instrumentation and controls are linked to. a 
computer which, when correctly programmed, can continuously 
monitor a large number of variables and notify the operator 
of discrepancies and the necessary corrective actions. 
However, even with this computerized on-line monitoring 
system, successful kiln operation still heavily dependent on 
the skill and experience of the kiln operator and his 
helpers.
Although the cement industry has seen considerable innovation 
during the last three decades, many gaps in knowledge of 
cement science and technology are not yet filled largely 
because of the complexity and multidisciplinary nature of 
cement.9 Consequently successful operation of cement works
is still heavily dependent on the skill and experience of 
those who carry out design, engineering and construction of 
cement works as well as of those who operate them.
1.2 Choice of techniques and kilns in Algeria
The choice of manufacturing processes and kilns is determined 
as much by technological and economic trends in the 
industrialized countries as by Algeria’s local conditions. 
The main characteristics of the former can be summarized in 
the following:
a) the wet process is rapidly replaced by the dry and semi-dry 
processes because the latter are more energy efficient,
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b) predominance of the rotary kiln,
c) the use of increasingly large scale kilns to save capital 
through the exploitation of scale economies10, and;
d) the introduction of more automation to save labour and 
improve the quality of the product.
The main local factors that were determinant in opting for
the dry process and rotary kilns11 are:
a) the nature of the raw material available in Algeria, i.e.,
lime stone,
b) scarcity of water which excludes the use of wet and semi-wet 
processes,
c) sources of energy most readily available at present, which
are natural gas and oil.
All newly constructed works use gas fired kilns mainly 
because Algeria’s approved reserves of natural gas are much 
larger than those of oil, and also because works can be 
cheaply connected to the existing gas distribution network. 
Although large deposits of coal exist in Algeria, they are 
not at present exploited largely because of their distance 
from the main industrial centres.
Whereas the first two characteristics of the prevailing trend 
in the industrialized countries coincide well with Algeria’s 
local conditions, the appropriateness of the latter two 
characteristics to Algeria’s conditions is questionable. The
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main problems associated with large scale plants and the 
automation associated with it in cement production are:
a) long time lag in construction relative to small units which 
can be built in less than a year,
b) difficulties over infrastructure required to meet the needs 
of such large scale works, such as railways, roads, power and 
the like,
c) limited number of locations where adequate reserves of raw 
materials can be found to keep the plant in operation for a 
25 to 40 year life of the works,
d) high costs of transportation to outlaying areas and waste 
incurred as a result of multi-handling and deterioration of 
the product in transit,
e) limited number of suppliers of equipment: the larger the 
works to be constructed, the smaller the number of workshops 
capable of producing its equipment. This means that for a 
country like Algeria where heavy workshops did not exist 
until 1980, the entire plant had to be imported,
f) difficulties over maintenance and operation of such large- 
scale and highly automated works which require highly skilled 
and experienced personnel, and availability of spare parts 
and equipment. Shortage of spare parts or accidental 
breakdowns can frequently result in plant shutdowns, thus 
causing severe losses of production and shortage of cement 
which in turn adversely affect investment implementation in 
other sectors. As a continuous flow process industry, a stop 
anywhere along the production line can bring the works to a
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halt and unplanned delays in repair and maintenance operation 
tend to be very expensive. Consequently large-scale works 
can be far from economic when a steady rate of full capacity 
utilization is not ensured. Additionally, unplanned 
stoppages can result in severe shortages of the product in 
the market; thus adversely affecting the smooth functioning 
of cement-using sectors.
Whereas most of these problems associated with large scale 
production and automation are not encountered in the 
industrialized countries because of the availability of 
skilled and experienced personnel, adequate infrastructure 
and heavy workshops, as well as of high population density, 
all these problems are encountered in Algeria. Firstly, 
Algeria is a large country (over 2.2m km2) and sparsely 
populated. Its infrastructure, particularly railways, is 
underdeveloped* and high level skills are scarce.** These 
local conditions adversely affect the effective use of large 
scale and highly automated cement works. Hence economies of 
scale expected from large scale plants are often more than 
offset by delays in project execution, capacity under­
utilization and transport costs.
(*) see the map on page 215
(**) see section 3 of this chapter
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2. The Emergence and Development of the Cement Industry in 
Algeria
Cement is one of the most basic of capital goods. It is the 
cornerstone of civil engineering and building industries and 
hence a continuing and expanding supply of cement is 
essential to provide the necessary social and economic 
infrastructure for development. A  temporary shortage of 
cement can, and often does, completely halt crucial 
development projects in many LDCs. In countries where cement 
is imported, construction activities go in cycles depending 
on the availability of foreign exchange. Because of its 
vital importance as well as the relative abundance of its raw 
materials throughout the world, and high transport costs 
relative to value, self-sufficiency in cement production is 
usually given a high priority in planning in LDCs. Since it 
launched its development strategy in 1967, the Algerian state 
has given a high priority to the cement industry in 
particular and construction materials in general, so as to 
meet the development needs of the country.
In order to implement its strategy in this sector, the state 
first set up in 1967 the national corporation SNMC12 with the 
purposes of operating the existing potential and developing 
the industry to meet future demands. Before its 
restructuring in the early 1980*s 13, SNMC was entrusted with 
production, development and distribution of cement and its
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derivatives as well as other construction materials such as 
Quicklime, plaster, aggregates, bricks, tiles and the like* 
While having monopoly over cement production and 
distribution, SNMC shared production and distribution of 
other construction materials with other state corporations, 
local authorities’ enterprises and private firms.
On the eve of the first Four-Year Plan, 1970-3, there were 
two semi-wet process works in Algeria, each having a capacity 
of 500,000 t/y, both works having been set up within the 
framework of the Marshall Plan. Before their nationalization 
in the late 1960 ’ s , both had been owned and operated by 
foreign firms. Their combined production was, until 1967, 
sufficient to meet local demand, which was depressed as a 
result of stagnation of the economy in the period following 
the country’s independence. As soon as investment programmes 
were launched in the pre-plan period 1967-69, shortage of 
cement began to emerge and local demand exceeded local 
production in 1969 by over 0.2 m tonnes despite the fact that 
the existing production capacity was fully utilized.14 At 
the end of the same year the first post-independence cement 
project with a capacity of 500,000 t/y was launched. The 
project was expected to be completed at the beginning of 
1972.
During the first Four Year Plan three new works with a 
combined capacity of 2.5 m  t/y were planned for construction.
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Two of them were expected to start production before the end 
of the plan thus meeting the projected demand on cement in 
1973-4. In practice, only 2 projects were launched and their 
implementation experienced long delays. In fact neither of 
them was completed before the end of the plan, thus resulting 
in a massive deficit in cement supply. Part15 of this 
deficit was met through imports which amounted in 1973 to 1.2 
m tonnes.16 As for construction of the third works, it was 
started during the 1974-77 Plan.
Despite these long delays in project execution experienced 
during the 1970-73 plan, six new works (one of them was 
partly a modernization and extension of an old works) were 
planned for construction during the 1974-77 plan. The main 
objective of this massive investment in the cement industry 
was to provide necessary supplies to building and civil 
engineering activities in the late 1970's and early 1980* s. 
Algerian planners were particularly aware of the existing 
housing crisis which was the result of both rapid population 
growth and lack of investment in the housing sector in 
previous years.
The second Four-Year Plan called for the construction of six 
new works having a total capacity of 5.5 m t/y and 
preparation of pre-investment studies of three others. Two 
of them were planned to start production in 1977 and three in 
1978, thus meeting the projected demand of about 8 m tonnes
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in 1980.17 In practice seven projects (the six planned plus 
the delayed one from the 1970-73 plan) were launched during 
the plan, but only one was completed in 1977; while four 
others were completed in 1978. The remaining two were 
completed in the early 1980*s: one in 1980 and the other in 
1982. During the 1980-4 plan, two new works each having a 
rated capacity of 1 m t/y were launched. Both were completed 
as planned: the first in 1983 and the second in 1986, thus 
bringing the total production capacity newly installed since 
1969 to 10.5m t/y.
Ever since independence, geographical diversification of 
foreign trade and assistance has been a major element in 
Algeria’s foreign economic relations. However, the 
application of this policy has been hampered by other policy 
options such as the scale of investment projects, technology 
and mechanism of its transfer. ’Small is beautiful* seems to 
have no place in the hearts of Algerian technocrats. All 
newly constructed works have been designed on the model of 
those in the West, and producing Portland Cement and other 
associated range of products satisfying ISO standards. Thus 
the smallest works has a rated capacity of half-million t/y. 
Although there are substantial economies of scale associated 
with large scale works, these may be more than offset by long 
construction lead times, transport costs and difficulties 
over maintenance and operation of such large scale works. 
Although there are no available data to support this
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hypothesis in the Algerian case, there are indications that 
this may be true. First, construction lead times are 
relatively longer than those experienced in the DCs.18 
Second, although each works supplies cement to a specific 
market in its surrounding area, with the aim of minimizing 
transport cost and waste incurred as a result of multiple 
handling and deterioration of the product in transit, each 
works has also to cater for demand of outlying areas which 
are sometimes thousands of miles away.* Furthermore, 
transport costs are substantial as most cement is transported 
by lorries rather than by railroads as the latter is still 
underdeveloped. Third, none of the new works is at present 
operating at full capacity due to many difficulties over 
maintenance and operation of works.19 Fourth, in contrast to 
previous large-scale works, the latest completed one 
comprises two kilns, each having a rated capacity of 500,000 
t/y. The primary aim of opting for multiple kilns, according 
to the project manager, was to minimize the adverse effects 
of unplanned stoppages. Fifth, the priority given at present 
to medium-sized works (200,000 - 250,000 t/y) to be located 
in outlying areas such as the Sahara which used to be 
supplied from the existing works in the North of the country. 
Pre-investment studies of a medium-sized works to be located 
in the Saharan region has recently been given priority over
(*)see the map on the next page
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other cement projects whose pre-investment studies were 
completed.
The technology used in newly installed works, is the most up- 
to-date technology with an extremely high degree of 
automation. The whole flow process that extends from the 
extraction of materials to cement expedition is monitored by 
a control system linked to a computer which, when correctly 
programmed, can continuously monitor the operation of the 
plant and notify the operator of discrepancies that may 
occur. The application of computer controls appears to have 
caused an alteration in the traditional division of labour. 
In consequence of the computerization of the control, the 
knowledge which was formerly concentrated in a multitude of 
direct workers is shifting to system developers in the user 
firms and, most importantly, in the control system supplier. 
Because the control system is the * nerve system* of the 
works, knowledge of the control system has become important 
not only in the development of new processes but also in the 
operation of the plant and in the application to new 
equipment and plants. Access to knowledge of the control 
system is important for the user that is endeavouring to 
improve the productivity not only of capital but also of the 
material used.
Consequently, even with this computerized on-line 
monitoring system, the successful operation of works is
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still heavily dependent on the skill and experience of the 
system control operator and his helpers. The main problem 
which hinders the optimum utilization of existing installed 
capacity in Algeria is an imperfect knowledge of both the 
cement technology and the control system used to monitor the 
whole flow process.
This systematic option for large-scale projects and up-to- 
date technology hinders both geographical diversification and 
participation of small firms in technology supply. It 
favours both Western countries and big firms at the expense 
of other potential suppliers. This tendency towards 
concentration was further strengthened by the decision to opt 
for a packaged mechanism of technology transfer, which not 
only hampers participation of foreign small firms but also 
local ones. This was clearly manifested in the cement 
industry where all of the completed projects were awarded to 
only eight firms or consortiums from six Western countries, 
with France and Japan having a lion’s share in terms of both 
capacity and value.20 Although some East European firms
attempted to enter the Algerian cement industry, they failed 
because the technology they offered was considered to be 
inappropriate and out-dated.21
Two mechanisms of technology transfer were used in developing 
the cement industry: unpackaged and packaged. The former
consists of splitting the project into various elements and
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preparing each element for tender separately. It was used 
during the First Four-Year Plan only. Two works were
constructed using the unpacked mechanism. In both projects
the principal contractor - a foreign firm - was responsible 
for basic design and supervision of the work in progress. 
The rest of work was sub-contracted. Over 70 sub-contractors 
- Algerian and foreign - participated in the implementation 
of one of the two works. Apart from the basic design which 
was carried out by the principal contractor without the 
recipient’s participation, the rest of work was performed in 
close cooperation between the personnel of the recipient and 
of the suppliers. The SNMC team, though limited to a handful 
of technicians, actively participated in detailed engineering 
and procurement. In the second project the number of sub­
contractors was much smaller and local participation in 
engineering, procurement and installation was very limited. 
The SNMC team responsible for the project was practically 
limited to the project manager whose main role was restricted 
to monitoring works in progress and solving day-to-day 
administrative problems. In fact all technical functions 
related to the implementation of the project were performed 
by the principal contractor.
Since 1972 the SNMC has totally abandoned the unpackaged 
mechanism of technology transfer. All cement projects 
launched since then have been implemented on a turnkey basis 
in which the contractor is responsible for design,
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engineering, procurement and erection. The main arguements 
often advanced by Algerian technocrats for this type of 
technology transfer can be summarized in the following:
1. Shortage of experienced and skilled personnel required to 
perform project design and management.
2. The supplier of technology is legally forced to share the 
risk by guaranteeing to hand over at a given date facilities 
operating according to contractual characteristics.
3. Shorter construction lead times and cost-effective. These 
arguements will be analyzed in the light of Algerian 
experience in the cement industry in the following section.
It is questionable whether geographical diversification 
really matters. There are several reasons why it may not. 
First, various firms may coordinate, and in fact they do 
through sub-contracting and other collaboration arrangements. 
The following example illustrates this point. Although the 
main contractor of one of the projects was a Canadian 
engineering firm, the implementation of the works required 
the involvement of 20 machine builders and over 100 
manufacturers of components and parts in a handful of Western 
countries including Japan. Secondly the absence of a 
standardization policy resulted in the proliferation of 
foreign designs, which in turn has adverse effects on both 
operation of installed capacity and technological learning on 
the part of the recipient. Standardization could be 
effective in cutting down the unit cost of new projects,
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speeding up the learning process and construction work, 
facilitating maintenance operations and the possibility of 
duplication. From the technological point of view,
geographical diversification may be more effective by 
selecting the best element(s) for most common requirements in 
the country. To start with a common design could be worked 
out, by selecting the best design from existing major 
equipment suppliers - A*s kiln may be the best for Algeria’s 
common requirements, B ’s preheater, C*s raw mill, D ’s 
precalciner, E ’s homogenizer and so on. Such rational 
unification and standardization of cement machinery designs 
can bring much benefits to the industry. Thus the effort 
should be to see whether all these could be satisfactorily 
put together. In fact, this solution appears to be
successfully applied to a cement works in Iran where the best 
equipment from over 20 different manufacturers have been 
brought and put together.*
3. Assimilation of Imported Cement Technology
Between 1970 and 1986 over 11,000 m AD were invested in the 
cement industry, more than 6,000 new jobs were created and 12 
works were completed. This provided an ample opportunity for 
Algerian firms to accumulate experience in all aspects of 
cement technology; process and basic design and engineering,
(*) See Vivesvaray, H.C., (1975): pp. 33-35
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detailed engineering, equipment design and procurement, 
construction, testing, startup, maintenance and operation as 
well as adaptation and improvement. This section aims at 
examining the degree of assimilation of cement technology by 
looking at local content in and lead times of project 
execution, capacity utilization in completed works and the 
improvements and modifications introduced.
The discussion is organized as follows: the first sub-section 
examines the degree of assimilation of the various tasks 
involved in project implementation through two indicators, 
namely the local content and lead times. The second sub­
section examines the degree of assimilation of operational 
technology, i.e., maintenance and operation of completed 
works, and the indicator to be used is capacity utilization 
levels. The third sub-section is devoted to the description 
of modifications introduced to improve and/or adapt the 
imported technology.
Data required for the analysis were obtained through a survey 
of all works. The survey consisted primarily of 
questionnaire-based interviews with executives of the works. 
Most questionnaire answers were not complete for reasons of 
confidentiality, lack of information at the works level 
and/or lack of cooperation on the part of some executives. 
To complete questionnaire answers, another method was used. 
It consisted of interviewing some executives and officials of
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relevant enterprises and Ministries, and screening some 
supposedly confidential reports at the ministries' level. 
The purpose of this additional work was not only to complete 
questionnaire answers but also to test the data obtained from 
works. Despite this additional search some questionnaires 
answers remained incomplete.
3.1 Local content in and lead-times of project execution
With data collected in this survey it is possible to test
three hypotheses about Algeria's assimilation of cement 
technology. The first is that local content will tend to 
increase over time for successive projects as a result of the 
learning process on the part of Algerians. This is based on 
the assumption that Algeria would progressively import less 
goods and services with the completion of each successive 
plant as Algerian personnel and firms would gradually perform 
an increasing proportion of tasks involved in project 
execution and eventually acquire full understanding of the 
technology concerned.22 The second is that lead times will
tend to be longer the larger the size of the project.23 The
third is that lead times for successive projects will tend to 
be shorter as a result of learning process on the part of 
those involved in their execution.
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3.1.1 Local content in project execution
Execution of an industrial project involves a large 
number of tasks. The following analysis will be limited 
to the most important technological tasks which are: 
basic and detailed design and engineering, supply and 
installation of equipment and machinery and the startup 
operation. Examination of local content in each of these 
tasks is accompanied by the definition of the task and 
the type of knowledge and experience required to perform 
it in relation to cement industry.
a) Basic design and engineering: consists of establishing the 
process flow through the works, and the associated materials 
and energy balances and of designing specifications of 
specific equipment and machinery. Performing this task 
requires a highly specialized knowledge of the core process. 
This knowledge can only be obtained through training in 
process design and engineering or applied R & D including 
pilot-plant experimentation. So far local content in this 
task is non-existent. Basic design engineering of all 
completed works was carried out by foreign firms without any 
local participation.
b) Detailed design-engineering: consists of supplying designs of 
the peripheral technology using data provided by basic 
design-engineering. It provides the functional 
specifications equipment, machinery and materials, detailed 
civil engineering, architectural plans and construction
224
specifications. Most detailed engineering tasks do not 
require specialized knowledge of the core process, but 
instead require other forms of specified knowledge of and 
experience in, for example, designing materials handling 
systems, civil works and structures. Before the 
restructuring of national corporations in the early 1980*s, 
there were at least a handful of local firms capable of 
performing this task. Meanwhile, the SNMC itself, before its 
restructuring at the end of 1982, had an ’’Engineering and 
Development Department” which was set up with the aim of 
learning the intricacies of the technology transferred by 
working closely with foreign suppliers during the process of 
transfer of technology. In practice, the Department’s role 
was ’’mainly limited to the preparation of tenders and 
monitoring of work in progress”.* With its restructuring, 
SNMC was split into a number of enterprises, one of which is 
the National Enterprise for the Development of Construction 
Materials (ENDMC) which was entrusted with research,
(*)According to a report presented to the ’National Commission for 
Restructuring’, the Engineering and Development Department was 
employing 215 employees, of which 78 were employed by the sub­
divisions ’’Engineering and Supervision of work in progress” . 
However a tentative analysis of the last figure shows that apart 
from the 14 project managers, technical personnel was limited to 
8 persons (of whom 4 were foreigners). The rest were non­
technical.
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development and engineering related to the construction 
materials industry. Its executives claimed that their 
enterprise at present "can carry out detailed engineering and 
other tasks involved in cement project execution except 
process design-engineering which is not yet fully mastered". 
So far detailed engineering of all works was carried out by 
foreign firms, with one exception where local participation 
was minimal.2 4
c ) Supply of production equipment and machinery: consists of 
designing and manufacturing, using basic and detailed design 
and engineering specifications, of equipment and machinery. 
A distinction must be made between equipment specific to 
cement industry such as kilns, homogenizers and pre-heaters, 
and peripheral equipment such as materials handling equipment 
and power generating machinery. Most peripheral equipment to 
construct a cement works can be designed and manufactured in 
Algeria. This was achieved as early as 1971-73 when most of 
the peripheral equipnent for cement works A*, constructed on 
an unpackaged basis, was supplied by Algerian firms. Since 
then there has been no local participation in the supply of 
this equipment to successive cement projects.
Concerning specific equipment, so far it has all been 
imported, despite the fact that the capacity to design most 
of the mechanical equipnent has existed in Algeria for some
(*) See the diagram on page 229 and the note accompanying it.
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years. So far, specific equipment was not manufactured 
locally not because of its technological complexity, but 
because of:
1. the enormous size of some of this equipment; as the size of 
mechanical equipment is closely related to the production 
capacity of the plant. This in turn requires large-scale 
metal processing workshops which did not in Algeria before 
1979. With the completion of a large workshop at the end of 
1979, the possibility of manufacturing most of the specific 
mechanical equipment lias existed, and an attempt at 
participating, in partnership with an East German firm, in 
the design and construction of the latest completed works, as 
well as in the supply and installation of specific equipment 
was made by the Algerian firm owning the workshop. The bid 
was rejected by SNMC on the ground that the technology 
proposed by the East German firm was, according to an 
executive at the works, "inappropriate and out-dated". The 
contract was eventually awarded to a West European firm on a 
turnkey basis, and;
2 . foreign contractors’ preference to sub-contract to firms 
known or linked to them in order to avoid enlarging their 
risk, which could happen, if they would rely on relatively 
inexperienced and unknown Algerian firms, even if the latter 
are judged to be capable of supplying goods and services
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similar to those of foreign firms.*
d) Installation of machinery and equipment: consists of putting 
together the various components of the plant using layout 
specifications and construction plans established by basic 
and detailed engineering. As early a3 1971 an Algerian firm 
was able to carry out, under supervision of the main 
contractor, installation of most mechanical equipment of the 
works A. This experience allowed the same firm to team up 
with a foreign firm which played the role of a general 
contractor, and carried out the whole installation of works
H. **
(*) This point was made by the chief engineer employed by the 
main contractor (a foreign firm) of a cement project in Algeria, 
who told the author that most of the mechanical equipment needed 
for the project could be locally supplied, adding that the local 
workshop he visited was "technologically more sophisticated than 
some of the firm’s European subcontractors". He insisted that 
"the main reason for the firm’s preference of European firms was 
reliability in terms of quality as well as delivery time", two 
essential factors which he thought the Algerian firm might not be 
capable of satisfying. [Source: from the interview with some
personnel involved in the execution of the latest completd works. 
The interview was carried out by the author in 1986].
(**)see the diagram on page 229 and the footnote accompanying it.
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This experience was not exploited in subsequent cement 
projects whose installation was carried out solely by foreign 
firms.25
e) Start-up operation: consists of test runs of various segments 
of the plant, minimum load testing of full-scale operation 
and full test run. Generally this task requires less 
knowledge of the core process than experience in maintaining 
and operating similar plants. However, in cases where there 
are design faults, familiarity with the core process and 
basic engineering may be essential to overcome design faults. 
The commissioning stage is not only a period of technical 
performance testing but also a learning period where primary 
design faults that might affect equipment availability 
are located and redesigned. Most executives described the 
role of the recipient’s personnel in start-up operations as 
that of observers rather than that of active participants. 
This lack of active participation explains at least in part 
why some design deficiencies from which certain works are at 
present suffering, have been discovered only years after 
start up of their operation.
Another approximative26 estimate of the local content in the 
execution of each project can be indirectly derived from 
total import content in relation to both total cost of each 
project and total cost of production equipment. The 
following two diagrams show the import content in relation to 
the cost of production equipment (diagram a) and in relation
Figure I: (a) Total import content in relation to production equipment cost (%) .
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to project total costs (diagram b). Diagram (a) shows that 
the import content considerably exceeded production equipment 
costs in nine cement works out of the eleven for which data 
is available. This excess reflects costs of various services 
(engineering, installation and the like) provided by foreign 
firms.
The three projects in which the import content was less than 
production equipment costs were B,C,D. The import content was 
at its lowest level in works B in which unpackaging was used 
to its maximum level and local potential in project 
implementation was fully mobilized. Over 70 sub-contractors 
participated in implementing this works. This number 
included 6 Algerian firms which supplied goods and services 
to the project. Works C was also constructed on an 
unpackaged basis but local content in various technological 
tasks previously listed was minimal. Works D was implemented 
on a turnkey basis, however, it was a combination of 
extension and modernization of an old works and consequently 
some old equipment and machinery were maintained. This 
explains why the import content in relation to both 
production equipment costs and total costs was much lower 
than in other turnkey projects.
Diagram (b) exhibits a roughly similar pattern to diagram (a) 
with import content in total costs falling sharply in Works B 
then progressively increasing with the passage of time in
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successive projects, reflecting the increasing reliance on 
foreign goods and services in project execution. The slight 
fall in import content in project H was due to the fact that 
the installation of production equipment was carried out by 
an Algerian firm acting as a sub-contractor to the foreign 
general contractor.
Whatever the parameter used to measure local content in 
project execution, there is no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that local content has increased with the passage 
of time by a learning process. The immediate explanation for 
this was the mechanism of technology transfer used. The only 
cement project in which local participation in some 
technological tasks was considerable, was works B in which 
maximum unpackaging was used. SNMC’s systematic option for 
the packaged mechanism of technology transfer since 1972 has 
hindered local participation in project execution and 
consequently inhibited the process of learning on the part of 
Algerian firms. Failure to use local suppliers precludes the 
possibility of local accumulation of experience and diffusion 
of technology. The economy as a whole is therefore deprived 
of experience that is directly relevant to the industry’s 
subsequent development. Moreover, the role of the direct 
recipient’s personnel in turnkey projects was often reduced 
to that of an observer rather than of an active participant 
in the application of technology. Thus the role of SNMC’s 
teams27 assigned to supervise projects was usually limited to
232
day-to-day administrative problems leaving all technological 
matters in the hands of foreign personnel.
In addition, turnkey contracts often deliver a plant together 
with instructions on how to operate it under the conditions 
assumed in its design, but fail to provide the recipient with 
an understanding of the full details of why the plant 
operates in the way it does. This inhibits the recipient’s 
ability to improve the technology as well as plant operating 
productivity or to adapt to changes that may occur over time 
in the circumstances which affect how the plant is best 
operated.28 As a result, the plant is likely to operate at 
lower productivity than could have been achieved - with the 
recipient probably also continuing to depend heavily on 
foreign technical assistance in troubleshooting - and the 
recipient may need to make greater efforts to master the 
technology than would have been necessary had its personnel 
actively participated in every phase of project 
implementation.
The SNMC’s systematic recourse to a packaged mechanism of 
technology transfer has in turn to be explained. The main 
arguements advanced by Algerian decision-makers in favour of 
this mechanism can be summarized as follows:
1. The supplier is forced legally to handover at a given date a 
plant in production according to contractual characteristics, 
and that he accepts part of the risk. Penalties are often
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included in such contracts in an attempt to ensure that both 
parties to the contract respect its contents. For example, 
around 10% of the value of the contract is often set aside as 
a guarantee, and only released when the plant is handed over 
according to contractual specifications. However, the bidder 
often incorporates contingency allowances in his bid to cover 
such risks. Furthermore, it is usually difficult to 
determine who is responsible for defaults, such as delays in 
project execution or design deficiencies..., which may occur. 
In fact a number of projects experienced delays in their 
execution and a number of completed works have been suffering 
from design deficiencies since their start-up. (see next 
section).
2. "The supplier is legally forced to guarantee a successful 
transfer of technology” . Those who use this arguement seem 
to confuse technology with its end product which is bound to 
become obsolete with time. What the supplier offers in
turnkey projects is the end product of an integral chain of 
technological activities which the recipient could only 
acquire through technological effort in the form of active 
participation with the supplier in the application of various 
technological tasks, and training of personnel in all 
aspects of technology. Without the acquisition of process 
and detailed design and engineering capacity, the recipient 
will remain incapable of attaining the desired level of 
operating capacity in a particular technology and a 
duplicative and, ultimately, innovative capacity. As
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Chaponniere stressed, a systematic application of the turnkey 
contract will not free the recipient from technological 
backwardness.2® The end product of the technological chain 
of activity is bound to become obsolete and the customer is 
forced to return to the supplier for renewal or extension of 
the existing capacity.
3. ”It is less costly and takes less time to execute projects on 
a turnkey basis than in unpackaged form”: from the data 
available on project costs and lead times, there is no clear 
evidence which supports this arguement.30 Furthermore, this 
arguement ignores direct and indirect beneficial advantages 
which may be derived from unpackaging such as experience and 
training on the part of both the direct recipient and local 
suppliers. The arguement implies that there is no explicit 
objective of acquiring technological capacity on the part of 
the recipient.
4. Another common arguement is what is often referred to in 
Algeria as ’contractual convenience*, meaning that the 
rigidity and clumsiness of Algeria’s bureaucracy make it 
necessary to concentrate one project on one contract, because 
if it is split into multiple contracts the bureaucratic 
procedures and obstacles are multiplied.31 It is true that 
Algerian bureaucratic procedures are extremely rigid, long 
and complicated, but these characteristics are not sufficient 
to explain the firm’s behaviour (see below).
5. "Lack of sufficient Algerian skills to carry out project 
engineering and management” . While this argument is
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generally true, it requires some qualification. Firstly, the 
firm did not attempt to establish a permanent team to work 
alongside foreign personnel so as to learn the intricacies of 
the technology. Secondly, this arguement ignores the fact 
that the existing human potential32 was largely misused as a 
result of both high labour turnover and misallocation of 
tasks.* Thirdly, training of Algerian nationals, which was 
given a major importance in investment decision was ill- 
conceived (see sub-section 3).
In fact, the main reasons for this systematic choice of 
project implementation on a turnkey basis were:
a) A very rapid rise in the volume of investment which 
outstripped the absorptive capacity not only of the firm but 
also of the whole economy. The volume of investment 
allocated to SNMC during 1974-79 period was almost 8 times 
that of 1969-73.33
b) Deformation in the planning system, which was the result of a 
combination of a rapid rise in the volume of investment and a 
change in the balance of power between the central 
administration which was supposed to orient, supervise and 
monitor, and various microeconomic entities. The former made 
the planning and centralized monitoring system unable to cope 
with the increasing work load and consequently it became 
unable to supervise and monitor all investment projects
* see sub-section 3
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efficiently. This in turn resulted in state corporations 
becoming increasingly autonomous in the way they implemented 
their investment projects. The position of the individual 
corporations vis-a-vis the central organs of the state 
bureaucracy was, if not one of complete autonomy, at least 
one of considerable leverage,
c) Lack of an explicit objective to acquire technological 
capacity on the part of some state corporations. Indeed, it 
is this factor which differentiates between those which 
systematically opted for turnkey projects and those which 
opted for the unpackaged form of technology transfer or a 
combination of the two at the same time, although their 
investment volume was multiplied by more than 10 during the 
same period.36 In fact most firms* overriding priority was 
to have their projects completed even at the expense of other 
socio-economic objectives.
3.1.2 Lead-Times
From contract signature to start-up operation for the 
twelve works took on the average 47.25 months. This 
average was approximately 48% higher than those projected 
by the Planning agency for the same projects. The latter 
was based on norms prevailing in the industrialized 
countries and consequently it under-estimated the adverse 
effects of certain conditions peculiar to Algeria (such 
as lack of adequate infrastructure, rigidity of certain
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administrative procedures and the like) on lead times. 
Thus it took on the average over 20% of overall lead-time 
for construction to be started once the contract was 
awarded. As for construction which involved various 
tasks such as site clearance, civil engineering and 
erection, it took on the average 37.66 months. Table 4.1 
summarizes the information on lead-times in unweighted 
arithmetic means.
These lead-times were judged by the respondents to be 
generally "similar to" those experienced in many LDCs. 
The Indian experience seems to support this view. Thus 
it was reported that: "Large new cement plants take
nearly 4 to 5 years to complete...".3 4 However the range 
between the shortest and longest lead times for very 
similar projects in terms of production capacity was 
extremely wide. Whereas the shortest overall lead-time 
was 35 months, the longest one amounted to almost 7 
years. The one project with the longest overall lead- 
time experienced long delays both before and during the 
phase of construction. The former was due to changes in 
location and the latter to the inefficiency of the firm 
entrusted with site clearance and civil engineering work.
Table 4.2: Unweighted Arithmetic means of lead-times and project
cost.
Lead-Times (months) number of projects 
n=12 n=10 n=10* n=ll n=8
Overall lead-time C (from 
contract signature to 
completion) 47.25 47.10 49.20 44.10 49.50
Lead-time B (from 
construction start-up 
to completion) . 37.66 37.80 38.10 36.36 38.37
Lead-time A  (from contract 
signature to construction 
start-up). 9.60 9.30 11.10 7.73 11.12
1978 project cost 941.83 995.20 936.20 918.36 973.14
Source: Data derived from the survey of works.
Notes: n=12: all works
n=10: all turnkey projects (ie all projects excluding the 
two executed in an unpackaged form)
n=10*: all works excluding the two launched during 1980*8. 
n=ll: all works excluding one which experienced long delays 
in its implementation before and after phase of construction. 
n=8: all turnkey projects implemented during the 1970*s.
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The following table summarizes the information on the maximum 
and minimum lead times experienced at different phases of 
projects execution.
Table 4.3: Longest and shortest lead times for the sample.
Lead times for the sample (in months) longest shortest
Overall lead-time C 82 35
Lead-time B 52 31
Lead-time A 30 1
Data in table 1 show that:
1) Once the project with the longest overall leadtime is 
excluded from the sample (column 4) all average lead-times 
are considerably reduced.
2) Once the two projects implemented during the 1980's are 
excluded from the sample (column 3), all average lead-times 
are considerably increased. (As mentioned before, these two 
projects were the only ones of the whole sample, which were 
implemented within the time projected by the Planning 
Ministry). This supports the arguement that lead-times tend 
to be shorter the smaller the number of projects under 
construction becuase of the limited absorptive capacity of 
both the firm and other institutions involved directly or 
indirectly in project execution,
3) There is no clear evidence to support the arguement often 
advanced by Algerian decision makers, that lead-times are 
shorter for turnkey projects. Comparison of data in column 2
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with those in column 1 and 5 reveals that the difference 
between the two sets of data is very marginal. Once the two 
turnkey projects implemented in the 1980’s are excluded 
(n=8), average lead-time3 for the 8 turnkey projects are 
considerably longer than those of column 2.
All projects in the sample, except the latest two, 
experienced delays in their implementation relative to lead- 
time initially approved by the central planning organ and 403* 
of them experienced delays in relation to contractual lead- 
times. All respondents emphasized the adverse effects of the 
Algerian system on lead-times. They drew attention to slow 
decision-making and rigidity of the administrative system as 
well as to a lack of coordination between various 
institutions responsible directly or indirectly for project 
implementation. Moreover some respondents referred to the 
inefficiency of certain Algerian firms responsible for 
providing goods and services related to projects, as well as 
certain foreign firms involved in project implementation. In 
one case the delay was judged to be largely due to 
cancellation of certain sub-contracts initially concluded 
with foreign firms.
With the cement project data collected it is possible to 
attempt a test of two hypotheses about Algerian assimilation 
of imported cement technology. The first is that lead-times 
will tend to decrease for successive projects as a result of
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learning processes on the part of Algerian firms and 
institutions (and also on the part of foreign firms which 
were involved in more than one project), the main arguement 
in favour of a possible ’learning curve’ is that successive 
investment in technologically similar projects would result 
in shortening lead-times, as a result of iterative problem 
solving and experimentation. This implies that technical and 
organizational problems encountered in the implementation of 
initial projects would be overcome in successive projects as 
experience was accumulated. However, it must be emphasized 
that learning does not take place automatically. Major 
financial and human as well as organizational effort is 
essential to create a learning system capable of gathering, 
screening and exploiting information about problems 
encountered and opportunities perceived.
Against the first hypothesis are the following:
1) the rigidity of the administrative system and slow decision­
making,
2) lack of an explicit technological strategy aimed at a long­
term objective of assimilating the imported technology both 
at the firm and national level. Most respondents emphasized 
the fact that the overriding priority in investment 
implementation during the 1970*s was to get planned projects 
implemented,
3) inadequate supply of skills relative to the volume of 
investment planned and lack of stability of both management 
and labour.35
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The second hypothesis is that lead-times will tend to become 
longer, the larger the project. In favour of this hypothesis 
is the proposition that a project of large value will 
logically entail a larger volume of work than a similar 
project of smaller value, and that there will be more 
technical and organizational problems to solve than there 
would be for similar smaller projects. Since projects of 
large value involve a large proportion of infrastructural 
work, it is expected that work on the project cannot be 
easily compressed into the same time-scale as for a smaller 
project simply by allocating more material and human 
resources to it; the need to carry out some tasks before 
other for technical reasons would limit the compression of 
time-scales by such means.
Against the second hypothesis is the fact that the more 
experience the project manager has with applying the 
technology concerned, the less the time-scale will tend to 
be. Lead-times can be reduced through adequate planning of 
project execution, the choice of competent sub-contractors 
and coordination and control of work in progress so that 
certain tasks can be performed simultaneously and according 
to the time-scale initially established. Against this 
arguement is the view of some (not all) respondents that 
certain sub-contractors were inefficient and the fact that 
certain sub-contracts were cancelled during the construction 
phase for one reason or another.
243
With data collected in this survey it is possible to attempt 
a statistical explanation of the variation in lead-times by 
the variations in (a) the date36 of the contract signature 
(as an explanatory variable in considering the learning 
effects) and (b) project size (measured in terms of value in 
1978 million Algerian Dinars). Multiple linear regression 
equations (using ordinary least squares) were calculated with 
lead-times as the dependent variable and project dates and 
values as the independent variables. This was carried out 
separately for various elements of the overall lead-time of 
all projects in the sample as well as for turnkey projects 
(i.e., excluding the two implemented in unpackaged way). The 
results are set up in table 4.3. (see page 244).
Clearly the computed regression equations in table 4.3 
provides no support to the hypothesis that larger projects 
take longer to implement or that lead-times have been reduced 
with time as a result of a learning process. The 
overwhelming bulk of the variance in lead-time is unexplained 
by the variances in project costs and experience. The 
regression coefficients are in no case significant at the 5% 
or even the 10% level.
Table 4.4 Lead-times, project costs and experience: Regression 
results.
Lead Time Constant Term 
(in months)
Regression Coefficients 
Project cost Experience 
(1978 m AD) (in years)
CM1 PS
Case A: n=12
Overall lead time C 32 0.023 -0.618 -0.05
(2.01) (1.19) (-0.52)
Lead time B 36.12 0.004 -0.21 0.20
(4.34) (0.37) (-0.34)
Lead time A -5.81 0.02 -0.59 0.05
(-0.56) (1.62) (-0.72)
Case B: n=10 (all turnkey projects)
Overall lead time C 22.6 0.03 -0.43 0.08
(0.95) (1.15) (-0.32)
Lead time B 35.4 0.005 -0.27 0.25
(2.77) (0.38) (-0.37)
Lead time A -13.23 0.025 -0.33 0.06
(-0.9) (1.59) (-0.37)
Source: Data derived from the survey
- 2
Notes: R is the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom. Figures in
brackets are t. statistics. Correlation between project costs
and experience is insignificant.
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engineering firms in order to reduce plant start-up time, and 
in order to optimize production. The SNMC had no engineering 
capacity of its own38 to perform this task efficiently and 
consequently it had to have recourse to foreign technical 
assistance. However, despite the existence of this technical 
assistance during the start-up operation of all plants39, 
none of them has ever operated at more than 78* of the rated 
capacity.
Although some works were able to achieve an output level as 
high as 78* of the rated capacity during the first years of 
their operation, they were unable to improve, and sometimes 
even to maintain, this level in subsequent years - with and 
without foreign technical assistance. This was primarily due 
to either design faults*, or the inability to carry out 
maintenance adequately, or both. "Major design faults" was 
suggested to be the "main problem" in three works and an 
existing but a "minor problem" in three others. In the 
former cases it was suggested that the "only solution" to the 
problem was through "substantial investment" to bring about 
the necessary modifications in the design. In the latter
* Similar problems were also reported in some Mexican cement 
works. See Ruth Pearson, (Sept 1977) esp. pp. 14-22. 
Meanwhile design faults were reported to the author by 
executives of some of the mechanical engineering plants which 
were visited during 1985.
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3.2 Capacity Utilization and Manning Levels
None of the eleven works surveyed37 has ever achieved its
rated production capacity. The main problems encountered 
are: design deficiencies, shortage of skilled and
experienced personnel, of spare parts and the non-renewal of
obsolete equipment.
1. Design deficiencies: The performance of a production unit
(output level, operating costs, quality of product(s) and the 
like) is partly dependent on the quantity and quality of 
engineering activity that has gone into its design and 
construction. At the design stage reliability and 
maintainability are the important factors and must be 
considered in relation to equipment performance, capital cost 
and running cost. At the installation stage, maintainability 
continues to be an important factor because it is only at 
this stage that the multidimensional nature of many of the 
maintenance problems becomes clear. The commissioning stage 
is not only a period of technical performance testing but 
also a learning period where primary design deficiencies that 
might affect equipment availability are located and corrected 
on the spot, or designed out. Indeed, some design problems 
are often overcome during the start-up operation of the
plant. Others may not be except by carrying out substantial 
modifications which can only be achieved through further 
investment in the plant. Industrialists in DCs usually have 
recourse to either their engineering departments or other
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cases it was suggested that "minor modifications" could 
result in removing bottlenecks and consequently lead to 
better performances.
Maintenance is another major problem which has a direct 
effect on output levels. The maintenance department 
influences availability of the plant directly through 
preventive and corrective40 maintenance. The former can be 
defined as that which is carried out at predetermined 
intervals with the intention of reducing the likelihood of an 
equipment’s condition falling below a required level of 
availability. It can be time- and/or condition-based and 
may, for its execution, require the equipment to be taken 
off-line. Determination of a preventive maintenance 
programme is a difficult management problem and its 
implementation often requires complete knowledge of the 
process of production being applied.
Preventive maintenance in modern cement works is a highly 
complicated matter and requires perfect knowledge of the core 
process and control system, and adequate resources and 
organization. The more sophisticated the equipment and the 
more automated the system, the more important is an adequate 
maintenance procedure to ensure that the equipment is fully
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utilized*. Although maintenance is also necessary with less 
sophisticated technology, it is only when systems analysis 
has been, since the early 1970*s, applied to cement 
production that the advantages of a programmed preventive 
maintenance system have been appreciated. In such a system 
it is possible to calculate the potential trouble areas which 
need special maintenance and the minimum frequency with which 
maintenance procedures must be carried out at all points of 
the production line. Meanwhile, it may be necessary in 
modern works to reprogramme the process computer, or work out 
new rules for the adjustment of the cycle.
So far, Algeria’s cement industry has not acquired the 
process know-how41 and consequently it relies heavily on 
foreign firms* "trouble-shooting*1 flying squads which are 
called upon whenever major technical problems occur. Even 
the capacity to carry out regular maintenance work (such as 
brick lining of the kiln) has not been fully acquired by all 
works. Some works still rely on foreign technical assistance 
to carry out this task. This technical assistance is often 
called upon at planned shutdowns to assist Algerian personnel 
to perform essential maintenance work and to attend to the 
refractory brick-work lining.
* To achieve this aim some cement firms in Mexico had recourse to 
foreign engineering firms to install a preventive maintenance 
system. See Ruth Pearson (1977): op. cited.
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2. Shortage of skilled and experienced personnel: Construction 
of every works was accompanied by training of some 
prospective personnel in various aspects of the plants  
operation and maintenance at home and abroad, often through 
experience working temporarily in similar plants. Further 
training is carried out in the plant itself, particularly 
during the commissioning stage when prospective personnel are 
allocated to work alongside foreign workers. Despite this 
extensive training, executives at eight works reckon that 
"shortage of skilled and experienced personnel" is "the major 
problem that hinders the optimum utilization of production 
capacities". This shortage of skilled and experienced 
personnel, despite considerable financial efforts to train 
the necessary personnel, is due on the one hand to the 
content of training itself and on the other to labour and 
management instability. During the technology transfer 
process by which production facilities were established, 
there was no training across the whole range of technological 
tasks. Most of the training was provided on-the-job and 
undertaken "mainly with the objective of acquiring basic 
operational know-how". Such training provides neither 
understanding of full details of how the plant operates, nor 
knowledge of why the plant operates in the way it does. This 
hampers the recipient*s ability to reduce start-up times and 
to react to post-start-up problems which may occur over time.
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Furthermore Ma considerable”* proportion of the trainees 
never joined the industry after completing their training and 
consequently new recruits have to be trained to replace them. 
Meanwhile, another proportion of trainees have been allocated 
to tasks42 other than those for which they were trained43 , 
thus depriving the works of their skills, limited though it 
may have been.
Another major problem which adversely affected technology 
assimilation and production performance in the cement 
industry was high labour turnover, both at the shopfloor and 
management level. The average labour turnover rate ranged 
from a minimum of 12* per year in one works to a maximum of 
25* in another. Some works experienced a turnover rate of
over 30* per year during their first three years of 
operation. Although this phenomenon was not peculiar to the 
cement industry44, its adverse effects on technological 
learning process and capacity utilization appear to be more 
pronounced in the cement industry than in other industrial 
branches. This was due to a number of factors, the most 
important of which are:
a) Location: in contrast to most other manufacturing industries 
which are often located in well established industrial zones 
near big cities where some ancillary and support activities 
exist, cement works are often located in isolated areas.
* Sources of quotes: questionnaire answers.
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This isolation often makes access to support activities and 
skilled manpower more difficult than for other industries. 
For example, most plant executives pointed out that they 
"find it difficult to attract skilled labour from other 
industries to replace departed ones because of both isolation 
and relatively hard working conditions”,
b) Lack of continuous training facilities: in contrast to most 
other firms which have their own vocational and sometimes 
even post-secondary training facilities which provide both 
general and specific training to prospective employees as 
well as those already employed, SNMC, until very recently, 
had no such facilities of its own to provide general and 
specific training to its prospective or old employees. As a 
consequence, the former find it easier both to retain their 
employees, as continuous training improves upward mobility, 
and to replace those who have left. A project aimed at 
establishing a vocational training centre was launched in 
1983, but its operation has encountered serious difficulties 
related to aquisition of equipment and recruitment of 
appropriate skilled personnel. Despite these problems, 
during 1985-6 the new centre provided basic training to a 
number of prospective employees of the latest completed 
works.
Although recently both skills supply and labour stability 
have tended to improve, more efforts are required both at the 
plant level and outside it to ensure that this trend lasts.
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Most works are at present "generally satisfactorily" endowed 
with qualified technical personnel whose performance depends 
largely on the improvement of their socio-economic conditions 
(such as housing, wages and transport) as well as on the 
efficient labour management at the plant and the enterprise 
levels.45 Meanwhile the rate of labour turnover has tended 
in recent years to decrease46, thus providing the possibility 
(not the inevitability) of capitalization on experience which 
will eventually result in optimum utilization of existing 
installed capacity and technological innovation. However, 
capitalization on experience of production depends, at any 
level above that of the individual task, on institutional 
mechanisms and the allocation of appropriate resources for 
generating, recording, screening and exploiting that 
experience. Without such a feedback system, the ongoing 
operational experience will, for practical reasons, generate 
little experience, and the process of technical change will 
lack a critical driving force. Most works appear to have no 
such feedback system to make effective use of experience 
accumulated by individual workers and to diffuse it within 
and outside the works. This perhaps "explains" why 
executives at some relatively old works pointed out that they 
have "individual experts" in certain technical areas but they 
lacked an "integrated team of experts" which has the complete 
know-how of cement technology. Although most of them blamed 
the lack of the latter on a "shortage of certain skills and 
labour turnover", some of them suggested that it was "also
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due to a lack of a feedback system and exchange of 
information between various works as well as within each 
works”.
Other labour-related problems are overmanning and lack of 
motivation. Overmanning was a common feature to all cement 
works. By overmanning I mean the excess number of workers in 
relation to the number of jobs suggested by foreign 
contractors. The degree of overmanning differed from one 
works to another: it ranged from a minimum of 8% (in the two 
works very recently completed) to a maximum of 80% in another 
works. While recognizing the fact that there was
overmanning, all respondents pointed out that manning levels 
specified by foreign contractors were largely based on 
prevailing conditions in their countries and consequently 
tended to underestimate the effects of certain conditions 
peculiar to Algeria on manning levels. As for the difference 
in manning levels between various works, it was largely due 
to employment conditions in their surrounding areas (e.g., 
recruitment for welfare reasons) and to the amount of 
employment in servicing departments such as those providing 
maintenance, medical, recreation and other social services. 
Some plant executives pointed out that some employees were 
"imposed on them by those with influence outside the plant 
for ’welfare* or ’personal’ reasons”. In two cases, 
overmanning was, according to works* executives, due largely 
to high labour turnover and absenteeism experienced during
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the first three years of their operation, as departed and 
absentee employees rarely gave prior notice of their 
departure or absence. Operating under these uncertain 
conditions, managers were forcd to recruit extra labour to 
replace those who did not turn up so as to ensure an adequate 
level of manning.
I
Meanwhile all respondents cited lack of motivation as an 
obstacle to technological effort on the part of employees. 
The Algerian labour law gives more importance to job security 
and upward mobility by seniority, than to labour productivity 
and efficiency. Accordingly managers find it extremely 
difficult to dismiss those who violate work rules or are 
inefficient, and to encourage those who work hard and are 
disciplined, through rapid upward mobility and the 
distribution of other rewards. This lack of motivation 
applies especially to technological effort. Thus there are 
no specific incentives to those who may find solutions to 
technical problems. This lack of incentives hinders 
technological effort on the part of workers and also 
discourages the efforts of potential inventors and 
innovators.48
3. Shortage of engineering spare parts and equipment: This is a 
major problem which adversely affects the performance of 
imported machinery and equipment not just in the cement 
industry but in all other sectors of the Algerian economy. 
Until very recently this shortage was not so much due to a
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shortage of foreign exchange, as to mal-management both 
inside and outside the plant concerned. A large proportion 
of components and parts can be produced locally, either 
inside the plant itself or outside it. However, there are 
major problems which hinder this. Among these problems which 
were repeatedly emphasized by different works executives are:
a) lack of technical specifications and plans of these 
engineering elements, as a result of the initial neglect on 
the part of the recipient to obtain this information from the 
technology supplier;
b) shortage of appropriate raw materials required to manufacture 
components and parts that could be designed at the plant 
level;
c) lack of knowledge on the part of a plant’s management of 
existing workshops which can manufacture such elements. This 
lack of knowledge was partly due to deficiencies in the flow 
of information and partly to lack of initiative on the part 
of some works managers.
Despite the above listed problems the share of locally 
produced engineering elements in total purchases of some 
works has recently increased substantially. In some works, 
this share has increased from nothing in the mid-1970*s to 
over 25% in recent years. This was primarily achieved 
through "reverse engineering" where the basic design is often 
carried out at the plant level, and detailed engineering and 
manufacturing is done by other local firms* workshops. Three
256
factors have been of great importance to the increase in 
locally produced spares and components: great effort on the 
part of management of some works, improvement in design 
capabilities of their personnel and the state’s effort to 
encourage sub-contracting and inter-enterprise cooperation.
A large proportion of engineering elements is still imported 
from manufacturers of equipment and machinery incorporated 
into the plant. There are many problems here as well which 
result in long delays in obtaining the necessary engineering 
element; and these delays sometimes cause stoppages of the 
plants. First each plant is required to plan its yearly 
import requirements both in quantity and quality before it 
applies for import licences. However, planning of such 
imports is an extremely complex matter partly because 
maintenance planning and management49 have not been fully 
mastered and partly because of unpredictable breakdowns and 
price fluctuations. Second, obtaining import licences, 
particularly for non-routine purchases, is a difficult and 
drawn-out bureaucratic process. Third, the granting of
import licences was initially conceived with the aim of 
obtaining essential engineering elements which cannot be
manufactured locally, so as to ensure the smooth operation 
of existing machinery and equipment. However, this
arrangement appears to be misused by most works, which tend
to resort to importing replacement parts and needed tools 
from established suppliers abroad rather than to try to
257
manufacture them inhouse or to search for potential local 
suppliers. While this tendency may make perfect economic 
sense to cement manufacturers, the potential social benefit 
that could be derived from increased use of local facilities 
for expanding the country’s engineering output and for 
acquiring more machine-building capacity was lost. Thus, 
while this arrangement may provide a solution to shortage of 
replacement parts and components, the problem is bound to be 
encountered as soon as foreign exchange is in short supply. 
Fourth, due to a lack of standardization and diversification 
of designs by initial suppliers of equipment during the 
technology transfer process, each plant has to deal with 
dozens of suppliers because Algerian law prohibits recourse 
to intermediaries. This lack of standardization also 
hampers:
a) cooperation between the works so as to find a common solution 
to maintenance and equipment replacement problems,
b) efficient import-substitution, as a result of the 
proliferation of designs,
c) the learning process as successive works incorporated 
technological improvements introduced in supplying countries, 
and equipment designs differed substantially according to the 
supplier.
Fifth, some relatively old works have already encountered 
major difficulties in obtaining vital replacement components 
and parts as a result of technological obsolescence. Some
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equipment incorporated in these plants is not anymore 
produced by the initial suppliers as a result of 
technological change introduced on such equipment by 
manufacturers of equipment in developed countries.
4. Non-replacement of obsolete equipment: This is another
problem which adversely affects not only the plant 
performance in the short run but can also cause technical 
changes in the plant as a whole resulting inter alia in 
variation in the product quality, accidental breakdowns, 
increased consumption of energy and other inputs, reduced 
security of the working place and even pollution of outside 
environment. For example, some works have been suffering 
from deficiencies in their obsolete dedusting system for many 
years. These deficiencies resulted among other things in 
reducing the efficiency of the plant, a considerable loss of 
clinker, pollution of the working place and works’ 
surrounding areas, and premature obsolescence of machinery 
and equipment.
3.3 Improvement of Imported Cement Technology
It was argued in the previous section that lack of complete 
know-how has hampered the optimum utilization of existing 
installed capacity. This lack of know-how is particularly 
acute with regard to process technology and control systems. 
Learning about how the process ’works* is particularly
259
important, because an understanding of the nature of 
process technology, quite apart from its beneficial effects 
on the productivity of the plant itself (and subsequent 
projects) through more rational operation of the plant, is 
also the starting point for further innovation, adaptation 
and possibly for building up relevant research and 
development activities. Meanwhile full understanding of the 
computerized control system is as important to the 
development of new processes as to its application to new 
equipment and plants, because the control system is the 
* nerve system* of the plant. This lack of complete know-how 
of the process and its related control system deprives the 
user of the technology of the necessary knowledge to innovte 
as well as to efficiently operate existing production 
capacity. However ’minor* improvements are still possible 
despite these handicaps. Such improvements often take the 
form of adjustments in the layout, improvement in peripheral 
technology and adjustment of certain specific equipment 
although introduction of the latter may cause unpredictable 
technical changes in the process. This is exactly what 
happened in one of the works when certain modifications were 
introduced without prior knowledge of their consequences on 
other segments of the plant; which led to a complete shutdown 
of the plant for a number of days.50
At the works level, the overriding preoccupation of 
management has been the optimization of utilization of
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production capacities. Consequently their technological 
effort has been- concentrated on finding technical and 
organizational solutions to problems encountered in operating 
and maintaining machinery and equipment. Thus executives at 
all works seemed to be very much in earnest when stating the 
reasons for introducing technological modifications, which 
are "to increase the availability of the plant to the desired 
level and to ensure security of the working place”. This 
technological effort has, so far, resulted in what they 
described as, ”a limited number of minor modifications”.51 
These technical modifications can be analytically divided 
into two categories: those which were introduced on the
peripheral technology, such as the material handling system 
and those which were applied to the core process such as 
kilns, homogenizers, dedusting systems and pre-heaters. 
Examples of the former category are: first, replacement of a 
pneumatic conveying system which transports clinker from the 
kiln to storage silos by a metallic one because of the 
former’s low level of reliability, and second, modifications 
in the control system of the conveyor belt which transports 
raw materials from the quarry to the works so as to improve 
its efficiency and reliability. Examples of the latter 
category include modifications in a) the dedusting system to 
improve its efficiency and consequently to reduce emission of 
polluting elements in the atmosphere, b) the blending system 
with the aim of producing a raw meal of uniform chemical 
composition, before feeding it to the kiln, and
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c) introduction of a new type of refractory kiln lining 
bricks as well as modification in their installation, with 
the aim of increasing brick life and consequently the running 
time and life of the kiln.
The way these modifications were carried out differs from one 
works to another. In one works all modifications were 
carried out in close cooperation with foreign machine- 
producing firms. Two others made use of both foreign and 
local producers of equipment. The rest used only local 
workshops. All respondents pointed out that none of these 
modifications was carried out in collaboration with local 
research institutes and universities.
At the firm level the SNMC, before its restructuring at the 
end of 1982, had two organizational units which dealt 
directly with technology aspects. These were the Engineering 
and Development Division and the central laboratory. The 
former’s actual functions have already been discussed. The 
latter*s were mainly limited to geological surveying and 
testing of raw materials required to develop the construction 
materials industry, and quality control of finished as well 
as intermediate products.
Since the restructuring of the SNMC, R-D and E activities 
related to construction materials, including cement, have 
been separated from production activities and entrusted to
262
the national enterprise ENDMC. Although the latter was 
created with the primary aim of promoting technological 
activities related to the construction materials industry, 
the idea of separating production activities from R-D and E 
activities on which the policy of restructuring was based, 
may prove to be a major obstacle to technological development 
and efficient application of technological innovations.52 
Although it is early to provide sufficient evidence to 
support this view, preliminary empirical information 
collected from the works suggest that there is at present no 
direct link between ENDMC and individual works already in 
operation. ENDMC executives explained this lack of direct 
links between their enterprise which was supposed to provide 
consultancy and other services to existing firms and 
potential investors, private and public, in construction 
materials industry, was due to the fact that their efforts in 
previous years had been concentrated on the establishment of 
the necessary infrastructure and monitoring of projects under 
construction. They claimed that ’’now that specialized 
teams53 are created, more attention will be given to 
providing technical assistance to production enterprises and 
prospective investors in the industry”.54 Still, it remains 
to be seen how this communication network will be 
established. As each enterprise is given autonomy in running 
its business, relationships between various enterprises were 
initially planned to take place on a contractual basis 
according to their mutual advantages. However, past
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experience shows that Algerian firms tended to have excessive 
recourse to foreign suppliers of goods and services, 
sometimes even at the expense of well-established local ones.
Conclusion
This chapter has looked at recent technological developments in 
the cement industry in DCs and their appropriateness (or lack of 
it) to Algeria’s conditions, and has examined the Algerian 
experience in acquiring and assimilating cement manufacturing 
technology. The first section has provided a summary of 
technological trends in the industrialized countries and examined 
Algeria’s options in the light of these trends as well as of the 
country’s specific conditions. It was argued that some of these 
trends such as increased use of the dry process and rotary kilns, 
coincide with Algeria’s conditions, while others such as capacity 
enhancement and automation may not be appropriate to Algeria’s 
recent and present conditions.
The second section has examined the main reasons why the cement 
industry was given priority in investment allocation and how 
cement projects were implemented. The main objective of giving 
priority to the cement industry in terms of investment programmes 
was to satisfy the rapidly increasing demand on cement as a 
result of investment in other sectors. While giving a major 
priority to the development of the cement industry in terms of
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investment allocation, the policy lacked the necessary support at 
the implementation stage. Thus unlike centrally planned 
economies where priority sectors often enjoyed primacy in terms 
of material and human resources over other sectors and are put 
under control of central organs to ensure that planned targets 
are achieved, priority sectors in Algeria are not treated as such 
in the implementation phase and consequently they run into major 
difficulties which, in turn, result in long delays and wastage. 
Whereas investments are centrally allocated, their implementation 
is left to individual national corporations or enterprises whose 
position vis-a-vis the central organs of the state bureaucracy 
is, if not one of complete independence, is at least one of 
considerable leverage. In the absence of assistance from central 
organs and lacking the necessary skills to implement planned 
investment programmes, state corporations, which appear to be 
subject to efficiency demand from the centre (or subjecting 
themselves) often opted for packaged forms of technology transfer 
with the aim of achieving targets set by the plan. This 
systematic use of the packaged mechanism in cement technology 
transfer adversely affected the technological learning process of 
both the direct recipient and potential local suppliers of goods 
and services.
The third section has dealt with the assimilation of cement 
manufacturing technology by Algerian firms and examined the 
influence of learning-by-doing and of hiring skilled personnel on 
the technological development of the cement industry. Between
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1970 and 1986, twelve new cement works were completed and over 
5000 new employees were recruited. This provided an ample 
opportunity for Algerian firms to accumulate experience in all 
aspects of cement technology from process and project design to 
operational technology. It seems that this opportunity for 
technological learning has not been seized. Indeed, there is
ample empirical evidence which suggests that Algeria is far from 
mastering cement manufacturing technology, including its 
operational aspects. The reason for the failure to seize the 
opportunity for technological learning was not so much the 
reluctance of foreign suppliers of technology to provide 
technical documentation and training, as the lack of an explicit 
technology policy on the part of both the recipient firm and the 
state.
By systematically opting for the packaged form of technology 
transfer, under which the foreign supplier assumes complete 
responsibility for project execution, the recipient foregoes the 
opportunity of acquiring an intimate knowledge of the intricacies 
of the technology transferred, as training in turnkey contracts 
is limited to basic operational technology and consequently 
excludes training in design, construction and phasing-in stages. 
Furthermore, the turnkey form of technology transfer precludes 
the local accumulation of human capital through experience-based 
learning acquired through the construction of the plant. The 
economy is therefore deprived of experience that is directly 
relevant to the industry’s subsequent development.
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The arguement often advanced by Algerian decision-makers in 
favour of the packaged form of technology transfer is that this 
form is more efficient than the unpackaged one, and that Algeria 
lacks skills in process and project design-engineering. The 
data (cost and lead-time) available on project execution provide 
no support to this arguement. Furthermore, a number of cement 
works executed on a turnkey basis were found to be suffering from 
serious design faults which hampered the optimum utilization of 
production capacities. As for the lack of skills, empirical 
evidence supports the view that Algeria was lacking skilled and 
experienced personnel, but although other local firms experienced 
a similar problem, they did not opt systematically for the all- 
inclusive form of technology transfer. To train their personnel 
in design and engineering some opted for the establishment of 
mixed engineering firms (e.g., the national hydrocarbons 
corporation Sonatrach), others for hiring ready-made skills 
abroad (e.g., the national metalworking corporation SN-Metal) and 
others had recourse to foreign consultant firms which were 
contracted with the aim of examining and supervising design and 
engineering work carried out by their engineering departments 
(for example Sonelgaz) or subsidiaries (e.g., Sonatrach). Thus 
the chosen option of the packaged form of technology transfer in 
the cement industry was not so much due to lack of skills as to 
lack of a technology strategy both at the micro- and macro­
level.
Concerning the acquisition of operational technology, the cement
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industry has not yet fully mastered production and maintenance 
technology despite considerable investment in training personnel 
in these tasks and in hiring ready-made skills. Empirical 
evidence does not support the views that learning-by-doing is 
costless and takes place automatically with the passage of time, 
and that hiring skilled labour automatically results in regular 
improvements in production performance and technological 
capacity. Without explicit efforts to attract and retain skills 
and without investment in the aquisition of technological 
capacity, experience of production would remain limited to the 
individual task and would lack the critical driving force.55 
Learning from experienced personnel and hired ready-made one 
depends, at any level above that of the individual task, on 
having an institutionalized mechanism for generating, analyzing, 
interpreting, diffusing and exploiting that experience.
Additionally there are numerous and considerable shortcomings of 
the economic system even after the restructuring of national 
corporations. And there have also been policy miscalculations. 
Examples of the former are lack of motivation, red tape and 
administrative control of prices, wages and imports which 
discourage initiative and result in great distortions. The 
restructuring of national corporations has had only a modestly 
positive effect on state enterprises because the centre has 
retained a dominant direct role in planning investment and 
imports, and a significant role in planning production, and in 
determining both product and factor prices. Furthermore,
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separation of R-D and E from production activities may hamper 
inter-enterprise communication and could result in inter­
enterprise conflicts, instead of promoting the horizontal flow of 
information and local technological development. This separation 
could also result in turning R-D and E enterprises into "white 
elephants". Although it is early to assess the consequences of 
this separation on local technological capacity, there are some 
indications that support the arguement advanced above. First, 
although ENDMC employs at present over 200 engineers and 
technicians, its team responsible for the execution of the latest 
cement project (awarded on a turnkey basis to a foreign firm 
during the restructuring of what used to be SNMC) was limited to 
a handful of engineers and technicians, most of whom has no prior 
experience in project execution and cement manufacturing 
technology. Furthermore, in contrast to the foriegn contractor 
who mobilized a team of over 60 engineers and technicians to 
carry out start-up operations (which were begun in July 1986), 
ENDMC*s effort was limited to sending one engineer from its 
headquarters to assist the already existing team. Second, so far 
ENDMC has not provided any technical assistance to already 
completed works, despite the fact that all of them have recourse 
to foreign assistance in one way or another.
Examples of the latter are mistakes in investment allocation 
which has resulted in substantial negative effects on the 
industry’s performance and lack of an explicit technology 
strategy. First and foremost, the planners undertook in the
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1970’s an investment programme in the cement industry which was 
well beyond the ability of SNMC to efficiently carry out. 
Second, neither the state nor the firm had an explicit technology 
strategy, and this seriously hampered technological assimilation 
and resulted in several problems that reduced the impact of 
imported technology on the industry and the economy.
Footnotes
(1) on the main functions of precalciners and preheaters see 
the following pages.
(2) Portland cement is the most widely used type of cement.
(3) Gartner, E.M., (1980): p. 713
(4) Erni, H., in Zement Kalkgips, Special Edition, No. 14,
p.11.
(5) Kurdowski, W., in Ghosh, S.N., (ed.,) 1983: p. 116
(6) quoted in Stewart, F., (1985): p. 640
(7) For more details see Otto Labhan, (1965) and Boack, H.C., 
1976.
(8) For more details see Mukurji, J., in Ghosh, S.N. (eds): op. 
cited pp. 265-286
(9) See e.g., Idron, J.M., in The Royal Society, (1983): pp. 
204-210.













Apparently shaft kilns using coal as well as oil as a 
source of energy were developed in the 1970*s, but not 
introduced in the DCs. For more details see Iyengar, M.S., 
1975 (Jan): pp. 36-38.
SNMC: Societe Nationale des Materiaux de Construction.
As a result of the 1982 restructuring, SNMC was split into 
a number of enterprises. Cement production has been
entrusted to four regional enterprises. As for development 
operations of the construction materials, including cement, 
it has been entrusted to another National Enterprise. In 
other words, production has been separated from 
development.
(MPAT), (1979): p. 245 and pp. 251-252.
Only partly because many housing projects were delayed and 
cement imports were not sufficient to meet local demand. 
MPAT, Ibid., p. 252
It was expected that priority in the post-1977 period would 
be given to social and economic infrastructure which had 
been largely neglected in the previous period.
For more details, see next section.
See the map on p. 215
In terms of capacity the combined share of France and Japan 
in total installed capacity amounted to approximately 51%. 
In terms of value, the share of each country is difficult 
to determine because of sub-contracting. However the value 
of contracts awarded to firms from these two countries, at 
1978 prices, exceeds 55% of the total.
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(21) According to some executives, the technology offered was 
that of the 1950’s. Furthermore, they argued that the 
bidder’s technology was "inappropriate from the point of 
view of standards and norms in application in Algeria".
(22) For example the contract signed between the Brazilian firm 
Petrobas and the American firm Kellog to develop Brazil’s 
ammonia industry, was based on the assumption that the 
former’s involvement in successive projects would 
progressively increase. For more details see Baranson, J., 
(1981): pp. 135-138.
(23) See sub-section 3.1.2 for more details.
(24) Local content in this task was estimated by the Managing 
Director of the works at about 30%.
(25) Some works executives argued that this lack of local 
participation in this task in subsequent works during 1976- 
80 was due to the fact that industrial investment was much 
beyond the capacity of local firms which were called upon 
to execute projects in other sectors particularly 
hydrocarbons and petrochemicals. After 1980, these firms 
were going through transition as a result of restructuring.
(26) Approximate because not all services provided by foreign 
firms were paid in hard currency. For example, a 
proportion of wages paid to employees of foreign firms was 
paid in local currency. This proportion is not included in 
the import content.
(27) These teams were often designated in an ad hoc fashion and 
assigned the role of supervising work in progress. Once
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the project was completed, the team was often appointed to 
manage the works. These teams often consisted of newly 
recruited engineers and technicians and other 
administrative personnel. Their composition sometimes 
changed completely during the project execution as a result 
of high labour turnover. There was no attempt on the part 
of the firm to set up a permanent team responsible for 
project execution.
(28) See next sub-section on capacity utilization.
(29) Chaponni^re, R., (1978): p. 36.
(30) The average cost and lead-time of all turnkey projects are
approximately 995.2 m AD and 47.1 months, and those of 
unpackaged ones respectively 675 m and 48 months. The 
average cost and lead times for works with equal capacity 
are respectively 1031.75 ra and 48 months for packaged works 
with a capacity 1 m t/y and 850 m and 53 months for the 
only unpackaged works. For those of 1/2 m t/y capacity, 
the average cost and lead-time for packaged projects were
respectively 849 m and 44 months and 500 m and 43 months
for the unpackaged project. However, if we exclude the two 
projects implemented in the 1980*s, the average cost and 
lead-time for turnkey projects are respectively 1052.3 m 
and 51.4 months.
(31) See for example, Table Ronde: Transfert de Technologie et
Industrie Sederurgique" in Judet, P. et al, (1977): pp. 
523ff. The same view was frequently stated by executives 
of various works studied.
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(32) The number of highly trained personnel registered more than
a sixfold increase between 1969 and 1978: from 107 in 1969 
to 690 in 1978. MPAT, 1979 (Oct): pp. 256-7.
(34) "A Special Study - Cement11, Science Today, Jan. 1975: pp. 
26.
(35) On labour turnover, see the next sub-section.
(36) Experience in project execution is measured in years 
starting from the date the first contract was signed. 
Experience related to each phase is calculated accordingly. 
This assumes that there was no experience in cement project 
execution prior to 1969, which is a logical assumption as 
Algerians had no experience in this field.
(37) The twelfth works was completed very recently, in July
1986.
(38) See footnote (*) on page 224
(39) The period for which permanent technical assistance was 
used ranged from a minimum of 12 months to a maximum of 40 
months.
(40) Corrective maintenance can be defined as that which is
carried out when equipment fails, or falls below an
acceptable condition when in operation.
(41) It is reported that the Indian cement industry partially
suffers from similar problems: "The lack of complete know­
how hinders the optimum utilization of existing installed 
capacity". The Estimate Committee Report, quoted in "A 
Special Report - Cement". Science Today, 1975 (Jan): p. 26.
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(42) There is a tendency to prefer non-productive jobs to 
directly productive ones not only because of job conditions 
but also because of the advantages associated with the 
former such as wages and other benefits.
(43) Similar problems were also reported by Hanson in his study
of transfer of Western Technology to the USSR. Hanson,
Philip, (1981): pp.186-205.
(44) Although the rate of labour turnover differed considerably 
from one industrial branch to another, the average annual 
rate for the whole industrial sector during 1970-1980 was 
estimated at over 25%. For more details see Thiery, S., 
(1980): pp. 189-191.
(45) This was the view of most works executives. Data collected 
from various plants appear in general to support this view. 
This is reflected in a considerable change in the 
composition of the plants* labour force in favour of highly 
trained personnel such as engineers and technicians.
(46) The main reasons for the decrease in the rate of labour
turnover in recent years are: rationalization and
unification of the national wage scale thus eliminating 
wage differentials between various firms and sectors and 
improving material conditions of skilled workers, 
improvement in the supply of skills and other socio­
economic infrastructure such as housing and transport, 
strengthening of discipline to combat absenteeism and 
introduction of production bonuses.
(47) By "personal” reasons, I mean those recruited not because
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the plant needs their services, or because of their 
competence, but because of their "personal connections” 
with those with influence outside the plant.
(48) This does not imply that no technological effort takes 
place in Algeria’s industry. A number of major discoveries 
have been reported but most of these have not been 
applied, either because of lack of motivation on the part 
of inventors’ employers, central allocation of investment 
which hinders initiative at the enterprise level, or 
because the discoverers refuse to divulge their details due 
to lack of material incentives. Some cases were reported 
in the official daily El-Moudjahid, May 20th 1986, p. 11 
and Bernard, C.H., (1982): p. 144.
(49) Maintenance planning refers to the formulation of a
programme for preventive maintenance and guidelines for 
corrective maintenance. The maintenance plan for a plant 
is drawn up by selecting for each unit the best combination 
of the following policies: condition-based maintenance,
fixed-time replacement and corrective maintenance. The 
plan is often based on information supplied by equipment 
producers, on an operating experience of the plant or 
similar ones. Maintenance management refers to 
organization and operation of a pool of resources (men, 
spares and equipment) directed towards implementing the 
maintenance plan so as to increase the level of 
availability of the plant.
(50) This information was provided to the author by a works
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executive who declined to either name the plant in which 
change was attempted or explain what exactly happened.
(51) Descriptions used by the respondents.
(52) This separation was found to be a major blunder in the 
USSR, see e.g., Berliner, J.S., (1976).
(53) In 1986, ENDMC was employing 600 workers, of which 200 were 
engineers, technicians and scientists, and organized as 
follows: Central administration, geological surveying and 
prospection unit, and R-D and E unit. The latter is 
divided into a number of divisions including process 
design-engineering, detailed engineering and monitoring of 
work in progress.
(54) The main tasks of ENDMC are: R-D and E, including project 
execution activities related to construction materials 
industry and promotion of local equipment suppliers to the 
industry.
(55) As stated by Jean d ’Herbes, Director of Total-Corporation 
Industrielle: "The most competent man, outside his
environment, loses his effectiveness: only the expert
articulated within a structure upon which he can continue 
to call, really has operational value". Extracts from an 
interview in Institut de l’Entreprise, 1978 (Nov), p.11.
277
Chapter Five
ALGERIAN ASSIMILATION OF IMPORTED FLOUR MILLING TECHNOLOGY
Wheat flour is the staple food in Algeria. In 1985 it was 
estimated that the average annual per capita consumption of 
commercial flour exceeded 150 kg.1 It is consumed in a number of 
ways, but most often in the form of bread and couscous.* In this 
form it is consumed by the vast majority of the population at 
least twice a day. Hence development of flour milling has been 
given a major impetus since the Algerian strategy of 
industrialization was launched in the late I960*s.
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section 
focuses on m o d e m  flour milling technology and recent innovations 
introduced in the DCs and analyzes Algeria's choice of 
techniques. The second reviews the emergence of m o d e m  flour
milling in Algeria, its development since the late 1960's and its 
organization. The third looks at Algeria’s capacity to 
assimilate the imported flour milling technology and examines the 
validity of the three hypotheses discussed at the end of chapter 
three, using data collected in the survey which covered a sample 
of m o d e m  mills established since 1970.
(*) Couscous is a dish prepared from balls of dough made with 
durum semolina.
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1. Wheat Flour Milling Technology and Algeria’s Choice of 
Techniques
For thousands of years wheat grains have been crushed to 
produce the powder or flour which was the starting point for 
further innovations in terms of the wide range of foodstuffs 
prepared from it. In the earliest times the grain was either 
pounded to a powder in a particular mortar and pestle or 
ground by rubbing a large oval, rounded stone over the grains 
sprinkled over an even larger flat slab of stone. Used in 
conjunction with a hand seive, the saddlestone method of 
grinding grain represented the first milling system, albeit a 
primitive one. Grains were reduced to powder by a rubbing 
action rather than the pounding action used in the pestle and 
mortar. The gentle treatment provided for easier removal of 
the seed coat (bran) and resulted in a more palatable flour.
These early milling methods involved small implements used 
exclusively in the home to provide for one’s family needs. 
As skill in stone working improved it was found that wheat 
milling could be made more easily if grooves were cut in the 
stone to roughen the surface. This improvement was 
accompanied by using methods of holding a supply of grain in 
the top grinding stone, while feeding grain onto the lower 
stone. The lever mill eventually evolved in which the grain 
w£is subject to a shearing and grinding action by a flat 
furrowed stone moving back and forth in a horizontal arc.
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Later improvements led to the introduction of circular stones 
which could be rotated by animals or slaves using bars 
inserted into radial holes to provide leverage. These rotary 
stone mills represented a major advance in the development of 
milling machinery. A rotary stone mill generally consists of 
two discs of hard, abrasive stones arranged on a vertical 
axis. In operation one stone rotates while the other is 
stationery. Gradually, the hand powered rotary mills 
superceded the saddlestone in the home and were widely used 
until the end of the nineteenth century. To this day, they 
are a popular piece of household equipment in many LDCs, 
where some milling is still occasionally practiced.
It was reckoned that water mills were introduced around 2000 
years ago, and eventually superseded animal driven mills. 
Where water was not available wind was harnessed, and about 
1000 years ago the first windmills were built. Water and 
wind driven mills were eventually superseded, first by steam 
powered roller mills, and subsequently by the electrically 
driven mills we know today. By the early nineteenth century 
bucket elevators and screw conveyors had been introduced in 
Europe into the mills, making the grinding of grain and 
sifting of the flour a highly mechanized and automated 
process. In the latter half of the century when the gradual 
reduction system evolved, rapid progress was made in the 
mechanization of the process and in the improvement of the 
finished product.2
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A gradual reduction of the wheat grain is the principle on 
which the theory and practice of modern flour milling is 
based, and the introduction of the roller mill was a great 
improvement on previous processes and spread rapidly 
worldwide. It made wheat flour cheaper and available to all. 
Today most countries possess at least one commercial mill for 
processing grain into some form of flour, but there are still 
millions of people in the rural areas of LDCs who continue to 
grow their own cereal crops, store the harvest in granaries 
and convert their grain by methods other than the roller 
mill. Some of these methods will be discussed at the end of 
this section in the light of Algeria’s experience.
1.1 Flour milling using modern roller mills
Modern flour milling is a continuous process which comprise 
the following operations:
a) Reception and storage of wheat Most modern mills receive
wheat in bulk by road or rail. The wheat is sampled and
tested for ’dockage* (to determine the amount of extraneous 
material, such as stones, straw and the like), checked for
moisture level and analyzed for protein content. The grain
is then ’pinned’ according to grade and protein content. The 
amount of grain received is weighed and transferred to the 
storage silos by mechanical or pneumatic conveyors. Usually 
the grain is passed through a machine called a receiving 
separator where trash and some other impurities are removed
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to avoid the bin outlets being blocked or machinery in the 
plant being jammed. Storage bins are arranged to feed back 
into the intake elevator to provide for ’turning over’* of 
the grain from one bin to another. This ’turning over* is 
essential to keep the grain in sound condition. Provision is 
also made for controlling dust so as to keep the atmosphere 
in the elevator relatively free of dust, which is produced 
whenever raw grain is moved.
The management of a large mill elevator is of considerable 
importance to the success of the total milling operation. 
Heavy losses can be caused by incorrect handling or careless 
blending of the wheat. A well run elevator keeps losses at a 
minimum and at the same time ensures the proper blending of 
wheat that is so essential to achieve uniformity in the end 
product.
b) Wheat cleaning Blends of the wheat are transferred from the 
elevator to the wheat cleaning section of the mill, known as 
the screenroom. This section is one of the most important 
departments of a modern mill. The extent and sophistication 
of the wheat cleaning equipment depends largely on the type 
and range of wheats in the blend (or grist). Because of 
marked differences in size, shape, degree of hardness and 
cleanliness of the grains, it is not unusual to find as many
(*) ’Turning over’ means conveying wheat from one elevator to 
another to assist in keeping it in good condition during storage.
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as four separate cleaning lines, each equipped with 
machinery best suited to clean a specific type of wheat. 
Generally impurities are removed by either wheat washing or 
dry scoring. In the wheat washing process, wheat is immersed 
in water, conveyed by means of a warm-screw to a centrifuge, 
or a whizzer, vigorously agitated and then spin-dried. This 
process has been abandoned in most modern mills on account of 
the problem of pollution control as well as the high cost of 
operating and maintaining the machinery.
In the dry scoring process, wheat passes in succession 
through a series of machines working on a number of physical 
principles. No single machine (except the specific gravity 
separator) can remove all the extraneous matter, but all the 
machines, considered as a unit, remove practically all the 
impurities for the loss of very little wheat. Recently 
electronic, colour-sorting machinery and electro-static 
separation equipment have been introduced in wheat cleaning.
The efficiency of operation of screenroom machinery depends 
on the machines* design and on the way they are operated, to 
determine feed rate and the proportion of cut-off (i.e., 
reject fraction). As the feed rate is reduced, interference 
between particles decreases and efficiency increases. As the 
proportion of cut-off increases, the rejection of impurities 
becomes certain.
c) Wheat conditioning. Whether washing is used or not, the
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wheat must be brought to a specific moisture content to 
prepare it for milling, and to improve the baking quality of 
the flour milled. This is achieved by several cycles of 
damping and resting. In milling technology, this is called 
tempering, or conditioning, which involves adjustment of the 
moisture content in the grain and moisture equiliberation 
throughout each grain in order to obtain the desired level of 
moisture of the grain. The damping is carried out in 
damping conveyor where a controlled amount of water is 
sprayed onto the moving wheat as it is conveyed slowly to the 
tempering bin, where the wheat is kept for a certain period 
of time to rest. Following the first tempering, the wheat 
may go through a second tempering cycle. Generally, a two- 
stage tempering system is preferable to a single stage, as 
there are occasions when the moisture content must be 
increased. It is also easier to make this addition in two 
stages separated by a rest period to allow for proper 
distribution of moisture throughout the grain.
Optimal tempering is an essential part of the flour milling 
because it toughens the bran and thereby facilitates its 
separation from the endosperm without extensive powdering. 
It also mellows the endosperm and this facilitates its 
reduction without producing excessive starch damage. This 
optimum level varies for different wheat types, being higher 
for hard wheats than for soft ones. To overcome these 
difficulties caused by variations in moisture content of the
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grain and by irregular feed rate, which could entail 
variation in the required amount of water added, a feedback 
monitoring system for automatic control of wheat damping has 
been devised. The moisture content is continuously recorded 
by measurement of microwave energy, the results compared with 
the required level, and the difference utilized to control 
the rate of addition of water to the dry grains.
A number of conditioning methods are used. These are cold, 
warm, hot and steam conditioning. In cold conditioning, the 
moisture content of the wheat is increased by adding the 
desired amount of cold water with frequent turning of wheat 
and aspiration between successive dampings. After 
moistering, the wheat is left to rest for at least 8 hours at 
normal temperature to allow the moisture to diffuse into the 
grains. Recently, small concentrations of surface active 
agents or sodium bicarbonate are being added to hasten cold 
conditioning. On the surface, cold conditioning may appear 
to be a cheap way of obtaining the desired results, but this 
is not so, because the bin space necessary to enable 
carefully controlled damping to be carried out, and the clean 
wheat storage required after damping is enormous, and so 
where the rents are high and space valuable, apart from the 
original costs of storage accommodation, the process is not 
so cheap as it may appear to be.
Warm conditioning is often applied to avoid the delay of 1-3
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days’ resting time in cold conditioning. The dampened grains 
are warm-conditioned for 1-1.5 hours at temperatures up to 
46°c and left to rest for some hours before milling. In hot 
conditioning, wheat temperatures can be raised very rapidly 
to around 60°c through heat transfer from hot air or
radiators, and maintained at that level for a short period of
time. This method is used less frequently than warm 
conditioning because it often results in ruining the baking 
quality of the gluten by over-treatment.3 In steam 
conditioning the transfer of heat to the grains is achieved 
faster than with the other techniques mentioned above, so 
that even shorter times of conditioning are possible. The
method is based on the application of steam to heat the
grains and moisten them at the same time. Compared with 
other methods, steam conditioning is said to require less 
energy and gives a higher yield of quality flour equal to or 
better than that obtained by other methods of wheat 
conditioning.4
d) Milling The objectives in wheat milling are: first, to
separate the endosperm, which is required for the flour, from 
the bran and germ, which are rejected, so that the flour is 
free from the bran, and of good quality, and so that the 
digestability and palatability of the product are improved 
and storage life strengthened. Second, to reduce the maximum 
amount of endosperm to flour fineness, thereby obtaining a 
maximum extraction of flour from the wheat.5
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The milling process requires the use of specific equipment. 
Essentially it comprises a series of operations involving 
break grinding, sifting and reduction grinding. Break 
grinding involves a combination of shearing, scrapping and 
crushing, exploiting the difference in physical properties 
between the endosperm, bran and germ. The break system 
consists of four to six roller mill (or ’breaks*) grinding 
stages, each followed by a sifting stage. The first roller 
mill is fed with the whole grain, the subsequent stages with 
the break stock from the preceding stage. Each roller mill 
is equipped with a pair of rolls, made of cast iron, mounted 
diagonally or horizontally in parallel alignment along their 
whole length.
As for the reduction system, it consists of eight to sixteen 
grinding stages, according to the types of wheat being 
milled, the extraction rate desired, and the usual moisture 
content, interspersed with siftings for removal of the 
grinds. Compared with break rolls, reduction rolls are 
smoother and the speed differential between the reduction 
rolls is lower. These two characteristics of the reduction 
rolls result in the grinding effect being a crushing rather 
than a shearing or tearing action. The feed to the reduction 
system consists of the purified semolina and middlings.*
* Middlings are particles of wheat endosperm extracted from the 
break system which have yet to be ground into farina or semolina.
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From time to time it is necessary to renew the corrugations 
on break and reduction rolls, which become worn with use. It
is very important to maintain all rolls in good condition,
otherwise both yield and quality of the flour will suffer.
Generally, first and second break rolls are expected to give
about six to twelve months of continuous service while
subsequent rolls (both break and reduction) are expected to
operate satisfactorily for several years before recorrugating 
or regrinding is necessary.
Sifting and purifying consists of classifying mixtures of 
particles of different sizes into fractions of narrow 
particle size range, and of separating mixtures of bran and 
endosperm particles, according to their terminal velocity, by 
means of an air current. The sieving process is carried out 
in the plansifter, which consists of a large number of
superimposed sieves all rotating together in a horizontal 
plane. The sieves are arranged in sections each of which may 
contain as many as twenty-seven sieves. The sieves are
clothed with wire mesh for coarse separations while nylon or 
silk is used for finer separations of middlings and flour.
Purifying is carried out in a machine called the purifier, 
which consists of a long narrow sieve set at a slight angle 
to the horizontal, oscillating in the lengthwise direction, 
and enclosed by a hood. The sieve consists of a number of 
sections, which become progressively coarser in size of mesh
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from head to tail. There is a trend in recent years to
eliminate the purifier in modern mills as a result of 
technological improvements introduced in the industry (see 
below).
The sieves should be inspected and cleaned at regular 
intervals to ensure both the efficiency of the plansifter 
(and purifier) and the quality of flour. Despite the
cleaning action of the bouncing balls or pads, the sieve
apertures can become clogged with floury or fibrous particles
after prolonged operation, reducing the efficiency of the 
machine. Routine brushing of the covers and repairs to holes 
caused by wear and tear are essential to keep flour yield and 
quality at the desired level.
e) Flour treatment. The milled white flour is enriched with 
iron, vitamin B, and nictronic acid or nictromide to the 
statutory levels prescribed for these ingredients, and chalk 
may also be added, according to regulations. Preservatives 
are also added in some countries where regulations permit 
their use.*
f) By-products processing. The by-products of flour milling are 
often used as a constituent of ’compound animal feed*. 
Screenings removed during the cleaning of the wheat are often 
ground at the mill and mixed with wheatfeed, which comprises 
bran and the accumulated residues from the purifier and
* Addition of preservatives is not permitted in Algeria.
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reduction system, to produce a product which is used as a 
constituent of animal feed.
1.2 Recent developments in milling technology
Flour milling was the first industry to introduce automation 
by integrating processing and handling systems as early as 
1875.6 Although the basic process of grinding, purifying and 
sifting has seen little change in the past century, the 
machinery has improved in both design and capacity. All 
three basic machines, the roller mill, the plansifter and the 
purifier are now far more reliable in operation and efficient 
than their predecessors. Recent developments in flour 
milling technology can be summarized as follows: a trend
towards ’simplification’, automatic control of the whole 
process and substitution of pneumatic conveying systems for 
metallic ones.
The trend towards ’simplication* is a process characterized 
by a decrease in the number of grinding stages, heavier 
loading on roller mills and plansifters, faster roller speeds 
and elimination of purifiers. As a result of this process, 
the grinding capacity of mills has been considerably 
increased without increasing the size of the mill or the 
quantity of machinery. Meanwhile, most modern mills use 
automatic control systems which range from electronic devices 
to control wheat damping, weighing systems and the like, to
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computers which are used to control the whole process. The 
purposes of introducing electronics are to maintain 
regularity and to facilitate more effective supervision of 
the process. However, computers have not yet replaced the 
miller, but rather assist him in operating the mill and in 
selecting and blending flour streams and additives to produce 
the consistent products required by customers. Some large 
mills use computers to arrive at least-cost blends of wheats 
which give a flour of the desired characteristics. 
Additionally, there is a tendency to use pneumatic conveyors 
rather than metallic ones. For many years, the bucket 
elevator was used to transport stocks vertically through the 
mills. For the last 25 years, most new mills have included 
pneumatic conveying systems in their design to move stocks 
and finished products through the mill. The versatility of 
pneumatic conveying coupled with improvements in machine 
capacities have made it possible to build mills with fewer 
flour levels. This in turn made supervision of the total 
process easier and as a result the mills become more 
efficient in the use of manpower. Moreover the use of air in 
pneumatic conveying greatly improves the uniformity of 
grinding and sifting and ensures that mill stocks are cold 
and easier to handle.
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1.3 Choice of technique in flour* milling in Algeria
There are at present a wide range of techniques in use in 
Algeria. They extend from the traditional, and most 
primitive method, using hand-operated stone mills, to the 
m o d e m  roller mill of identical design to those in use in the 
industrialized countries. Between these two extremes there 
are water mills and grind stone mills which are operated by 
either electric or diesel engines.
A large proportion of locally produced wheat is not marketed 
but consumed by those who produce it.7 This proportion as 
well as a small proportion of marketed wheat (produced 
locally or imported) are processed by methods other than the 
roller mill. These methods are:
a) Hand-operated stone mills. The only piece of equipment 
involved in this method is the use of two discs of hard, 
abrasive stone, some 50 cm in diameter, arranged on a 
vertical axis. The opposing surfaces of the two stones are 
patterned with a series of grooves leading from the centre to 
the periphery* In operation the lower stone is stationary 
while the upper one is manually rotated, using a wooden bar
* Flour here refers to semolina and farina. In Algeria, demand on 
the former is much higher than the latter, largely because a 
large proportion of bread, couscous and other flour-based 
products are domestically prepared using semolina.
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inserted into a side hole of the upper stone to provide 
leverage. Grain is fed into the centre (’eye*) of the upper 
stone, is fragmented between the two stones, and the ground 
products issue at the periphery. The bran is separated from 
the flour by hand operated sieves. The former is often used 
to feed chickens while the latter is used to make bread, 
couscous and other baked foods.
This method is a purely domestic and subsistence activity. 
It is very laborious and time consuming and consequently does 
not represent a real alternative to other methods since it 
can never be practiced commercially. Even domestically, it 
has given way to other methods. However, it is still
occasionally practiced to ground wheat for specific purposes,
b) Water Mills. These were the first non-manually operated 
mills to be used. Water provides power which turns 
propellers, which turn the stones between which the grains 
are ground. The grinding process is fully automated and
labour is only required in handling operations. Water mills 
were widespread in the northern part of Algeria where water
was available and wheat was grown. Most of them have
disappeared and even the few which still operate are at 
present underutilized.
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c) Electric and diesel grind stone mills.* The former exist
mainly in small cities and villages where electricity is 
available. The latter are used in the countryside. The 
grinding process in both types is fully automated and labour 
requirements are limited to handling operations. Once the 
grain arrives at the mill, the miller or servant in the mill 
weighs it so as to extract the toll which is usually paid in 
grain. The mill was started (if not already running) and the 
grain owner’s proportion of grain poured into the hopper 
above the mill stones and milled into meal. As the floury 
meal pours out the mouth of the stones it is collected in 
sacks for dispatch.
Aside from honesty, which is a decided advantage when dealing 
with his customers, a good miller posesses a great deal of 
technical knowledge and skill that can be summed up as sharp 
eyes, ears and feel. His eyes not only keep him aware of the 
conditions of the machinery and customers’ belongings, but 
also ensure his physical safety in a potentially dangerous 
mill. His ears are constantly attuned to the rythraetical 
sound of each mill device so that he knows their progress. 
His sense of touch (or miller’s ’thump’) is indispensable in 
discerning the feel that dictates how fast the millstone
* Though the capacity of these mills varies, those which exist in 
Algeria have daily production capacity of 5 to 10 tons when 
continuously operated.
294
should run, how fast the grain should pour and how close, 
sharp and dressed the millstones should be. In fact 
adjustments are made on the basis of this feel. Another 
constant responsibility of the miller is to keep the mill 
flour and machinery clean.
The main common characteristics of the last two methods are 
that both cleaning of wheat and sifting of the ground product 
are carried out domestically and manually, that a small 
proportion of bran and the majority of germ are not removed, 
and all mills using these traditional methods are privately 
owned and their machinery is imported. Wheat cleaning is 
often carried out through the combination of winnowing and 
screening. Grain is first exposed to the air so that the 
wind blows away impurities lighter than wheat such as chaff, 
dust and straw. This often takes place in the barn. This is 
often followed by screening to remove other impurities by 
using hand operated screens, or sieves, of different meshes. 
Once the grain is cleaned, it is packaged into sacks ready 
for transport to the mill. The ground product is sifted at 
home using hand operated sieves which are clothed with wire 
mesh for coarse separation and nylon or silk mesh for finer 
separation of middlings and flour.
Both cleaning of wheat and sifting of the ground product are 
laborious and require space where they can be carried out. 
Consequently, these two methods do not represent a real
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alternative to modern roller mills in urban areas where space 
is very limited.
Although a large proportion of bran is removed in the sieving 
process, the majority of germ and a small proportion of bran 
are retained. These two elements are of great importance 
nutritionally because they contain a higher proportion of 
protein and important minerals than the endosperm from which 
flour in modern roller mills is obtained. The sifting 
process in modern roller mills involves the removal of the 
germ and bran and consequently adversely affects the 
nutritional content of the flour milled. However, even 
modern roller mills could be adjusted so as to retain the 
desired level of the bran and germ and even to produce a 
’wholemeal* flour where no bran or germ is removed from the 
ground product. So far ’wholemeal’ is not produced in 
Algeria, ’’primarily because of lack of demand” .*
The predominant flour milling technique in use at present is 
the roller mill. It is reckoned that the first roller mill
* This is the view of mill executives who suggested that the 
Algerian customer ’prefers high quality semolina and farina*. 
However, this preference is based on lack of knowledge on the 
part of the consumer of nutritional aspects of what is consumed. 
No effort was made to explain to the consumer the benefits of 
’wholemeal* from the point of view of nutrition.
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was established in Algeria in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Some of those set up at the very 
beginning of this century are still in operation. Since the 
1960’s all public investment in flour milling industry has 
been directed to the expansion of commercial flour using 
imported roller mills. All newly set up mills are basically
similar in design to those in use in the industrialized
countries, except that computers are not used and handling of 
the ground product in some of them is not automated, so as to 
provide jobs.
The choice of the roller mill is mainly the result of a rapid 
increase in demand for commercial flour. This rapid increase 
in demand is, in turn, due to rapid population growth and
socio-economic changes that have taken place since the
1960*s. Algeria’s population has more than doubled since 
1963, and this rapid growth took place mainly in the cities 
as a result of rural exodus. Indeed, it is socio-economic 
changes that resulted in a radical change in the consumption 
pattern. Rapid urbanization, monetization of the economy and 
improvement in living standards led to a change in 
consumption patterns, which is reflected in increasing demand 
for commercial flour* at the expense of non-commercial flour.
* A large proportion of commercial flour is at present imported 
to meet local demand. For more details see below as well as FAO 
Trade Year Books, 1969, 1977, and 1983.
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Whereas in the mid-1960’s the urban population amounted to 
just over 30% of the total, by 1980 it had increased to over 
43%.8 This rapid urbanization has been accompanied by rapid 
monetization of the economy through integration of the 
subsistence economy into the market. Even the most isolated 
peasants are integrated into the market through their labour 
(as casual wage earners) and produce. At present it is very 
common for farmers and peasants to exchange the grain they 
produce for commercial flour despite the fact that there is a 
considerable price differential between the two in favour of 
the latter. As a result of this socio-economic change, 
average consumption per head of commercial flour has more 
than doubled between 1967 and 19859 , and flour has to be 
imported to meet demand. Meanwhile some stonemills are 
underutilized.*
2. The Emergence and Development of Modern Flour Milling 
Industry in Algeria.
Wheat flour is the main source of energy, protein, iron and 
vitamins consumed by the vast majority of Algeria’s 
population. Average per capita expenditure on flour and 
derivatives in 1979 amounted to more than 20% of total
* These mills are underutilized not because of shortage of grain 
but because of farmer’s (as well as other consumers’) preference 
for commercial flour.
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expenditure on food.9 Compared with the UK, this average was 
approximately four-fold.10 Hence provision of adequate 
supplies of wheat flour is of major importance politically 
and economically. Because of its vital importance, both 
state control of the industry and self-sufficiency in flour 
production have been given a high priority since 
independence. In order to implement its s t r a t e g y i n  this 
sector, the state first set up in March 1965 the national 
corporation, SN SEMPAC, with the purposes of operating the 
existing potential and developing the industry to meet future 
demands. Before its restructuring in 198211, SN SEMPAC was 
entrusted with production, development and distribution of 
flour and its derivatives, as well as other related products 
such as yeast and baby foods. While having a monopoly over 
production and distribution of commercial flour, pasta and 
couscous, the SN SEMPAC shared production and distribution of 
other flour-based food stuffs with local private and public 
enterprises.
Modern flour milling was well established in Algeria prior to 
its independence. Modern mills were set up in most urban 
areas and the installed production capacity in the early 
1960*s was estimated at about one million mt, and local 
production was generally12 sufficient to meet local demand. 
However, some of the existing mills were very old and their 
modernization was not carried out by their foreign owners 
because of the political uncertainty created by the war of
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liberation. Despite this drawback, the inherited production 
capacity was in excess of local demand which was depressed as 
a result of the massive flight of the European settlers and 
the evacuation of the French army in the aftermath of 
independence; who were the main consumers of commercial 
flour. It took almost ten years, after independence, for 
local demand to outstrip the existing production capacity. 
Whereas the installed capacity in 1969 was around one million 
mt, local demand for commercial flour for the same year was 
estimated at just over 0.85 million m t .13 It was in the same 
year that contracts for the construction of 6 new mills were 
awarded to foreign firms. These projects were expected to 
start production at the beginning of 1973 so as to meet local 
demand which was expected to exceed 1.2 m in the same year. 
Most of them were extensions of old mills, some of which were 
obsolete and were expected to be shutdown in subsequent 
years.
The actual construction of the six plants was started 
simultaneously at the beginning of 1970, but only five of 
them were completed during 1973. The sixth plant was brought 
into production in the first half of 1974, thus raising the 
total production capacity to about 1.4 mt. Although the 
installed production capacity was somewhat higher than local 
demand, which was estimated at about 1.3 mt for 1974, 51 000 
tonnes of flour were imported to meet local demand.14 This 
deficit was essentially due to technical difficulties
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encountered during the start-up operation of some new mills.
The Second Four-Year Plan called for the construction of 25 
new mills. The main objectives of this massive investment in 
flour milling were firstly to meet the increasing demand for 
commercial flour and secondly to replace obsolete mills which 
were marked for shutdown in the near future. Most of these 
mills were planned to be located in small cities and 
villages, and in the south of the country, so as to provide 
employment to those living in disinherited15 areas as well as 
to meet demand for commercial flour in these areas.
All new projects experienced long delays in their 
construction start-up. Only one was launched in 1975, while 
the rest were launched during 1976-78. This delay was mainly 
due to the firm’s preoccupation, during the first two years 
of the plan, with:
a) The standardization of products and milling equipment: SN 
SEMPAC, in cooperation with foreign firms carried out studies 
aimed at establishing national norms and standards of ground 
products as well as standardization of machinery designs to 
facilitate maintenance operations and subsequently 
reproduction of milling equipment;
b) The establishment of repair workshops to provide technical 
assistance to production units.
This delay in construction start-up was accompanied by long
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delays in projects’ completion. Whereas all projects were 
expected to be completed before the end of 1981, only 8 units 
were actually completed during 1978-81 and three projects are 
still under construction, two of which are not expected to be 
completed before the beginning of 1987.16 These long delays 
in project implementation, coupled with a rapid increase in 
demand for commercial flour due to both demographic 
explosion* and the rapid increase in per capita 
consumption**, has resulted in massive deficits in flour 
supply in recent years. Whereas demand for commercial flour 
amounted to over 1.9 mt in 1978, production capacity remained 
stagnant at its 1974 level and the deficit had to be filled 
with imports. An even higher deficit was registered in 1985. 
Thus it was reported that 0.7 mt of flour were imported in 
1985 to fill the gap between demand for and supply of 
flour.17 At present Algerian is one of Africa’s major 
importers of both wheat flour and wheat.18
The following section focuses on the assimilation of m o d e m  
flour milling technology and analyzes the difficulties 
encountered in investment implementation in this sector as
* The average annual rate of the population growth over the last 
two decades is estimated at over 3%.
** Per capita consumption of commercial flour had more than 
doubled between 1967 and 1985. For more details see note (16) 
and Revolution Africaine, Nov. 29 - Dec. 5, 1985, p. 28.
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well as in operating installed capacities. Emphasis will be 
put on the technological effort on the part of Algerian firms 
to master the various tasks involved in the application, 
operation and reproduction and improvement of the imported 
technology in this sector.
3. Algeria’s Assimilation of Imported Flour Milling Technology
M o d e m  flour milling was well established prior to Algeria’s 
political independence. At the beginning of the 1960’s 
modern roller mills were set up in most large and medium size 
cities and the industry as a whole employed around 4 000 
workers. A large proportion of this labour was Algerian. 
There was also a specialized school set up near Algiers where 
millers and other skilled and semi-skilled production workers 
were trained.* It appears that by the mid-1960’s maintenance 
and production engineering had been mastered relatively well 
by Algerian workers. This was reflected in the workers* 
ability to successfully reopen and operate the mills left 
vacant by their European owners and managers who had fled the 
country in the aftermath of independence.
* Until the late 1970’s, the school provided training in 
operational technology. Since then the school has been expanded 
to provide training in the basics of process design-engineering 
and in maintenance. (This information was obtained by the author 
from the School's Director.).
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Although all the mills that existed at the eve of 
independence were imported, and Algerians had no experience 
in their design and installation, four factors could 
potentially favour assimilation of various tasks of flour 
milling technology on the part of Algerians in subsequent 
years. These factors are: the fact that the technology is 
highly "mature", massive investment in the industry, the 
existence of a milling school and the experience aquired in 
operational technology. First, flour milling technology is 
highly "mature". Although the machinery has improved 
considerably in design, capacity and relability, "the basic 
process of grinding, grading, purifying and sifting 1ms seen 
little change in the past century"19. This high maturity 
potentially makes the task of assimilating technology by 
late-comers relatively easy. Second, the experience acquired 
by Algerian workers in operational technology constitutes a 
potential basis for other technological tasks such as 
process, basic and detailed design-engineering as well as 
design and manufacture of specific capital goods and their 
installation. Third, massive investment effort has been 
carried out since the late I960*s. Between 1969 and 1986 
approximately 6 000 m current AD has been invested and 31 new 
mills have been either completed or under construction. 
Although these projects differ in their details, they are 
very similar in their basics. This provided an ample 
opportunity for Algerians to accumulate experience in various 
aspects of flour milling technology. Fourth, the existence
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of a milling school which provides specialized training to 
prospective employees as well as retraining of those already 
employed to improve their skills.
This section analyzes the degree of assimilation of m o d e m  
flour milling technology using data collected in the survey. 
The parameters to be used are local content in project 
execution, lead-times of project implementation, capacity 
utilization in a sample of newly completed mills and 
technological modifications introduced on imported 
technology.
3.1 Local content in and lead-times of project execution
Data required for the analysis was obtained from a survey of 
20 newly set up mills for which data was available. The 
survey consisted primarily of questionnaire-based interviews 
with mill executives. Most questionnaire answers were not 
complete for reasons of confidentiality, lack of information 
at the plant level and/or lack of cooperation on the part of 
some executives. In an attempt to complete questionnaire 
answers and to verify their validity, two other methods were 
used. The first consisted of screening official reports 
related to the industry and some contracts signed with 
foreign firms involved in the execution of the projects 
concerned. The second involved interviews with executives of 
some flour milling enterprises, directors of the newly set-up
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Food Industry Research Centre, C.E.R.I.AL20 and the Centre 
for the Design and Manufacture of Capital Goods for the Food 
Industry, C.E.I.AL21, and with a number of officials at the 
Ministries of Light Industry and Planning. Despite these 
efforts complete data concerning the local content in project 
execution was only available for eight projects.
With data collected in this survey it is possible to test 
three hypotheses about Algeria’s assimilation of flour 
milling technology. The first is that the local content in 
project execution will tend to increase over time for 
successive projects as a result of the learning process on 
the part of Algerian workers and institutions which are 
directly or indirectly involved in investment implementation 
in the industry. The second is that lead times will tend to 
decrease with time as a result of a learning process on the 
part of those involved in project execution. The third is 
that lead-times will tend to be longer, the larger the size 
of the project.
3.1.1 Local content in project execution
Design and construction of a flour mill require the 
performance of a number of technological tasks, the most 
important of which are: basic and detailed design-
engineering, supply of machinery and equipment, 
construction and installation, training of prospective
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production and maintenance personnel and start-up 
operations.22 Before its reorganization in 1982, SN 
SEMPAC had neither an engineering department as such nor 
R & D facilities. However, it had a multipurpose 
department in charge of new projects. It was in charge of 
the selection of engineering firms to be responsible for 
engineering studies, of drawing up bids, negotiations and 
supervising23 of works on site. The firm has also a 
specialized school where millers and other production and 
maintenance personnel were trained.
Detailed information concerning local participation in 
each of the technological task - mentioned above - was 
obtained for eight projects, two of which are among those 
completed during the 1970-73 plan. All projects in the 
sample, except two, were implemented on a turnkey basis. 
With data collected it is possible to test the first 
hypothesis by looking at local content in each task*; 
beginning with:
a) Basic design-engineering: Local participation in this task
was limited to one project which was launched in 1969. This 
participation took place through a Swiss-Algerian
* For reasons of confidentiality every attempt is made in the 
following analysis to preserve the anonymity of the plants and 
individuals involved, inevitably those with detailed knowledge 
about the industry will be able to identify the plants involved.
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engineering firm, in which the Algerian state held a majority 
capital share. This project was implemented on an unpackaged 
basis, where foreign participation was limited to the supply 
and installation of equipment and machinery and, marginally, 
to the training of prospective production personnel.
b) Detailed engineering: Local participation took place in one
project (the same above). Detailed engineering work of this 
mill was carried out by a wholly owned Algerian firm.24
c) Supply of machinery and equipment25: Local participation in 
this task took place in three projects. It consisted of 
supplying some handling equipment and machinery for repair 
workshops. The latter consists of a handful of standardized 
machine-tools manufactured in Algeria by a state owned firm. 
In financial terms this local participation was estimated at 
less than 10% of total costs of machinery and equipment 
incorporated in the mills concerned.
d ) Construction and Installation: There was no local content
tvhatsoever in the installation of machinery and equipment. 
Local participation was limited to technically minor tasks 
such as civil engineering, provision of utilities and 
construction of administrative buildings and sometimes 
structures in which machinery is installed and materials 
stored. Even these tasks were sometimes carried out by 
foreign firms, and this was the case in three projects 
included in the sample.
e) Training of prospective production and maintenance personnel;
Although the firm has a sp>ecialized training school, it has
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continuously had recourse to training abroad of its 
prospective personnel. This practice was a common feature in 
all projects. However, whereas in the early projects 
training abroad was of equal importance for production and 
maintenance personnel, in recent projects it was essentially 
limited to the latter. This shift in policy, according to 
respondants, "reflects the priority given by the firm in 
recent years to maintenance operations, which aim at both 
improving the cumulative time of mills’ operation and 
increasing the local content in spare parts, components and 
equipment". Local content in this task differed from one 
project to another. It ranged from a minimum of 40-50% in 
two projects to over 80% in three cases (the parameter used 
here to measure local content is the number of employees 
trained specifically for the project inside and outside 
Algeria). Two of the three projects in which the local 
content in training was above 80% were those executed in an 
unpackaged way (i.e., not on a turnkey basis).
f) Start-up operations: The Commissioning stage is not only
a period of technical performance testing but also a learning 
period where design faults that might affect equipment 
availability are located and corrected, and prospective 
production and maintenance personnel are trained on the 
machinery which they will operate and maintain. Hence active 
participation of the equipment user in start-up operations is 
extremely important to subsequent efficient utilization of 
the equipment. Active participation could ensure design
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fault detection and correction as well as effective training 
of the user’s personnel, so as to avoid maloperation and 
optimize equipment operation once the commissioning stage is 
over. Local participation in this task was judged by
respondents as "relatively ineffective" in four causes. The 
main reasons for this ’relatively ineffective’ participation 
according to respondents were*, "high labour turnover" during 
the commissioning stage in one case, "unwillingness of the 
supplier" to fully cooperate with the user’s personnel38 in 
two cases, and "lack of incentive" on the part of the user’s 
personnel to effectively participate in start-up operations. 
In only four cases local participation was judged to be 
"sufficiently effective". This "effective participation" was 
achieved by "posting prospective technical personnel to work 
closely with the supplier’s personnel" during this stage of 
the plant’s life. Two of the four cases happened to be 
those implemented on unpackaged mechanism.28
The above analysis appears to provide no support to the 
hypothesis that local content will tend to increase over 
time as a result of the learning process on the part of the 
recipient. The immediate explanation of this was the 
mechanism of technology transfer used. The two projects in 
which local participation in some technological tasks took 
place were those in which unpackaging was used. However, 
this systematic recourse to a packaged form of technology 
transfer has in turn to be explained.
310
The main reasons for this systematic recourse to the packaged 
form of technology transfer are:
a) A very rapid rise in the volume of investment: the planners 
undertook and approved a number of mammoth investment 
programmes whose simultaneous implementation was beyond the 
ability of the firm concerned and the economy to carry out. 
Thus whereas the total cost of all projects entrusted to SN 
SEMPAC to carry out between 1974-78 amounted to over 9 500 m 
AD at current prices, or more than 43 times that of 1969- 
7329, the firm’s highly skilled technical personnel had 
considerably decreased during the same period. 30
b) Lack of an explicit technological strategy on the part of the 
firm as well as of central organs. At the firm level, there 
was no attempt on its part to set up a permanent team to work 
alongside foreign personnel so as to learn the intricacies of 
the technology transferred. Nor did it try to establish a 
learning system so as to gather and provide information. The 
firm's "overriding priority was to have its investment 
projects launched and completed" even at the expense of other 
socio-economic objectives. The same argument applies to 
central organs, where no attempt was made to establish design 
offices at their level a la chinoise31 to assist firms 
responsible for priority sectors to implement their 
investment programmes and develop their technological 
capacities. Whereas in other planned economies, priority 
sectors are given both major priority in resource allocation 
and special attention from central organs during all stages,
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priority sectors in Algeria are considered, as such only in 
investment allocation.32
c) "Complexity’' of the bureaucratic system and "bureaucratic 
indifference". ’Rigidity', ’slowness* and ’clumsiness’ of 
the Algerian bureaucracy were repeatedly stated as major 
obstacles to efficient use of available resources.33 Thus it 
is often argued by executives that because of these 
bureaucratic obstacles managers often prefer to concentrate 
one project on a minimum number of contracts, and even on one 
contract, for "contractual convenience" because if the 
project is split into several contracts the bureaucratic 
operations and obstacles axe multiplied.34 While this 
arguement is understandable from the point of view of the 
firm (even if state owned), it certainly cannot be in the 
interest of the country to react to such problems in such a 
way, not to speak of solving them.
d) Inadequate information flow between different institutions 
involved directly or indirectly in investment implementation 
and lack of coordination between them, and lack of confidence 
in local skills and products. For example approximately 50% 
of respondants (out of 20) suggested that there were no 
engineering firms and capital goods producers capable of 
supplying services and goods required to implement their 
investment projects, and stated clearly that they "do not 
know what C.E.I.AL has achieved so far". In fact there were 
local engineering firms or departments which were capable of 
carrying out detailed engineering and supervision of works in
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progress, and whose potential was underutilized.35 Meanwhile 
some handling equipment and most machine tools installed in 
workshops have been produced in Algeria since 1977 and their 
producers found difficulties in selling thorn because of lack 
of demand. Meanwhile C.E.I.AL has recently manufactured a 
number of machines specific to flour milling; which according 
to C.E.I .AL ’s director are "more appropriate to Algeria’s 
conditions than some of those imported".36 In fact, there is 
ample evidence that a number of technological tasks could be 
at least partially performed by local sub-contractors who 
were not integrated into the process of industrialization 
largely because foreign contractors generally prefer to sub- 
con tract to firms known to them, than to relatively 
unexperienced local ones.
3.1.2 Lead-times of project execution
From contract signature to start-up operations of the 20 
completed mills for which data were available took on the average
t
64.15 months. This average was approximately 40% higher than the 
average lead-time projected by the State Planning Secretariat for 
the same projects. The latter was slightly shorter37 for 
projects launched during the 1974-77 Plan than for the six mills 
launched in 1969. Thus despite long delays experienced in the 
implementation of early projects, a decrease in lead time was 
expected to take place as a result of both the experience 
acquired in previous years and the expectation that contractual
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dates would be respected.38 In practice, implementation of 
projects launched during the 1974-77 Plan experienced delays much 
longer than those experienced during the 1969-73 period.39 The 
following table summarizes the information on lead-times in 
unweighted arithmetic means.
Table 5.1: Unweighted arithmetic means of lead-times and project
costs of the sample
Lead times (in months) n = 20
Overall lead-time C
(contract signature to completion) 64.15
Lead-time A
(contract signature to construction start-up) 9.06
Lead-time B
(construction start-up to completion) 55.09
Average project cost (m. AD at 1980 prices) 164.35
Source: derived from the survey
All projects in the sample experienced delays in their
implementation relative to overall lead-times approved by the 
State Planning Secretariat and 80% of them experienced delays in 
relation to contractual lead-times. These delays were attributed 
to a number of factors. All respondents emphasized the "adverse 
effects of the Algerian system" on lead-times. They particularly 
drew attention to "slow decision-making", "rigidity" and
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"clumsiness" of the Algerian administrative system, as well as to 
"lack of coordination" between various administrative and 
economic entities directly or indirectly involved in projects 
implementation. Moreover, some (not all) respondents referred to 
"inefficiency" of some Algerian firms responsible for the 
execution of certain project tasks40, as well as of certain 
foreign contractors. In four cases the delay was largely 
attributed to changes in location and in three others to 
modifications in the project.
With the milling-project data collected in this survey it is
possible to attempt a test of two hypotheses about Algeria’s 
assimilation of imported flour milling technology. The first is 
that lead times will tend to decrease for successive projects, as 
a result of the learning process on the part of those involved in 
their implementation. The second is that lead times will tend to 
be longer, the larger the size of the project. The main
arguements in favour of the first hypothesis are:
1) "Catching-up" objective: the main aim of Algeria’s import of 
m o d e m  technology is to catch up with the industrialized
countries. This implies that success over time in reducing 
assimilation lead-times should be important to success in 
"catching-up",
2) "Self-sufficiency" in flour production which implies that new
production capacities have to be set up quickly to meet the
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rapidly increasing local demand,
3 ) the possibility of a "learning curve": successive investment 
in technologically similar projects may result in shorter 
lead-times as a result of accumulated experience. This 
implies that technical and organizational problems 
encountered in the implementation of initial projects would 
be overcome in successive projects as experience was 
accumulated.
Against the first hypothesis are, first, the point frequently 
made by respondents that the Algerian administrative system 
is rigid and clumsy, second, inefficiency of some firms 
involved in projects execution, and, third, lack of an 
explicit technological strategy aimed at long-term objective 
of assimilating the imported technology both at the firm and 
national level. Most executives clearly stated that their 
overriding priority during the 1970* s was to get planned 
projects implemented and those completed running efficiently, 
rather than devote resources to assimilation. This lack 
of an explicit technology strategy was reflected in a lack of 
effort to establish a learning system capable of gathering, 
screening and exploiting information about both problems 
encountered in project execution and also about perceived 
opportunities. Forthly, the supply of skills was inadequate 
relative to the volume of investment allocated to the
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industry.
In favour of the second hypothesis is the proposition that a 
project of large value will logically entail a larger volume 
of work, and consequently proportionately more or longer 
lead-time, than a similar project of smaller value, and that 
there will be more technical and organizational problems to 
solve than there would be for similar small projects, since 
projects of large value involve a large proportion of 
infrastructural work, it is expected that work on the project 
cannot be easily compressed into the same time-scale as for a 
smaller project simply by allocating more material and human 
resources.
Against the second hypothesis is the argument advanced by 
respondents that the more experience the project manager has 
with applying the technology, the less the time-scale will 
tend to be. Lead-times can be reduced through selection of 
competent sub-contractors, adequate planning of project 
execution and coordination and control of work in progress so 
that certain tasks can be performed simultaneously. Against 
this argument is the point frequently made by respondents 
that certain sub-contractors were inefficient and that 
frequent work stoppages were experienced as a result of 
delays in payments of work completed and shortage of 
construction materials.
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With data collected in this survey it is possible to attempt 
a statistical explanation of the variation in lead-times by 
the variations in (a) the date of the contract (as an 
explanatory factor in considering the learning effect) and 
(b) project size, measured in terras of value at 1978 AD 
prices. Multiple linear regression, using ordinary least 
squares, was undertaken with lead-times as the dependent 
variable and project values and years of experience as the 
independent variables. This was carried out separately for 
the overall lead-time C, and for each of its constituents A  
and B. The results are set out in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Lead-times, Project costs and contract dates:
Regression results
Lead times Constant term 
(in months)
Regression coefficients 
project cost contract dates 
(1978 m AD) (years)
-2
R
Lead time A 6.2 0.05 -0.89 0.147
(1.5) (1.8) (-2.15)
Lead time B 42.32 -0.067 2.44 0.59
(8.02) (-1.75) (5.13)
Lead time C 52.1 -0.014 1.34 0.37
(10.45) (-0.4) (3.14)
Source: Data derived from the survey
Notes: 1) Correlation between project cost and contract dates
is negligible.
2) Figures in brackets are t- statistics.
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Clearly these tests provide no support to the hypothesis that 
large projects take longer to implement or that lead-times 
have been reduced by the learning process on the part of 
those involved in project-execution. The overwhelming bulk 
of the variance in lead-times is inexplained by the variance 
in project size and contract dates, so that the constant 
terms come out close to the arithmetic means of the lead- 
times (see table 5.1). The results of table 5.2 support the 
view of the survey respondents that there is no necessary 
relationship between the size of the project and lead-times. 
They also support our arguement that doing-based learning 
does not take place automatically. Rather, it depends 
largely on the degree of financial and organizational effort 
allocated to establish a learning system capable of 
gathering, analyzing and exploiting information about 
problems encountered and opportunities perceived. Projects 
were often launched in waves41, rather than in succession, 
project managers were often recruited in ad hoc fashion with 
no prior experience in project management and with no 
supportive system to back them up.42 In such circumstances, 
project lead-times depended largely on the initiative of the 
project manager, and his commitment, e l s  well e l s  on the 
complexity of Eidministrative and technical problems 
encountered in each case. No effort was made at explicit 
training of personnel in project management, nor to establish 
a permanent team responsible for project management, 
supervision and evaluation of work in progress. These
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organizational shortcomings had in turn adverse effects on 
the learning process of those involved in project execution.
3.2 Capacity utilization in flour milling industry*
Capacity utilization of a flour mill depends on demand for 
its output, supply of inputs and the plant availability. In 
practice the first factor has not constituted a constraint to 
capacity utilization. Demand for flour has been, since 1975, 
far in excess of local supply. As for the demand for milling 
by-products, it fluctuates considerably from one season to 
the next43, but is generally higher than local supply.
It is the supply of some inputs that has adversely affected 
the capacity utilization of some mills and the quality of 
flour milled. Both water and electricity supplies were 
considered by some (not all) respondents to be "inadequate". 
Inadequate supply of the former adversely affects wheat 
conditioning, which in turn affects grinding and sifting as 
well as the quality of flour obtained. As for the inadequate 
supply of the latter, it usually results in a mill shutdown. 
Both frequency and duration of power failure differ from one 
mill to another, and generally they affect mills located in
(*) Capacity utilization is used here as a parameter to measure 
the degree of mastery of operational technology i.e., production 
and maintentenance engineering and management.
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small villages more than those situated in urban ones. The 
effects of some power failures on the mill operation are not 
limited to their duration as sudden failures usually result 
in bottlenecks in the mill. These bottlenecks have to be 
removed before the mill is brought back to its normal running 
once the power is restored.
Four respondents (out of 20) considered supply of water as 
"inadequate particularly during the hot season" and judged 
its effect as "very minor" on capacity utilization but "very 
considerable" on the quality of flour milled. As for power 
failures, it affected eight (out of 20) mills. However, only 
2 respondents considered it as having "a considerable effect" 
on capacity utilization. For 1984, these two mills 
experienced an average loss of production due to power 
failure, equivalent to one day of production per month.44 
However, all respondents claimed that these losses were made 
up for by intensive use of the plants45 with the aim of 
fulfilling their production targets agreed upon with 
ministries and marketing agencies concerned.
It is the plant availability which is the determining factor 
in capacity utilization of flour mills. Availability can be 
defined by the following formula:
Availability (over a specified time) =
cumulative time of operation in the normal working state
cumulative outage time
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The plant availability is mainly dependent on the reliability 
and maintainability of its machinery and equipment and on its 
personnels mastery of production and maintenance engineering 
and management. The level of maintenance required at the 
plant operation stage is largely affected by the quantity and 
quality of design-engineering work put into it at pre- 
production stage. At the design stage reliability and 
maintainability are the important factors which should be 
considered in relation to the plant performance, capital cost 
and running cost. At the installation stage maintainability 
continues to be an important factor because it is only at 
this stage that the multidimentional nature of many of the 
maintenance problems becomes clear. The commissioning stage 
is not only a period of technical performance testing but 
also a learning period during which design defects that might 
affect plant performance are located and corrected.
All respondents judged machinery and equipment incorporated 
in their mills to be "generally reliable" and their 
maintainability "very satisfactory". In only one case some 
"minor modifications" were introduced, after the 
commissioning stage, in the installation of some equipment 
"to facilitate maintenance work as well as to reduce their 
unavailability".
Since reliability and maintainability were judged to be "very 
satisfactory", the plant availability becomes predominantly
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dependent on the degree of mastery of maintenance and 
production engineering and management at the operation stage. 
Mastery of production engineering and management results in 
the avoidance of maloperation and in the detection of defects 
while the plant is in operation before breakdowns occur. The 
mastery of the former results in minimizing cumulative outage 
time and resource costs. To achieve this aim the maintenance 
department must work closely with the production department 
so that an optimum balance between availability and 
maintenance resource costs could be maintained. This is 
particularly important where there is a pressure on the 
production department to maximize output in order to satisfy 
demand, and where availability costs change greatly with 
time.
Maintenance can be regarded as a combination of actions 
carried out in order to replace, repair, service and modify 
the components, or some identifiable grouping of components, 
so that the mill continues to operate at a specified 
availability level for a specified time. The maintenance 
department influence availability directly through corrective 
and preventive maintenance. The proper objective of 
maintenance is the minimization of the sum of 
unavailability46 and maintenance resource costs.47
Both maintenance and production engineering and management at 
the mill level seem to be mastered in almost all mills. This
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is reflected in capacity utilization of the mills surveyed as 
well as in their running-in times and absence of foreign 
technical assistance. All respondents, except three, claimed 
that their plants have been regularly operated at the rated 
capacity or above it.48 This view is supported by official 
macro-economic industry reports.4 9 The three exceptions had 
experienced considerable yearly fluctuation, but appeared on 
the average to operate very close to the rated capacity. 
Hence, the average yearly rate of capacity utilization over 
the period 1981-84 amounted to 98% for the first mill, 99.2% 
for the second and 96.5% for the third.
The average running-in time for the mills completed in the 
late 1970's and early 1980's was less than half of that for 
those completed in the early 1970’s. Whereas the average for 
the 6 plants completed before 1975 amounted to just over 10 
months, the average running in time for a sample of 10 of 
those completed later amounted to just over 4 months. 
Meanwhile, all respondents claimed that they had never had 
recourse to foreign suppliers or other foreign personnel 
after the stage of commissioning.
Four factors were judged by almost all respondents as being 
of major importance to mastery of operational technology.
These were:
1. Intensive in-house and on-the-.job specialized training of
prospective personnel. In contrast to the cement industry
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which relied almost exclusively in its recruitment of 
managerial and technical personnel on outside institutions, 
flour milling industry relied heavily on its in-house trained 
personnel whose training was not limited to operational 
technology but also involved some training in most aspects of 
process technology particularly since the early 1980*3. This 
in-depth training was often accompanied by on-the-job 
training in specific tasks either at home or abroad, and 
retraining. Most respondents claimed that specialized in- 
house training is "much more effective" than formal education 
because the former "makes the trainee immediately operational 
once he or she is recruited". Most mill managers judged 
their technical personnel as highly "qualified and 
competent", and some managers of relatively old mills drew 
attention to the fact that some of their technical personnel 
were "overqualified for the jobs available at the mills" 
and consequently "underutilized".50
2. "A relatively adequate flow of information" both within each 
mill and between each mill and its neighbouring ones. All 
mills surveyed had sub-departments in charge of information 
gathering, processing and diffusion, and some production and 
maintenance managers judged these sub-departments to be of 
great importance to their departments* operations. Meanwhile 
most respondents emphasize the role of information exchange 
between mills in solving a number of technical problems and 
in enhancing the learning process, as well as in avoiding
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some unprogrammed stoppages, due to shortage of spares, 
through exchange of engineering components.
3. Labour stability: In contrast to the cement industry which 
experienced an extremely high labour turnover rate, flour 
milling industry appeared generally to have enjoyed a great 
degree of labour stability. Data collected from the 20 mills 
surveyed showed that labour turnover was relatively high51 in 
only two cases during their first two years of operation. 
However, the rate of turnover dropped drastically in 
subsequent years52, and data on capacity utilization in these 
two mills suggest that this high labour turnover had minor 
effects. This very weak correlation between labour turnover 
and capacity utilization was, according to the two mill 
managers, due to the fact that the two mills were overmanned 
and that labour instability concerned essentially semi- and 
unskilled personnel.
4. Heavy investment in repair workshops and standardization of 
designs and products. The firm (ex-SN SEMPAC) had invested 
heavily, during the mid-1970's, in maintenance through the 
establishment of regional and central repair workshops in 
addition to the small ones set up at each new mill. The 
purposes of these regional and central workshops were:
a ) In the short- and medium run to maintain machinery and 
equipment of the established mills. This was to be achieved 
by assisting the mills to establish their maintenance 
planning, servicing and repairing of equipment which cannot 
be carried out at the mill for technical or economic reasons,
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providing technical specifications and plans of engineering 
components and parts to the mills* workshops, and designing 
and manufacturing those elements which cannot be produced at 
the mills. In practice many problems had been encountered, 
the most important of which were firstly a lack of technical 
specifications and plans of the engineering components and 
parts and shortage of semi-finished products required to 
manufacture these elements when designs had been successfully 
worked out. Secondly there was a diversity of technologies 
and designs particularly with regard to old mills.
Despite these problems local content in spare parts usage has 
recently increased. Thus according to data collected from 
some mills, which separate expenditure on locally produced 
engineering components from those imported, suggest that 
local content increased from almost nothing in the early 
1970’s to over 75% in some of the large mills. Most 
respondents suggested that most of the locally produced 
engineering components were designed and manufactured by 
these workshops.
b) In the long-run to design and manufacture flour milling 
machinery and equipment, which cannot be produced by other 
local firms and to encourage sub-contracting by assisting 
local firms which lack know-how. This switch was expected to 
take place once maintenance engineering was mastered and 
skills were improved. The central workshop would then
transfer all technical information which existed at its level
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to regional mills and workshops so that it could concentrate 
on the design and manufacture of prototypes of milling 
machinery and equipment as well as machine-building for the 
flour milling industry. Meanwhile regional workshops, in 
conjunction with other local firms, were expected to play the 
role of sub-contractors to the central workshop and the 
mills.53 In practice, the shift in function required a 
definitive option for a particular technology and design, so 
as to ensure economic efficiency; and executives of SN SEMPAC 
were aware of this problem and its implications.54
Since the firm's restructuring in 1982 regional workshops 
have been integrated into newly established flour production 
enterprises, and the central workshop has been integrated 
into the newly set up National Enterprise for the Development 
of Food industry, E.N.I.AL. The latter is an engineering 
firm entrusted with implementation of investment projects in 
the food industry, including flour milling, and R & D related 
to the industry. At present E.N.I.AL is investing in the ex­
central workshop, which is upgraded into a Centre for the 
Development of Machinery for the Food Industry, C.E.I.AL, so 
as to enhance its design, engineering, experimentation and 
machine-building capabilities. Meanwhile, C.E.I.AL is 
expected to work closely with the food industry research 
centre C . E . R . I . AL whose main functions are to develop new 
products and processes and to train labour force for the food 
industry. So far mass production of milling machinery has
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not yet started, but a number of prototypes have been 
developed and tested by C.E.I.AL, some of which have already 
been installed in some neighbouring mills.*
3.3 Manning levels in the operation of the completed mills
Manning levels were obtained for the 20 mills surveyed. In 
most cases the data covers only recent years (1981-85). Data 
on early years of operation of relatively old mills were 
lacking. Generally, all the mills completed before 1975 were 
overmanned, while those opened since 1980 are generally 
manned at levels similar to or less than those specified by 
the technology supplier. By overmanning I mean the excess 
number of workers in relation to the number of jobs specified 
by the supplier of technology. The degree of overmanning 
differed from one mill to another: it ranged from a minimum 
of 30% to a maximum of 75% in one of the old mills. The main 
reason for this overmanning was social: to provide jobs for 
the unemployed and for those who had been employed in closed 
mills next to the new ones. In one of the old mills where 
overmanning was highest, the new mill’s work force was almost 
doubled in one day as a result of the closure of an obsolete 
mill to which the new mill was added in the early 1970’s. 
While recognizing the existence of a certain degree of 
overmanning, all managers of these overmanned mills
(*) For more details, see sub-section 3.4
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emphasized the fact that "manning levels suggested by foreign 
contractors were based on prevailing conditions in their 
countries" and consequently they tended to underestimate the 
influence of certain conditions peculiar to Algeria on 
manning levels.
Since 1980 there has been a change in policy at the national 
level and firms were instructed to restrict their manning 
levels to their necessary operational requirements.55 This 
explains largely why the newly opened mills are operated at 
manning levels similar to, or even less than, those specified 
by the technology supplier. Indeed, data collected from 
these mills reveal that four mills were undermanned and their 
managers as well as five managers of other mills claimed 
that manning levels imposed on them were insufficient to 
meet their units’ operational needs, particularly in those 
mills where handling of milled products was not automated. 
Meanwhile managers of overmanned mills were instructed to 
gradually reduce their manning levels.
3.4 Indigenous Technological Change in Flour Milling Industry
Before its restructuring in 1982, most of SN SEMPAC’s effort 
had been oriented towards investment implementation, 
standardization of products and equipment designs, and 
assimilation of operational technology. The corporation had 
neither R & D infrastructure nor an engineering department
330
capable of developing new products and processes or improving 
imported ones. The only exceptions which are worth 
mentioning are:
1) The introduction by the firm of a product developed by a 
local laboratory56: Although the product enjoyed great
success during its first years of appearance on the local 
market, the firm has recently found difficulties in selling
the product ’’because of lack of market protection” according
to the production manager of the plant57,
2) Design and manufacture of a handling equipment, which
according to a mill manager who introduced it is ’’more 
reliable and easy to maintain than those imported",
3) Design and manufacture of a large number of engineering
components and parts with the main aims of replacing imported 
ones, and training its personnel in the design and 
manufacture of equipment specific to flour milling. The 
experience accumulated played a major role in stimulating 
technological innovations in subsequent years (see below).
At the mills level, all technological effort was oriented 
towards efficient use of installed capacities through mastery 
of production and maintenance engineering and management. In 
only one mill were some "minor" changes introduced on the 
installation of some production equipment.5 8
The establishment of C.E.R.I.AL and C.E.I.AL in the early 
1980’s appears to have stimulated technological effort in the
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industry. A number of improved prototypes of production 
equipment, some of which are specific to the flour milling 
industry, were locally developed without recourse to foreign 
licencing or technical assistance. Some of these machines 
have already been installed in a number of existing mills on 
an experimental basis. The most important of these machines 
are:
A. A specific gravity separator which is used in removing
impurities from the grain. Unlike other dry cleaning 
processes, which require the use of a series of machines 
working on a number of physical principles, the specific 
gravity separator alone can remove all the extraneous 
matter. Compared with other cleaning processes, it is "less 
expensive to operate and more reliable than other dry 
processes and more appropriate to Algeria's condition than a 
wheat-washing process because it does not require the use of 
water which is scarce in the country"5 9.
B. A flour grading and purifying machine: this machine is mainly
a replica of those installed in newly set up mills. The main 
aim of its development is "to substitute locally developed 
for imported machinery"60.
C. A wheat conditioning machine which is used to adjust the
moisture of the grain and moisture distribution within the
grain in order to obtain the desired level of moisture of the 
grain before its milling. The main advantage of this locally 
developed prototype is that its application would result in 
great saving in water consumption by the flour milling
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industry. Thus whereas "imported tempering machinery 
requires about 150 litres per quintal of wheat, the locally 
developed one requires only 17 1/q". Indeed, it is claimed 
that "its application in all existing flour mills [would] 
result in saving about 3,000,000 m3 of water per year".61
So far none of these locally developed prototypes has been 
mass produced, despite the fact that most of them have been 
"fully tested and approved both technically and 
economically",6 2 and that "over 90% of components and parts 
required to produce them, in value terms, have been locally 
produced". Although some E.N.I.AL and C.E.I.AL executives 
were confident that production of some of those fully tested 
prototypes "will be started soon", there is a likely danger 
that these prototypes may remain display items for a long 
time, and consequently become out-dated before they have the 
chance to be introduced on the market. This is because of 
inadequate market research and information flow as well as 
central control of investment allocation. Although a great 
effort was made by C.E.I.AL to publicise the results achieved 
through local seminars and trade fairs, no effort was made at 
exploring foreign markets for export possibilities63, which 
are essential for some of these prototypes to be mass 
produced economically. Meanwhile the organizational system 
which is based on vertically separated sectors lacks 
horizontal cooperation and is characterized by segmentation. 
This, in turn, resulted in duplication of work64 and an
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inadequate horizontal flow of technical and economic 
information both within and from without the economy.65 
Furthermore, central control over investment in new projects 
and imports of goods and services usually inhibits initiative 
at the enterprise level and increases innovation lead- 
times . 6 6
In addition to the development of a number of prototypes,
C.E.I.AL has "successfully" carried out the design and 
engineering work as well as procurement and installation of 
machinery and equipment in its newly set up workshop in 
which foreign involvement was limited to the supply of 
machinery and equipment.6 7 It has also taken part in the 
start-up operations of a bottle-making and water bottling 
plant, in cooperation with Algerian employees of the firm 
owning the plant: C.E.I.AL was requested to assist in start­
up operations after the plaint was abandoned by the foreign 
contractor before start-up operations were carried out.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at technological developments in 
flour milling technology, the various techniques used in Algeria 
and have examined Algeria's experience in importing and 
assimilating modern flour milling technology. It was argued, in 
the first section, that m o d e m  flour technology is highly 
"mature" and despite the many technological changes (such as the
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introduction of electronic control systems including computers, 
changes in the design of machinery to enhance both reliability 
and capacity and the introduction of pneumatic conveying systems) 
introduced in the industry in recent years, the core technology 
has remained basically unchanged. It was also argued that a 
m o d e m  flour milling industry was well established in Algeria 
prior to its independence, and that the priority given to 
commercial flour production (using modern flour milling 
technology) in investment allocation since the late 1960’s 
reflected changes in local consumption patterns, which in turn 
were due to socio-econimc changes such as rapid urbanization and 
rapid expansion of the monetised sector of the economy. It was 
also emphasized that imports of flour milling production systems 
did not entail indiscriminate imports of innovations introduced 
in the industrialized countries which supplied these systems. 
Whereas the tendency in the industrialized countries has been 
towards capacity enhancement, increasing automation through 
computerized control systems and a proliferation of flour grades 
to cater for the highly differentiated markets, imports of flour 
productive systems has largely avoided introduction of these 
innovations. All newly constructed mills, except two, have been 
of medium size (relative to those constructed during the same 
period in the industrialized countries), produce a very limited 
number of flour grades, do not incorporate computerized control 
systems, and in some cases do not use automatic handling systems 
for ground products.
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The second section has provided an historical background to the 
development of the flour milling industry in Algeria, before 
independence, and examined the Algerian state’s effort and 
objectives in developing a modern flour milling industry. 
Although a major priority in terms of investment was given to 
m o d e m  flour milling, with the aim of meeting the increasing 
local demand for commercial flour, the state provided no support 
facilities, except personnel training, to ensure the efficient 
implementation of investment projects and the rapid assimilation 
of imported technology. This resulted, among other things, in 
long delays in projects execution, heavy reliance on foreign 
firms in investment implementation and a lack of assimilation of 
technological tasks related to investment execution.
The third section has dealt with the assimilation of imported 
technology and has examined the significance of learning-by-doing 
and by training and hiring skilled labour on technological 
development in the industry. The assimilation process can be 
divided into two phases. The absorption phase which involves the 
successful exploitation of the imported technology in the first 
production facilities for which it is acquired. The diffusion 
phase entails the replication of the imported technology in other 
plants and subsequent innovations introduced in it. Weakness in 
either phase reduces the impact from the acquisition of imported 
technology. It was argued that due to policy miscalculations, 
systemic shortcomings and lack of an explicit technology 
strategy, investment projects had experienced long delays in
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their implementation and local participation in the engineering 
tasks connected with these projects was not even attempted, 
except in one case through a joint venture firm. First and 
foremost, during the 1970’s the planners approved a programme of 
investment in the industry which was well beyond the ability of 
the economy to efficiently carry out. Second, neither the 
central organs nor the firm in charge of the industry had made an 
effort to establish support facilities needed to facilitate the 
process of assimilation of the imported technology. Furthermore, 
SN SEMPAC’s systematic option for the packaged mechanism of 
technology imports precluded the active participation of both its 
personnel and other local suppliers in engineering tasks 
connected with the projects’ implementation. This in turn 
precluded the possibility of local accumulation of human capital 
through experience-based learning, and hampered the process of 
diffusion of the imported technology.
Additionally there were numerous systemic shortcomings which 
hampered the process of assimilation. The most important of 
these were central control of decision-making concerning prices, 
wages, investment and imports, complexity and rigidity of the 
administrative system, lack of incentives and coordination 
between various entities, sectoral segmentation, and an 
inadequate flow of information and of competitive pressure that 
may stimulate technological effort. Empirical evidence suggests 
that almost all respondents believed that the Algerian system 
even after its reorganization in the early 1980’s was not
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conducive to rapid assimilation of imported technology. V?e 
return to this point below.
However, data collected in the survey suggest that a great deal
of effort was made, almost from the beginning of the 1970*3, to
master the operational technology. This effort is reflected in 
the establishement of a large number of repair workshops, 
intensive specialized training of Algerian personnel in 
operational technology, standardization of products and equipment 
and efforts at establishing preventive maintenance programmes 
which cover all aspects of the maintenance programme from 
recording the information about the machinery and equipment 
installed at the plants, to analyzing the relevant programming, 
and planning the execution of the programme using mainly
conventional techniques. This technological effort appears to
play a major role in acquiring operational capability which 
subsequently spilled over to other tasks such as improvements in 
the imported machinery and equipment. Data collected in the 
survey also suggest that existing mills have been generally 
operated continuously at their rated capacity (and in some cases 
even above it) without outside technical assistance. However, 
there was no evidence at the mills surveyed of innovations of the 
form of modifications being introduced on equipment specific to 
the industry except in one mill where locally developed 
production machinery had been introduced on an experimental 
basis.
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Although the restructuring of SN SEMPAC appears to meet certain 
necessary conditions for technological innovation and the 
internalisation of the learning process, a number of systemic 
shortcomings have not been removed and new ones have emerged. 
Examples of the former are lack of motivation, red tape and 
administrative control over prices, wages and imports. The 
restructuring of the economy has had only a modestly positive 
effect on state enterprises because the centre has retained a 
dominant direct role in investment allocation and in determining 
both product and factor prices, as well as in controlling imports 
of goods and services. Examples of the latter are separation of 
R & D and E activities from production and the lack of procedures 
on how coordination between the two activities would be achieved. 
Although the main aim of establishing an autonomous national 
enterprise responsible for R & D and E activities connected with 
the industry, was to stimulate these activities which were 
previously neglected and consequently reduce the degree of 
reliance on foreign suppliers of technology, this new 
organization suffers, in turn, from a number of shortcomings 
which could hamper technological effort and may result in inter- 
enterprise conflicts. To start with, both production experience 
and detailed knowledge of local conditions are essential for the 
successuful design, experimentation and maintenance of new 
plants, equipment and products. By separating R  & D and E 
activities from production, and by not establishing institutional 
or other kind of procedures to ensure labour mobility and other 
types of interaction between suppliers and users, this new
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organization could result in a great waste of effort and 
resources and consequently retard technological progress 
generally. Indeed, one of the main weaknesses of this new 
organization is that it does not provide a solution to the 
problem of the lack of linkages between the production system and 
research institutions. This shortcoming could in turn result in 
either inter-enterprises conflicts if R-D and E enterprises 
attempted to impose their technological results on production 
enterprises, or a lack of application of the results achieved if 
the latter decided that they were not adequate or competitive 
with potential foreign alternatives.
Empirical evidence also showed that doing-based learning and 
learning by training and by hiring skilled labour played a major 
role in augmenting local technological capacity when adequate 
financial and organizational effort was allocated to acquire such 
capacity. The establishment of various workshops and of an 
information gathering, screening and diffusing system at the mill 
and workshop levels have played a major role in establishing 
preventive maintenance programmes, improving production 
management and the emergence of the design and manufacturing 
capability of components and parts, which subsequently formed the 
basis of C.E.I.AL's activities. The existence of repair 
workshops and of the feedback system, coupled with intensive 
specialized training, presumably explain why design and 
manufacture of specific machinery and equipment have advanced
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much faster since the restructuring of the industry than other 
engineering tasks connected with new investment.
Footnotes
(1) Calculated on the basis of data published in the official 
weekly Revolution Africaine 29 November - 5 December 
1985, p. 28.
(2) For more details see Leung, F.L. (1981)
(3) See Kent, N.L., (1984): pp.84-85
(4) Ibid.
(5) The extraction rate varies from one country to another.
Since standardization in the mid-1970,s this rate has been
set at 72%.
(6) For more details see Leung (1981) and Kent (1984): pp.
101-102
(7) No statistics are available on the proportion of locally
produced wheat which is not marketed. However it was
reported that around 50% of hard wheat produced in 1984/85
was not sold to the State Marketing Board. Part of this
proportion is often exchanged outside the official channel
and milled by methods other than the roller mill.
(8) Calculated on the basis of data published in MPAT, 1981
(October): Annexes, p. 248 and Revolution Africaine. 29
November - 5 December 1985, p. 28










For the U K ’s average weekly household expenditure on flour 
and its derivatives for 1956-1976 see: The Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, 1977 (July): p. 13
In 1982, SN SEMPAC was split into 6 enterprises: five of 
them were entrusted with production and distribution of 
flour and its derivatives. The sixth is an engineering 
and R & D enterprise.
The quantity of flour imported from and exported to France 
was very marginal and the trade balance fluctuated 
considerably especially during the 1950’s. For more 
details see FAO Trade Year Book(s) concerning these years. 
MPAT, 1979 (October): p. 200 
Ibid.
Due to the high degree of integration of the colonial 
economy to the French economy, most industrial activities 
had been established on the northern coastal strip around 
the main ports. This concentration of industrial 
activities was further strengthened during the period 
1967-73, while the interior of the country lacked the 
necessary investment to develop. The II Four Year Plan 
called for concentration of development effort on the 
interior of the country through light industry in 
particular to reduce the rural exodus and unemployment in 
these regions.
From: MPAT, (1979), MPAT, (1981), Annexes and data 
collected in the survey.
Revolution Africaine. November 2 9 - 5  December, 1985, p.
342
28
(18) For details, see FAO Trade Year Book(s)
(19) Alf Panter in Canadian Interional Grains Institute, 1975
(May): p. 488
(20) C.E.R.I.AL was set up in 1982 with the objectives of
carrying R & D related to food industry, training
technical personnel and the provision of technical 
assistance to the food industry Engineering Enterprise
(E.N.I.AL, and other production enterprises on contractual 
basis. It is an integral part of E.N.I.AL. At present it
acts as a consultant to E.N.I.AL, carries out R & D and
trains personnel for the food industry.
(21) Since the restructuring of SN-SEMPAC in 1982, C.E.I.AL
(which had been a central workshop) has been entrusted 
with designing and manufacturing machinery for the food 
industry, as well as providing assistance to local sub­
contractors and production units interested in introducing 
technological modifications. In 1986 it employed 12 
engineers and 30 technicians. On its achievements so far, 
see pp. 332-333.
(22) See Chapter 4, section 3.
(23) This supervision was mainly administrative as technical 
tasks were carried out by foreign firms.
(24) The firm employed foreign personnel. For details on its 
organization and performance see El Hindis, Nos. 7-8, 
(1981): pp. 29-35










not incorporated in the mill.
This estimate was given by executives of the three mills 
concerned.
One executive, e.g., explained that foreign personnel
refused to explain the nature of design faults or to allow 
Algerian workers to carry out, under their supervision, 
correction of design faults, on the grounds that it was 
their job to carry out start-up operations and test 
equipment performance.
This effective involvement is perhaps due to the fact that 
projects implemented in this way are not covered by 
performance guarantees attached to turnkey projects.
MPAT, 1979 (Oct): op. cit., pp. 247-248
Whereas the number of engineers had increased from 11 in 
1969 to 19 in 1978, the number of technicians fell from 
283 in 1969 to 175 in 1978. MPAT, Ibid.
On the Chinese experience, see D Chudnovsky, et al., 
(1983): op. cit., pp. 155-182
Some executives complained of the increasing pressure on 
them from central organs which they accuse of being 
indifferent to difficulties they encounter in obtaining 
necessary suppliers and in recruiting and retaining 
skilled workers, required to carry out their managerial 
tasks effectively.
The Algerian bureaucracy is not only criticized by 
Algeria's technocrats but also politicians and the public. 










ex-President Houari Bonraedienne. See also J.R. Nellys
(1980): pp. 407-422.
A number of concrete examples can be found in the 
confidential report written apparently by a number of 
policy-makers in the Ministry of Industry and Energy, who 
were dismissed in 1979: L*Industrialisation en Algerie: 
Echec ou Reussite, Continuity. Inflechissement ou 
Reversement? Algiers (n.d.). See in particular Ch. 3 and 
title III.
See e.g., M.F. Gallineri, in El Hindis. Nos. 7-8, pp. 36- 
42
See sub. section 3.4 below.
About 4 months. Sources: MPAT (1979) and our survey.
This explanation was given to the author by two officials 
at the Planning Ministry.
The average delay time experienced by projects launched 
during the 1974-77 Plan was more than twice the average 
delay experienced by the six mills launched in 1969. 
e.g., a partially completed mill remained idle for more 
than 15 months because of the delay in the construction of 
its silos, which was entrusted to an Algerian firm. This 
delay, according to the manager of the firm concerned, was 
largely due to inadequate supply of construction 
materials.
In January 1969 six milling projects were launched. In 
March 1976, seven new ones were initiated and in January 
and March 1977 eight and four new milling projects were
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started.
(42) Some of these project managers had no prior experience in 
flour milling technology. An executive of E.N.I.AL argued 
that "because of lack of experience in project management, 
complexity of administrative and technical problems 
encountered on construction site and lack of support 
facilities required to back them up at the firm or the 
ministry level, a number of designated project managers 
handed in their resignation soon after their 
appointments".
(43) e.g., during the second half of 1985 most mills 
experienced great difficulties in disposing of their by­
products and extremely large stocks were piled up at the 
mills as distributors refused to pick them up because of 
lack of immediate demand for them.
(44) This is due to the fact that mills did not have 
electricity generating units of their own. Their requests 
to set up their own generating units were turned down on 
the ground that the national electricity generating board 
had already undertaken steps to improve the supply, not 
only to industrial units but also to non-commercial users 
in these regions. There is evidence to support this 
arguement as one of the two mills discussed above 
experienced only minor problems as a result of power 
failure during the first half of 1985.
(45) This is usually achieved by carrying out maintenance 
during power failures instead of doing so at programmed
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intervals.
(46) Unavailability costs consist of production loss while in 
repair, waiting for repair, or while undergoing preventive 
repairs and loss of in-house service material.
(47) Maintenance resource costs consist of maintenance labour, 
equipment, spare parts and holding costs.
(48) Some respondents (e.g., 8 out of 20) claimed that their 
mills have been regularly operated at above their rated 
capacity since the second year of production start-up. 
This was achieved through intensive use of machinery and 
equipment. Two mills for which data on yearly running 
time was available for the whole period, reveal that they 
were operated much above the specified availability level 
during their first years of operation. Whereas the 
average yearly availability level was estimated at 315 
days, the two mills were operated regularly over the 
first five years of their operation, for more than 330 
days/year. However, actual availability time tended to 
decrease with the plant’s operating life. This intensive 
use of installed capacities was imposed on reluctant 
managers by central organs with the aim of reducing flour 
imports. Most mill managers claimed that such intensive 
use of machinery resulted in rapid obsolescence and in the 
increase in maintenance work and cost.
(49) See e.g. MPAT, (1980): pp. 82-83 and MPAT, (1981), p. 248. 
The latter shows that total output of commercial flour was 
lower than installed production capacity. However this
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was due to the fact that a large number of new mills had 
just been completed during 1980 and were not yet operated 1
at full capacity.
(50) This point of view was supported by technical personnel of 
two mills where the author had the opportunity to discuss 
the matter with a large number of technical personnel. 
Their suggestion was to establish R & D cells at the mills 
so as to make effective use of human resources available.
(51) The average rate of labour turnover amounted to 20% in one 
of the mills and 15% in the other. The highest labour 
turnover experienced in other mills was 7%.
(52) In subsequent years the highest labour turnover registered 
was 10% in one of the two mills in 1983.
(53) This obviously would be applicable to those mills whose 
technology and design is similar to that opted for. 
Consequently old mills whose technologyis obsolete would 
suffer most as a result of shortage of engineering 
components which are at the same time difficult to obtain 
from abroad as their technology is obsolete.
(54) To opt for a definitive technology and design would ensure 
future reproduction of the industry through development of 
local suppliers, but it would at the same time penalize 
existing mills which used different technology and design.
In other words, the firm faced a dilema on whether to 
provide assistance to all existing mills while relying on 
imports for its future expansion or to develop its 
technological and capital goods design and manufacturing
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capabilities to ensure its future self-expansion. The 
latter option requires a final decision on the technology 
and design most appropriate to the firm’s conditions. Up 
to the end of 1982 no final decision had been taken.
(55) Whereas some mills operated in the early 1970’s had a 
number of auxiliary activities such as canteens, consumer 
cooperatives and the like, attached to them, newly opened 
ones had no such activities. At present there are moves 
to close these activities in old mills.
(56) The product was developed locally and tested in a number 
of laboratories abroad before the decision was finally 
taken to mass produce it. All equipment needed to produce 
it on a commercial basis was imported. The product is a 
basic baby food.
(57) It must be noted here that distribution of the product is 
entrusted to another firm which, according to the plant 
manager, played a major role in creating marketing 
difficulties because of imports of foreign competing 
markets and their promotion by the firm at the expense of 
the locally produced product. In 1984 C.E.R.I.AL was 
requested to either improve the product or develop a new 
one to replace it.
(58) A number of technological modifications in plants 
producing pasta and couscous were successfully carried 
out. The maintenance manager of a large complex, which 
incorporates one of the mills surveyed, claimed that a 
number of "important technical modifications in the design
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and operation of some machinery" was successfully carried 
out with the aims of "improving efficiency and safety".
(59) This was the view of C.E.I.AL’s manager.
(60) Ibid.
(61) Ibid., it was also the view of the manager of the mill 
where this machine had been tested.
(62) Ibid.
(63) Until very recently export possibilities were ignored by
almost all local manufacturing firms, probably because of
lack of competitive pressure on the local market, which is
highly protected. This equally applies to C.E.I.AL and 
E.N.I.AL whose executives argued that market research 
abroad was not carried out because they were not certain 
when the decision to manufacture the new products would be 
taken by central organs. Although this uncertainty 
exists, export possibilities could also strengthen the 
enterprise’s position when applying for investment in new 
projects and could facilitate administrative procedure in 
the light of priority given in recent years by the 
government to firms with great export potential. In fact 
enterprises have been encouraged to earn their foreign 
exchange they need to pay for their imports, through 
exports of their goods and services. See e.g., the 
Financial Times Supplement on Algeria published on 
December 10 1986.
(64) This fact was admitted by C.E.I.AL’s manager who spoke of 
some "wasteful effort" as some of their design-engineering
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work could have been saved by subcontracting to other 
local firms producing components.
(65) "Inadequate personal interaction and inadequate supply of 
printed technical economic material" were judged by
C.E.I.AL’s executives as "great obstacle" to efficient use 
of their human potential.
(66) Lack of flexibility in investment planning and long 
administrative procedure of the Algerian system were 
judged by C.E.R.I.AL and C.E.I.AL executives as a "serious 
handicap" to the innovation process.
(67) Even machinery and equipment were initially expected to be 
supplied by local firms. However the latter could not 
deliver them in the time agreed upon and foreign suppliers 
were awarded the contract.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We set out to examine the impact of the policies of 
industrialization through imports of technology and of 
'packaging*, on local technological development in the LDCs, in 
the light of Algeria’s experience. In the first chapter we 
argued that those who put forward arguements in the 1950 *s and 
1960*s for industrialization in LDC’s paid little attention to 
the fact that the technologies needed to carry out these policies 
have to be imported. This is a rather important oversight for 
the following two reasons. First, because the international 
income distribution effects that result from transferring 
technologies are likely, at least in the short-run, to reduce the 
surpluses available for re-investment and so curtail the ability 
of the industrial sector to be self-generating. Empirical 
evidence on Algeria’s experience in the 1970’s revealed that 
technology payments were extremely high both in absolute and 
relative terms, and has considerable adverse effects on the 
country’s balance of payments. Second, if technologies are 
transferred in such a way that learning does not take place, the 
economy will forego some of the important ’external economies’ 
which are used to justify the policy of industrialization in the 
first place.
It was also argued that the straight forward application of 
concepts of comparative advantage to the transfer of technology 
and to the dependence on foreign sources of technologies in LDCs
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is simplistic and inadequate for at least two reasons. The first 
is that it does not take into account doing-based learning in the 
technological field. This means that if market forces sure left 
alone to determine the extent to which foreign skills, as opposed 
to local ones, are used in the investment process, there will be 
less accumulation of experience than is socially desirable. This 
arguement holds even if the technology in question is widely 
available - so there is an inherent tendency to a sub-optimality 
which has nothing to do with the ' monopolization * of technology. 
This particularly occurs in packaged technology transfers where 
all, or most of the elements of technical knowledge and equipment 
needed to carry out an investment project are provided by the 
supplier of technology. Failure to use local suppliers of goods 
and services in such packaged deals precludes the possibility of 
local accumulation of human capital through both explicit 
training of local personnel and experience based learning. The 
economy as a whole therefore is deprived of experience and skills 
that are directly relevant to the industry's subsequent 
development. Second, on top of this inherent characteristic of 
the market for skills there is the question of a technology 
'monopoly' which tends strongly to reinforce the way the market 
works - thus making it even more difficult for locals to get 
involved in the leaming-by-doing process.
Both of these reasons, in addition to the direct costs of 
technology imports, are arguements for direct state intervention 
in the technology field. Indeed many LDCs have increasingly
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resorted to interventionist efforts to restructure the demand 
for, and supply of technology in their respective economies. 
However, the empirical evidence available so far suggests that 
most of these policies have been misconceived, have lacked 
consistency and political commitment and have been poorly 
implemented. For example, many LDCs have chosen to protect 
locally manufactured consumer goods rather than protect capital 
goods and encourage the technological learning process. They 
have also tended to concentrate their efforts on establishing 
publicly supported R  & D institutions, rather than encouraging 
technological efforts at the firm or enterprise level. 
Underlying the creation of many of these R & D institutions was 
the naive belief that technological change is a linear process 
which starts with R & D and proceeds by stages automatically to 
commercial application. However, subsequent evidence has shown 
that this initial faith in the efficacy of these institutions was 
misplaced, and they almost invariably had virtually no links 
with, or impact upon the production system.
The second chapter dealt with the implicit technology policies 
inherent in the basic-industry strategy followed by Algeria in 
the 1970’s and examined in great detail the effects of its 
inherent contradictions as well as shortcomings in its 
application in Algeria, on economic growth and local 
technological development. It was argued that the implementation 
of the basic-industry strategy requires heavy investment in basic 
and capital goods industries using advanced technologies that are
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unlikely to be mastered by the developing country in its initial 
stage of development. Thus it seems inevitable that such
industries will have to be started and maintained for some time, 
under foreign patents and at least partially foreign skills. 
This is only part of the learning process, a necessary but not 
sufficient step towards mastery of the technology. It was also 
argued that proponents of this strategy tend to overlook the 
strategy’s inherent contradictions between medium-term heavy 
reliance on foreign technology and skills and the long term 
objective of technological autonomy, and technological progress 
in the supplying countries - progress which may render imported 
technologies obsolete, even before they are fully mastered by the 
locals. Another likely danger is that local managers may become 
complacent within their protected structures and therefore lose, 
or never develop the ability to respond to changes in conditions 
outside their protected structures.
Algeria’s experience reveals that these contradictions inherent 
in the strategy coupled with the numerous and considerable 
systemic shortcomings and policy miscalculations, have tended to 
curtail the ability of state enterprises to make effective use of 
imported technologies, and to inhibit local technological 
development. Examples of the former are central control over 
investments and imports, a significant role in planning 
production and distribution and administrative regulation of 
factor and product prices. Examples of the latter are, first and 
foremost, the planners’ approval of numerous mammoth investment
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programmes whose simultaneous implementation was much beyond the 
ability of the economy to efficiently carry them out. In turn 
this led to a heavy reliance on foreign skills, long delays in 
project execution, cost overruns and capacity underutilization. 
Second, investment was highly concentrated in a limited number of 
industrialized branches at the expense of the socio-economic 
infrastructure and agriculture. This led to serious bottlenecks 
and deterioration of the neglected sectors, as well as to 
shortages.
Even after the early 1980’s reorganization, the centre has 
retained a dominant direct role in planning investment and 
imports, a significant role in planning production and 
distribution and full control over factor and product prices. 
The system as it operates at present cannot foster the interests 
of enterprises in the long-run profitability and stimulate 
innovative activities. Although the principle of self-financing 
and self-accounting was the cornerstone of this re-organization, 
state enterprises have been unable to gain control over their 
surplus funds and to give efficient workers significant bonuses 
as central organs continued to control investment and factor 
prices as well as imports. A transitional solution to this 
dilemma is to split investment projects into two categories: 
those written into the National Economic Plan, which the banks 
and the Treasury will be obliged to finance, and those where 
particular state enterprises will have to convince the banks that 
what they wish to do is economically viable. Once implemented,
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this division may eliminate many wasteful or oversize projects 
and stimulate innovative activities. This is not an easy task in 
a country which has inherited archaic practices of old French 
state banking style which often prefers to observe the minutiae 
of complicated rules rather than to take bold initiative. 
Consequently, for such a policy to succeed such practices will 
have to be removed and the senior staff of all Algerian banks 
will need to be strengthened and many more managers trained in 
the skills of project assessment.
The third chapter dealt with the various technological capacities 
and the efforts required on the part of recipients to assimilate 
an imported technology. Certain misconceptions concerning the 
nature of industrial technology and how it is derived were 
dispelled so as to deal realistically with the problems related 
to local technological devlopment in and technology transfers to 
LDCs. The main arguement was that technology cannot be packaged 
like any other commodity for immediate use and shipped from one 
country to another. Technology is derived from a continuum of 
activities encompassing research, development and engineering 
which in turn is intimately linked to on-going production and 
marketing activities. Consequently successful acquisition and 
assimilation of an imported technology depends largely on the 
quantity and quality of technological effort made by its 
recipient. Generally firms in LDCs have been found to undertake 
substantial technological efforts in order to make effective use 
of imported technologies. Empirical evidence showed that some of
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the firms studied appeared to have followed explicit 
technological strategies aimed at specific objectives. Others 
seemed merely to have reacted defensively to changes in their 
circumstances, or to obvious needs to adapt imported 
technologies.
In the fourth and fifth chapters we set out to examine the 
significance of learning on technological development and 
production performance in the cement and flour milling industries 
in Algeria. The idea of learning-by-doing has been widely used 
in the literature to capture conceptually the knowledge and 
skills that are generated by performing tasks over a period of 
time. As treated in most economic analysis, leaming-by-doing 
arises passively, takes place automatically with the passage of 
time and acquired as a free by-product from carrying out usual 
tasks and results in regular improvements in performance. The 
implication of this model is that increased learning requires 
increased doing, and hence various forms of protection for doing 
are seen as appropriate means for enhancing learning - the 
benefits of which will offset the inevitable costs of protection.
The validity of this concept was examined by looking at the local 
content in and the lead-times of project execution as well as the 
production performance and technical change in the cement and 
flour milling industries, over the last fifteen years. The 
results of our empirical findings suggest, first, that learning 
does not take place automatically but depends on the quantity and
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quality of efforts allocated to generate, screen and exploit that 
experience (and skills). In other words, there is no inevitable 
causal link between increased doing on the one hand, and learning 
and production and technical improvement on the other. The 
policy implication of this finding is that protectionist measures 
may be necessary but not sufficient by themselves to enhance 
learning and stimulate local technological development. While 
protectionist measures may be necessary for some time, it is also 
necessary for national technology policies to go beyond negative 
restrictive measures to create necessary conditions to enhance 
learning and stimulate technical changes, otherwise such 
protective measures may be counter-productive as local managers 
may become complacent within their protected structures and lose, 
or never develop, the ability to augement local technological 
capacities. Second, learning from experience (and skills 
acquired) depends, at any level above that of the individual 
task, on the existence of a feedback system for generating, 
interpreting and diffusing that experience and skills. Without 
such a system, the ongoing performance of tasks will, for 
practical reasons, generate little or no useful experience. 
Third, firms * behaviour towards selection and assimilation of 
imported technologies, under very similar macro-economic 
conditions, differs substantially. Thus although both industries 
are state owned, and managed according to a common set of 
regulations, there 1ms been a considerable variation in the way 
selection and assimilation of imported technologies has taken 
place, and this in turn has considerable effects on the results
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achieved in terms of production performance and local 
technological development in each industry. However, macro- 
economic conditions have also a major impact upon the actual 
contribution of imported technologies to economic growth and 
local technological development. Fourth, packaging of technology 
imports, often results in precluding potential local suppliers of 
goods and services and consequently tends to inhibit the process 
of learning on the part of the locals. In addition, turnkey 
contracts often deliver a plant together with instructions for 
operating it under the conditions assumed in its design, but fail 
to provide the recipient with an understanding of the full 
details of how the plant operates or of how it operates as it 
does. This hampers the recipient's ability to improve plant 
operating productivity or to adapt to changes which may occur 
over time. These outcomes can be avoided by having the 
technology unbundled and the recipient’s personnel actively 
involved in every phase of project execution, so as to create the 
necessary conditions for participation of potential local 
suppliers and acquisition of 'know-how' and 'know-why* related to 
the imported technology. This in turn could stimulate the 
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(1) Could you please describe the plant with regard to:
(i ) product(s )
(ii) rating capacity (in volume)
(iii) characteristics of technology used: (please tick
appropriate box(es))
(a) automation:________  highly automated
_________ fairly automated
_________ mainly hand operated
(b) production process: (please describe briefly 
the process chosen)
(2) Can you please specify the form of the construction 
contract of the plant:
(a)   unpackaged (b)__________________ turnkey
(c) _____  turnkey-plus
(3) Please give reasons why this contractual form was chosen?
(4) What was the total cost of the plant? (In Algerian Dinars)


















Total cost of the plant
(6) Would you give an estimate of the time taken from the 
signing of the contract to the startup:_____ months.
(7) What were the contractual dates for (month/year):
(a) signature of the contract:...../19..
(b) construction start-up:  /19..
(c) project completion:  /19..
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(8 ) Were these contractual dates observed?
_________ yes
________  no, longer, by how much? ______  months
________  no, shorter, by how much? ______  months
If no, please give reasons.
(9) Is the Algerian team which was involved in commissioning 
the plant still together?
  yes
  no, if no, please explain what happened to the team?
(10) What was the role of this team in project execution?
(a)   mainly technical (b) ___ mainly administrative
(c)   both technical and administrative
(11) Does the plant have an engineering department?
______  yes
______  no, if no, is there an engineering department at:
a)   The enterprise level b)   the Ministry level
(12) What are the activities of the engineering department?
(a)___ ______  improvement in process control
(b)_________  improvement in process
(c)   improvement in product design
(d)___ ______  new product development
(e)   adaptation of the product/process to local
conditions
379
(f) ______  others (please specify)
(13) Does the engineering department employ foreigners?
______  yes _____  no
If yes, what is the proportion of foreigners to local 
technical personnel of the department?
(14) Did you provide training to your employees?
______  yes   no
If yes, please explain where and how?
(a)_________  in Algeria:________  on the job
_______  off the job
_______  in outside institutions
(b)_________  abroad: _______  on the job
_______  off the job
_______  in outside institutions
(15) Did this training concern:
(a )_______  process design engineering
(b )________ detailed process design engineering
(c )_______  product design engineering
(d )_______ construction and installation of similar plants
(e )_______ project management
(f )________ start up operations
(g )________ maintenance
(h )________ production management
(i )________ others (please specify)
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(16) What managerial and technical skills does your personnel 
possess at present?
(a) ^_______ to assemble similar plants
(b )________  to operate efficiently the plant
(c )________  to maintain efficiently the plant
(d )________  to train local employees
(e )________  to modify the imported technology
(f )________  to carry out equipment design
(g )________  to carry out process design
(h )________  to carry out product design
(i )_______  others (please specify)
II Capacity Utilization
(1 ) is the plant at present operating at its full capacity?
  yes _____  no
If no, please give reasons for this
(2) What was the time taken to achieve full capacity?
  months
(3) Was this time compatible with that specified by the 
contractor?
  yes
  no, longer, by how much?  months
  no, shorter, by how much? months
If no, please explain why?
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(4) Is the level of manning similar to that specified by the 
contractor?
______  yes
______  no, greater, by how many?
______  no, less, by how many?
If no, please give reasons for this?
(5) Is labour productivity (in volume) at present equal to that 
specified in the contract?
______  yes, _____  no, higher, _____  no, less.
If no, please explain why?
(6 ) Who carries out at present quality control at the plant?
(a )______  Algerians only, if Algerians only, how long did
it take for Algerians to replace foreigners?
(b )______  Algerians and expatriates
(c )______  Expatriates only
III Maintenance
(1) Who used to carry out maintenance during the first year of 
the plant operation?
(a) ______  Algerians only: ________those employed at the plant
______ others, please specify
(b) ______  expatriates only:  those employed at the plant
 other, specify
(c) ______  Algerians and expatriates, please explain
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(2) Who carries out maintenance at present?
a) ______ Algerians o n l y _________ those employed at
the plant 
_______  others, specify
b) ______ expatriates only ______  those employed at
the plant
  others, specify
c) ______ Algerians and expatriates; please explain
(3) How long did it take for Algerians to replace expatriates 
with respect to maintenance?
IV. Replacement of W o m o u t  Engineering Components and Parts
(1) Would you please give an estimate (in value) of the 
proportion of imported components and parts required to 
replace w o m o u t  ones last year? %
(2) Has there been an increase in the proportion of locally 
supplied components and parts since the plant was completed? 
_______  yes, by how much per year? ......%
_______ no.
(3) Would you please specify whether locally supplied components 
and parts is produced by:
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other national firms, if so who carries out 
design work? 
the plant itself 
others, specify
(4) What do you think of the quality of locally produced 
components and parts, compared with those previously 
imported?
(a)   similar (b)   higher (c)   lower
V Adaptation and Development of Imported Technology
(1) Do you know of any local modifications in the
process/product that has been introduced on the process you 
use or products you manufacture?
________  yes, if yes, please describe them
no
(2) Would you explain how these modifications were achieved
(a) in cooperation with:
  Algerian research institutions
  Algerian engineering firms
  Algerian producers of capital goods
  the users of the product(s)
  foreign firms, explain
(b) at the plant level without outside help
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(3) What were the major motivations behind these modifications?
(a) ___ to scale down production
(b) ___ to reduce production costs
(c) ___ to reduce the degree of automation
(d) ___ to adapt the product to market conditions
(e) ___ to adapt the process to local conditions
(f) ___ other, please specify
(4) How do you describe these technical modifications?
(a) ___  minor (b)   major (c)_____________ _ average
(5) What period of time elapsed between the import of technology 
and the introduction of these modifications?
(6 ) Please give same examples of these modifications
(7) Do you know if there has been any incorporation of imported 
techniques into the design of Algerian-built machinery? 
_________  yes_____________  no
If yes, please explain how this was achieved and give some 
examples?
(8) Do you know if there are Algerian firms that are capable of 
producing:
(a)   similar machinery or components of
machinery incorporated into your plant?
385
incorporated into your plant?
If yes, please give some examples
(9) Do you know if there are Algerian firms that are capable of 
carrying out:
(a)____ ______ all tasks involved in projected execution
in your branch? please give examples*
(b)   some tasks, please explain which? and
give some examples.
(10) Do you know of any Algerian R  & D institution that is
working in your field of activity?
  yes ________  no
If yes, please specify relationship between your plant and
the institution.
Appendix to the questionnaire: please give data for the following:
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1982 1983 1984























Rate of labour turnover 
among Algerians
Rate of capacity utilization
Number of days lost due to 
technical problems
Number of days lost due to 
shortage of inputs
Local content in consumption 
of components and parts
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